Guilty But Insane

Guilty But Insane offers a timely and challenging discussion of the relationship between popular literature, science, and what it means to be human by examining how writers of detective fiction during the 1920s to 1940s understood guilt, responsibility, and the workings of the mind in relation to crime.

Captain J.C. Bowen-Colthurst, originally from Cork, served with the British Army in the Boer War, in Tibet and in the Great War. Having been wounded, he returned to Ireland and was caught up in the 1916 rebellion where he was responsible for the deaths of six unarmed civilians, including the pacifist Francis Sheehy Skeffington. The resulting outrage was one of the key factors in turning the tide of Irish public opinion towards independence. Having been tried for murder, he was deemed 'guilty but insane' and spent eighteen months in Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum before being released under medical supervision for another year. He was then allowed to travel to Canada on condition that he not return to Ireland. This has been portrayed as a perversion of justice perpetrated by the British authorities, but Taylor's unprecedented access to both army and Bowen-Colthurst's personal papers have revealed that he was probably suffering from what we now know as PTSD. This book corrects many published errors, debunks some myths and reveals the personal side to a much-maligned historical character. The author has also worked with the family of both Bowen-Colthurst and Sheehy Skeffington, who have praised his unbiased research.

The plea of insanity in criminal cases can be traced back at least to the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, which dates from 1755-1759 BC. It is a complicated defence, and its origins in modern law lie with what are called the 'M'Naghten Rules' of 1843, formulated by British judges as a jury instruction in cases where a plea of insanity had been entered. Daniel M'Naghten shot and killed one Edward Drummond, believing him to be the British Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, and was acquitted on the grounds of insanity, and the M'Naghten Rules still exert considerable influence over defences today. Clearly a plea of insanity in murder cases is of critical importance when the death penalty is still applied, and even today it may still be the difference between a life sentence in a high-security prison, or an indeterminate one in a secure psychiatric hospital. Meanwhile, 27 of the USA's 50 states have retained or readopted the death penalty, and at least 54 other countries, including China, Russia, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia, also retain it. Naturally, a criminal who was liable to swing for murder could, and sometimes did, make every attempt to appear insane, and this book examines some of these cases, as well as trials in which the accused was indeed judged to be insane. The failure rate is high; of seven American serial killers who deployed the defence in their trials, only two were successful, ending their days in secure psychiatric facilities; two were executed, and the other three either died or were killed while serving full-life sentences, or are still in gaol.

Thinking About the Insanity Defense answers ninety-seven frequently asked questions and presents sixteen case examples in easily understood language. This volume provides a clear and compelling introduction to one of the most important topics in the relation between psychology and law. Compiled by members of a Harvard seminar, it directs attention to the issues most often raised by the general public and by students of social science and criminal justice. The frequently asked questions about the insanity defense address: its history and psychological aspects; the effects of different standards for determining insanity; the arguments for its retention, abolition, and revision; media and other responses to it; controversies around pre- and post-conviction commitment; and the roles of psychologists, psychiatrists, and lawyers. The case examples illustrate a variety of outcomes and include individuals who were: found not guilty by reason of insanity; found guilty even though mentally ill; and not charged because of mental illness. The extensive bibliography directs students and citizens interested in psychology, law, and criminal justice to further cases and analyses. The insanity defense is one of the most significant topics in psychoforensics. This brief and readable book is the first place to look for what most people want to know about the insanity defense.

A psychiatrist and an internationally recognized expert on violence, Dorothy Otnow Lewis has spent the last quarter century studying the minds of killers. Among the notorious murderers she has examined are Ted Bundy, Arthur Shawcross, and Mark David Chapman, the man who shot John Lennon. Now she shares her groundbreaking discoveries--and the chilling encounters that led to them. From a juvenile court in Connecticut to the psychiatric wards of New York City's Bellevue Hospital, from maximum security prisons to the corridors of death row, Lewis and her colleague, the eminent neurologist Jonathan Pincus, search to understand the origins of violence. GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY is an utterly absorbing odyssey that will forever change the way you think about crime, punishment, and the law itself.

The insanity defense debate has come full circle, again. The current round began when John Hinckley opened fire; in 1843, it was Daniel M'Naghten who pulled the trigger; the "acts" of both would-be "insanity acquittees" provoked the press, the populace, a President, and a Queen to expressions of outrage, and triggered Congress, the House of Lords, judges, jurists, psychologists, and psychiatrists to debate this most maddening matter. "Insanity" -which has historically been surrounded by defenses, defen ders, and detractors-found itself once again under siege, on trial, and undergoing rigorous cross-examination. Treatises were written on the sub ject, testimony was taken, and new rules and laws were adopted. The dust has settled, but it has not cleared. What is clear to me is that we have got it wrong, once again. The "full circle" analogy and historical parallel to M'Naghten (1843) warrant some elaboration. Hinckley's firing at the President, captured by television and rerun again and again, rekindled an old debate regarding the allegedly insane and punishment (Caplan, 1984; Maeder, 1985; Szasz, 1987), a debate in which the "insanity defense" is centrally situated. The smolderings ignited anew when the Hinckley (1981) jury brought in its verdict-"not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI).