Greek Turkish Relations And U S Foreign Policy

From the John Holmes Library collection.

Bahcheli analyzes the dispute over Cyprus from its emergence in the 1950s to the coup against President Makarios which brought Greece and Turkey to war in 1974. He considers the Cyprus issue within the narrow context of Greek-Turkish relations, and the broad context of international relations

"Major topics covered in this volume include: 1) U.S. efforts to maintain the cohesion of the NATO alliance by avoiding outbreaks of violence on Cyprus that would provoke clashes between Greece and Turkey; 2) attempts of U.S. policymakers to devise a compromise solution for Cyprus that would meet the requirements of its major regional partners; 3) a growing U.S. involvement in Greece's internal politics as a result of a major constitutional crisis between political forces led by George and Andreas Papandreou on one side and a conservative coalition under the leadership of King Constantine II on the other; and 4) the U.S reaction to the Greek military coup of April 1967 and imposition of a dictatorship in Greece. Coverage of bilateral U.S.-Turkish relations focuses on the Cyprus issue"--Overview.

This publication shows that the Eastern Mediterranean, having been transformed from a region of secondary importance during the Cold War to one of greater importance for the western interests in the post-Cold War era, is in a state of flux. Despite sporadic periods of rapprochement, tensions between Greece and Turkey still exist. Therefore, one must question the grounds behind the lack of normal relations that exist between these two NATO members and its effects on the NATO organisation as a whole. Hence, this volume has two purposes first, to examine Greek and Turkish foreign, security and defence policies during and after the post-Cold War period and second, to investigate why these policies have been formulated.

This book examines the role of the United States in Greek–Turkish relations and fills an important gap in alliance theory regarding the guardian’s dilemma. The strategy of a great power involves not only tackling threats from enemies, but also dealing with problems that arise between allies. Every time Greece and Turkey threatened to go to war against each other, the United States had to effectively restrain its two strategic allies without straining relations with either one of them. This book explores how the United States responded to the guardian’s dilemma in six crises during the Cold War, pursuing a policy of dual restraint to prevent an intra-alliance conflict, mitigate the consequences of each crisis, and maintain effective control of the Rimland Bridge. From a neoclassical-realist standpoint, the book examines how the United States responded to each Greek–Turkish crisis, for what reasons, and with what results. It will be of interest to scholars of foreign policy, security studies, geopolitics, and international relations.