Hedge Fund Activism

Hedge Fund Activism begins with a brief outline of the research literature and describes datasets on hedge fund activism.

In recent years, hedge funds' successful interventions in some large public companies have revealed their critical role in the corporate governance landscape in the United States and Europe. Due to public opinion, this new form of shareholder activism is accompanied by much polemic. This study examines the nature of hedge fund activism, the types of them, and the market’s perception of interventions in the United States. Starting with a distinction between shareholder activism by traditional institutions, and activism performed by hedge funds, the study elucidates why the latter may be more effective in monitoring management, and reduce agency costs. Analysing the Schedules 13D filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the study provides a classification of activists’ demands into ten distinct categories, arguing that hostile forms of activism are not central for hedge funds, and some more aggressive types of activism are possibly used as a negotiating tool to achieve the activist’s agenda. Using the event study methodology, the author estimates the stock returns around the announcement date. For a better understanding of hedge fund activism, and their demands on target companies, the reader will find two original Schedule 13D filings accompanied by letters to the management. Finally, the paper concludes on a view of the subject through the prism of the 2007/ 2008 financial crisis, outlining some trends in the aftermath of the financial market turmoil.

Activist hedge fund managers represent a small part of the $1.5 trillion hedge fund industry, but their approach is causing a stir among traditional managers and the investment community because they are shaking up the corporate establishment and making money for their investors. These types of managers are here to stay and Extreme Value Hedging tells the story of their rise to power in the U.S. and how they are spreading their influential gospel around the globe to places like China, Ukraine, South Korea and Sweden. Author Ronald D. Orol has a unique understanding of this world and through this book he shares his unparalleled insights in an easy to comprehend manner. He discusses everything from activist investor efforts to breakup the clubby insider world of corporate boardrooms to their deal-making or breaking pressure tactics and courtroom battles. Orol skillfully makes his case for each subject by offering revelations and examples from insiders like Ralph Whitworth, (Relational Investors), Guy Wyser-Pratte, (Wyser-Pratte Management), Mark Schwarz, (Newcastle Capital Group LLC), Robert Chapman (Chapman Capital), Phillip Goldstein (Opportunity Partners), Jeffrey Ubben (ValueAct Capital), Jeffrey M. Solomon (Ramius Capital Group LLC), Michael Van Biema (Van Biema Value Partners), Eric Rosenfeld (Crescendo Partners), Lars Förberg (Cevian Capital) and Emanuel Pearlman (Liberation Investment Group), among many, many others.

The past two decades has witnessed unprecedented changes in the corporate governance landscape in Europe, the US and Asia. Across many countries, activist investors have pursued engagements with management of target companies. More recently, the role of the hostile activist shareholder has been taken up by a set of hedge funds. Hedge fund activism is characterized by mergers and corporate restructuring, replacement of management and board members, proxy voting, and lobbying of management. These investors target and research companies, take large positions in `their stock, criticize their business plans and governance practices, and confront their managers, demanding action enhancing shareholder value. This book analyses the impact of activists on the companies that they invest, the effects on shareholders and on activists funds themselves. Chapters examine such topic as investors' strategic approaches, the financial returns they produce, and the regulatory frameworks within which they operate. The chapters also provide historical context, both of activist investment and institutional shareholder passivity. The volume facilitates a comparison between the US and the EU, juxtaposing not only regulatory patterns but investment styles.

This handbook provides a comprehensive look at the hedge fund industry from a global perspective.

Charts the rise and fall of confrontational hedge fund activism in Japan.

The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance has three basic aims: to understand and explain the factors that have caused an explosion in hedge fund activism; to examine the impact of this activism; and to survey and evaluate possible legal interventions with an emphasis on the least restrictive alternative.

The Foundations and Anatomy of Shareholder Activism examines the landscape of contemporary shareholder activism in the UK. The book focuses on minority shareholder activism in publicly listed companies. It argues that contemporary shareholder activism in the UK is dominated by two groups; one, the institutional shareholders whose shareholder activism is largely seen as a driving force for good corporate governance, and two, the hedge funds whose shareholder activism is based on value extraction and exit. The book provides a detailed examination of both types of shareholder activism, and discusses critically the nature of, motivations for and consequences following both types of shareholder activism. The book then locates both types of shareholder activism in the theory of the company and the fabric of company law, and argues that institutional shareholder activism based on exercising a voice at general meetings is well supported in theory and law. The call for institutions to engage in more informal forms of activism in the name of 'stewardship' may bring about challenges to the current patterns of activism that institutions engage in. The book argues, however, that a more cautious view of hedge fund activism and the pattern of value extraction and exit should be taken. More empirical evidence is likely to be necessary, however, to weigh up the long terms benefits and costs of hedge fund activism.