Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological

In this first book-length study of the topic, Robert C. Scharff offers a detailed analysis of the young Heidegger’s interpretation of Dilthey’s hermeneutics of historical life and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. He argues that it is Heidegger’s prior reading of Dilthey that grounds his critical appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology. He shows that in Heidegger’s early lecture courses, a “possible” phenomenology is presented as a genuine alternative with the modern philosophies of consciousness to which Husserl’s “actual” phenomenology is still too closely tied. All of these philosophies tend to overestimate the degree to which we can achieve intellectual independence from our surroundings and inheritance. In response, Heidegger explains why becoming phenomenological is always a possibility; but being a phenomenologist is not. Scharff concludes that this discussion of the young Heidegger, Husserl, and Dilthey leads to the question of our own current need for a phenomenological philosophy—that is, for a philosophy that avoids technique-happiness, that at least sometimes thinks with a self-awareness that takes no theoretical distance from life, and that speaks in a language that is “not yet” selectively representational.

In the decades since Martin Heidegger's death, many of his early writings--notes and talks, essays and reviews--have made it into print, but in such scattershot fashion and erratic translation as to mitigate their usefulness for understanding the development, direction, and ultimate shape of his work. This timely collection, edited by two preeminent Heidegger scholars, brings together in English translation the most philosophical of Heidegger's earliest occasional writings from 1910 to the end of 1927. These important philosophical documents fill out the context in which the early Heidegger wrote his major works and provide the background against which they appeared. Accompanied by incisive commentary, these pieces from Heidegger's student days, his early Freiburg period, and the time of his Marburg lecture courses will contribute substantially to rethinking the making and meaning of Being and Time. The contents are of a depth and quality that make this volume the collection for those interested in Heidegger's work prior to his masterwork. The book will also serve those concerned with Heidegger's relation to such figures as Aristotle, Dilthey, Husserl, Jaspers, and Löwith, as well as scholars whose interests are more topically centered on questions of history, logic, religion, and truth. Important in their own right, these pieces will also prove particularly useful to students of Heidegger's thought and of twentieth-century philosophy in general.

In this early lecture series, the author of Being and Time develops his unique approach to understanding humanity’s relationship to the world. This volume presents a collection of Martin Heidegger’s lectures delivered at the University of Freiburg in the winter of 1921–1922. Preceding Being and Time, the work shows the young Heidegger introducing novel vocabulary as he searches for his genuine philosophical voice. In this course, Heidegger first takes up the role of the definition of philosophy and then elaborates a unique analysis of “factical life,” or human life as it is lived concretely in relation to the world, a relation he calls “caring.” Heidegger’s descriptions of the movement of life are original and striking. As he works out a phenomenology of factical life, Heidegger lays the groundwork for a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle, whose influence on Heidegger’s philosophy was pivotal.

A new 2024 translation of Martin Heidegger's major work "Being and Time" (Sein und Zeit), originally published in 1927 in multiple publications. This edition contains a new afterword by the Translator, a timeline of Heidegger's life and works, a philosophic index of core Heideggerian concepts and a guide for terminology across 19th and 20th century Existentialists. This translation is designed for readability and accessibility to Heidegger's enigmatic and dense philosophy. Complex and specific philosophic terms are translated as literally as possible and academic footnotes have been removed to ensure easy reading. Being and Time presents a complex philosophical discourse on the nature of being (Sein) and time (Zeit), focusing in particular on the temporal-existentialist concept of Dasein, a term that combines the German words for "to be" (sein) and "there" (da). This classic philosophic work examines the traditional metaphysical understanding of being, arguing that this understanding, typically based on the idea of a constant presence, fails to account for the temporal and existential dimensions of being. Heidegger proposes that an understanding of being requires an analysis of Dasein, which is characterized not only by its existence, but also by its being in the world and its temporal existence. The concept of Dasein is central to the his argument, emphasizing that Dasein is always already situated in a world, and its understanding of being is shaped by its temporal existence. This perspective challenges traditional metaphysical notions of being as static and unchanging, proposing instead that being is fundamentally temporal and connected to human existence and understanding. As the title suggests, Heidegger sees the question of Being as indistinguishable from Time, arguing that Newtonian conceptions of time as a series of now-points are inadequate for understanding the being of Dasein. His Ontochronology argues that the existential and ontological analysis of Dasein reveals a more fundamental concept of time, one that is integral to the structure of Being itself. The text further elaborates on the idea of "thrownness" and several other existentialist themes. Thrownness is one of the three conditions that signifies Dasein's immersion in the world, where it finds itself already entangled in a web of relations and meanings. This "thrownness", combined with Dasein's inherent being-toward-death, underscores the existential condition of human beings, framing their existence as a continual engagement with their own finitude and the possibilities of their being. Heidegger posits that understanding the nature of being requires a fundamental rethinking of both being and time, dogmatically stating that the true nature of being can only be grasped through an understanding of the temporality that characterizes the existence of being.

In this collection of early lectures, the author of Being and Time defines and begins to develop his unique approach to phenomenology. This volume contains the first lectures Martin Heidegger delivered at Marburg in the winter semester of 1923–1924. In them, he introduces the notion of phenomenology by tracing it back to Aristotle’s treatments of phainomenon and logos. This extensive commentary on Aristotle is an important addition to Heidegger’s ongoing interpretations which accompany his thinking during the period leading up to Being and Time. Additionally, these lectures develop critical differences between Heidegger’s phenomenology and that of Descartes and Husserl and elaborate questions of facticity, everydayness, and flight from existence that are central in his later work. Here, Heidegger dismantles the history of ontology and charts a new course for phenomenology by defining and distinguishing his own methods.

Of a Seminar on the Lecture "Time and Being". p. 25.

It can be easily argued that the radical nature and challenge of Heidegger’s thinking is grounded in his early embrace of the phenomenological method as providing an access to concrete lived experience (or “factical life,” as he called it) beyond the imposition of theoretical constructs such as “subject” and “object,” “mind” and “body.” Yet shortly after the publication of his groundbreaking work Being and Time, Heidegger appeared to abandon phenomenology as the method of philosophy. Why? Heidegger was conspicuously quiet on this issue. Here, William McNeill examines the question of the fate of phenomenology in Heidegger’s thinking and its transformation into a “thinking of Being” that regards its task as that of “letting be.” The relation between phenomenology and “letting be,” McNeill argues, is by no means a straightforward one. It poses the question of whether, and to what extent, Heidegger’s thought of his middle and late periods still needs phenomenology in order to accomplish its task—and if so, what kind of phenomenology. What becomes of phenomenology in the course of Heidegger’s thinking?

A new, definitive translation of Heidegger's most important work.