Greek Models Of Mind And Self

A. A. Long’s study of Greek notions of mind and human selfhood is anchored in questions of universal interest. What happens to us when we die? How is the mind or soul related to the body? Are we responsible for our own happiness? Can we achieve autonomy? Long shows that Greek thinkers’ modeling of the mind gave us metaphors that we still live by.

From the sixth century BCE onwards there occurred a revolution in thought, with novel ideas such as such as that understanding the inner self is both vital for human well-being and central to understanding the universe. This intellectual transformation is sometimes called the beginning of philosophy. And it occurred - independently it seems - in both India and Greece, but not in the vast Persian Empire that divided them. How was this possible? This is a puzzle that has never been solved. This volume brings together Hellenists and Indologists representing a variety of perspectives on the similarities and differences between the two cultures, and on how to explain them. It offers a collaborative contribution to the burgeoning interest in the Axial Age and will be of interest to anyone intrigued by the big questions inspired by the ancient world.

The only available volume of essays from scholars of every interpretative viewpoint on self-knowledge and self-ignorance in Plato's thought.

This book argues that, rather than being conceived merely as a hindrance, the body contributes constructively in the fashioning of a Platonic unified self. The Phaedo shows awareness that the indeterminacy inherent in the body infects the validity of any scientific argument but also provides the subject of inquiry with the ability to actualize, to the extent possible, the ideal self. The Republic locates bodily desires and needs in the tripartite soul. Achievement of maximal unity is dependent upon successful training of the rational part of the soul, but the earlier curriculum of Books 2 and 3, which aims at instilling a pre-reflectively virtuous disposition in the lower parts of the soul, is a prerequisite for the advanced studies of Republic 7. In the Timaeus, the world soul is fashioned out of Being, Sameness, and Difference: an examination of the Sophist and the Parmenides reveals that Difference is to be identified with the Timaeus’ Receptacle, the third ontological principle which emerges as the quasi-material component that provides each individual soul with the alloplastic capacity for psychological growth and alteration.

Selfhood and the Soul is a collection of new and original essays in honour of Christopher Gill, Emeritus Professor of Ancient Thought at the University of Exeter. All of the essays in the volume contribute to a shared project - the exploration of ancient concepts of self and soul, understood in a broad sense - and, as in the work of the honorand himself, they are distinguished by a diversity of approach and subject matter, ranging widely across disciplinary boundaries to cover ancient philosophy, psychology, medical writing, and literary criticism. They can be read separately or together, taking the reader on a journey through topics and themes as varied as money, love, hope, pleasure, rage, free will, metempsychosis, Roman imperialism, cookery, and the Underworld, yet all committed to examining central issues about the experience of being a person and the question of how best to live. The international line-up of contributors includes many established figures in the disciplines of classical literature, ancient philosophy, and ancient medicine, as well as several younger scholars. All have been inspired by Christopher Gill's contributions to scholarly research in these fields and their collective work aspires to honour through imitation his remarkable combination of range with focus.

The book explores the encounter of the self with situations of crisis from diverse disciplinary and cultural perspectives from antiquity to contemporary times. A crisis is at once a historically situated phenomenon and a recurring idea of endangerment or a breakdown in creaturely living. By making our choices stark and difficult, crisis opens up the possibility for genuinely fresh and unexpected beginnings. At the most fundamental level, crisis is the disintegration of relationality among creatures. In fact, crisis is a battle of attrition with and within selfhood. It has the potential to turn into a norm in everyday interaction. It then stops being an exception and becomes the very condition of our living. Through the rubrics of the assured and the restive, the volume addresses how selfhood encounters and negotiates concentric circles of crisis in life and literature. Does the idea of crisis allow us to formulate the idea of self in a particular way? How do certain sources and resources within the self – stoic or heroic, political and creative – come into being during crisis? While some essays delve into questions of repose and sensuality by highlighting specific cases and trajectories from the subcontinent, others deal with questions of mythology, politics and art in a wider sense. One essay directly addresses the core literary question of the uncanny and its relation to selfhood. While specific concerns illuminate each essay, the volume speaks with a collective, global sense of crisis that faces humanity now and tentatively offers some prospects to deal with it.

Philosophies in several ancient traditions aimed to alleviate people's anxieties and improve their lives. In contrast to the contemporay world, in which philosophy is mostly an academic subject and personal concerns are commonly addressed by psychological therapies, philosophy in these traditions often played a central role in programs that aspired to enable people to achieve a good life. In this volume, Christopher W. Gowans argues that the idea of self-cultivation philosophy provides a valuable approach for comprehending and reflecting on several philosophies in ancient India, Greece and China. Self-cultivation philosophies put forward a program of development for ameliorating the lives of human beings. On the basis of an account of human nature and the place of human beings in the world, they claim that our lives can be substantially transformed from what is thought to be a problematic condition into what purports to be an ideal state of being. Self-cultivation philosophies are preeminently practical in their aspirations: their purpose is to change human life in fundamental ways. Yet, in pursuing these practical ends, these philosophies typically make significant theoretical as well as empirical claims about human nature and the world. The book shows how the concept of self-cultivation philosophy provides an interpretive framework for understanding, comparing, assessing and learning from several philosophical outlooks in India, the Greco-Roman world, and China. The self-cultivation philosophies in India are those expressed in: the Bhagavad Gita; the Samkhya and Yoga philosophies of Isvarakrsna and Patanjali; and the teaching of the Buddha and his followers Buddhaghosa and Santideva. The philosophies originating in Greece, with subsequent development in the Roman world, are the most prominent Hellenistic approaches: the Epicureanism of Epicurus, Lucretius, and Philodemus; the Stoicism of Chrysippus, Epictetus, and Seneca; and Pyrrho and the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus. The self-cultivation philosophies from China are the early Confucian outlooks of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi; the classical Daoist perspectives of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi; and the Chan tradition of Bodhidharma, Huineng and Linji. Though these philosophies developed in very different traditions, Gowans shows the connections between them in this compelling work of comparative philosophy.

Plato's Four Muses reconstructs Plato's authorial self-portrait through a fresh reading of the Phhaedrus, with an Introduction and Conclusion that contextualize the construction more broadly. The reference to four Muses in the myth of the cicadas is read as a hint of the "ingredients" of philosophical discourse, which Plato sets against the Greek tradition of poetic initiations and conceptualizes as a form of provocatively old-fasioned 'mousikē'.The book unravels three surprising features that define Plato's works. First, there is a measure of anti-intellectualism: Plato counters the rationalistic excesses of other forms of discourse, thus distinguishing his own words from both prose and poetry; second, Plato envisages a new beginning for philosophy: he conceptualizes the birth of Socratic dialogue in, and against, the Pythagorean tradition, with an emphasis on the new role of writing and on the cult of Socrates in the Academy; finally, a self-consciously ambivalent attitude emerges with respect to the social function of the dialogues. Plato's works are conceived both as a kind of “resistance literature” and as a preliminary move towards the new poetry of the Kallipolis.