Heidegger S Philosophy And Theories Of The Self

This title was first published in 2001. Explaining and defending a Heideggarian account of the self and our knowledge of the world, this book addresses the fundamental issues of selfhood and the elemental question of what it means to be human. The author vcritically examines theories of the self derived from two distinct schools of thought: Descartes, Hume, Kant, Sartre and Stirner representing a tradition which has dominated Western philosophy since Descartes; Heidegger and Laing representing a radical departure from the tradition. The author focuses on two key philosophical problems throughout: the problem of knowledge and the problem of identity. The author argues that ultimately Heidegger does no more than echo Stirner's empty egoism and provides a bleak, inescapable heroism for the individual.

A new 2024 translation of Martin Heidegger's major work "Being and Time" (Sein und Zeit), originally published in 1927 in multiple publications. This edition contains a new afterword by the Translator, a timeline of Heidegger's life and works, a philosophic index of core Heideggerian concepts and a guide for terminology across 19th and 20th century Existentialists. This translation is designed for readability and accessibility to Heidegger's enigmatic and dense philosophy. Complex and specific philosophic terms are translated as literally as possible and academic footnotes have been removed to ensure easy reading. Being and Time presents a complex philosophical discourse on the nature of being (Sein) and time (Zeit), focusing in particular on the temporal-existentialist concept of Dasein, a term that combines the German words for "to be" (sein) and "there" (da). This classic philosophic work examines the traditional metaphysical understanding of being, arguing that this understanding, typically based on the idea of a constant presence, fails to account for the temporal and existential dimensions of being. Heidegger proposes that an understanding of being requires an analysis of Dasein, which is characterized not only by its existence, but also by its being in the world and its temporal existence. The concept of Dasein is central to the his argument, emphasizing that Dasein is always already situated in a world, and its understanding of being is shaped by its temporal existence. This perspective challenges traditional metaphysical notions of being as static and unchanging, proposing instead that being is fundamentally temporal and connected to human existence and understanding. As the title suggests, Heidegger sees the question of Being as indistinguishable from Time, arguing that Newtonian conceptions of time as a series of now-points are inadequate for understanding the being of Dasein. His Ontochronology argues that the existential and ontological analysis of Dasein reveals a more fundamental concept of time, one that is integral to the structure of Being itself. The text further elaborates on the idea of "thrownness" and several other existentialist themes. Thrownness is one of the three conditions that signifies Dasein's immersion in the world, where it finds itself already entangled in a web of relations and meanings. This "thrownness", combined with Dasein's inherent being-toward-death, underscores the existential condition of human beings, framing their existence as a continual engagement with their own finitude and the possibilities of their being. Heidegger posits that understanding the nature of being requires a fundamental rethinking of both being and time, dogmatically stating that the true nature of being can only be grasped through an understanding of the temporality that characterizes the existence of being.

This edited volume offers a new approach to understanding social conventions by way of Martin Heidegger. It connects the philosopher's conceptions of the anyone, everydayness, and authenticity with an analysis and critique of social normativity. Heidegger’s account of the anyone is ambiguous. Some see it as a good description of human sociality, others think of it as an important critique of modern mass society. This volume seeks to understand this ambiguity as reflecting the tension between the constitutive function of conventions for human action and the critical aspects of conformism. It argues that Heidegger’s anyone should neither be reduced to its pejorative nor its constitutive dimension. Rather, the concept could show how power and norms function. This volume would be of interest to scholars and students of philosophy and the social sciences who wish to investigate the social applications of the works of Martin Heidegger.

This thought-provoking study explores the philosophical resources provided by Hegel and Heidegger to grasp the nature of the “I” and combines those resources in a theoretical analysis of “I-hood” in its connection with nature and history, experience and myth. The “I” has a fleeting, almost elusive character in the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger. Yet, both philosophers strive to make sense of what it means to be an “I”. Their respective theories, though seemingly divergent, offer remarkable insights into the nature of the “I” and its relationship to the world. Through meticulous examination, this book explores the parallel journeys of Hegel and Heidegger, tracing their respective paths towards a comprehensive conception of identity beyond the subject/object dichotomy. Moreover, this study goes beyond being an exploration of Hegel’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of the self by actively employing their insights to chart a path towards a novel understanding of “I-hood”. Hegel, Heidegger, and the Quest for the “I” will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hegel, Heidegger, history of European philosophy, and contemporary theories of subjectivity and personal identity. Offering a fresh perspective on the work of these two seminal thinkers, the book contributes to the ongoing dialogue on the nature of the self and its place in the world.

This book provides a systematic reading of Martin Heidegger’s project of “fundamental ontology,” which he initially presented in Being and Time (1927) and developed further in his work on Kant. It shows our understanding of being to be that of a small set of a priori, temporally inflected, “categorial” forms that articulate what, how, and whether things can be. As selves bound to and bounded by the world within which we seek to answer the question of how to live, we imaginatively generate these forms in order to open ourselves up to those intra-worldly entities which determinately instantiate them. This makes us, as selves, the source and unifying ground of being. But this ground is hidden from us – until we do fundamental ontology. In showing how Heidegger develops these ideas, the author challenges key elements of the anti-Cartesian framework that most readers bring to his texts, arguing that his Kantian account of being has its roots in the anti-empiricism and Augustinianism of Descartes, and that his project relies implicitly on an essentially Cartesian “meditational” method of reflective self-engagement that allows being to be brought to light. He also argues against the widespread tendency to see Heidegger as presenting the basic forms of being as in any way normative, from which he concludes, partially against Heidegger himself, that fundamental ontology is, while profound and worth pursuing for its own sake, inert with respect to the question of how to live. The Bounds of Self will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on Heidegger, Kant, phenomenology, and existential philosophy.

"This thought-provoking study explores the philosophical resources provided by Hegel and Heidegger to grasp the nature of the "I" and combines those resources in a theoretical analysis of "I-hood" in its connection with nature and history, experience and myth. The "I" has a fleeting, almost elusive character in the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger. Yet, both philosophers strive to make sense of what it means to be an "I". Their respective theories, though seemingly divergent, offer remarkable insights into the nature of the "I" and its relationship to the world. Through meticulous examination, this book explores the parallel journeys of Hegel and Heidegger, tracing their respective paths towards a comprehensive conception of identity beyond the subject/object dichotomy. Moreover, this study goes beyond being an exploration of Hegel's and Heidegger's conceptions of the self, by actively employing their insights to chart a path toward a novel understanding of "I-hood". Hegel, Heidegger and the Quest for the "I" will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hegel, Heidegger, history of European philosophy, and contemporary theories of subjectivity and personal identity. Offering a fresh perspective on the work of these two seminal thinkers, the book contributes to the ongoing dialogue on the nature of the self and its place in the world"--

This study, first published in 1984, presents an explanation and critical examination of the theories of Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl and Hegel on the fundamental relationships between persons. It also synthesizes the results into a new conception of one’s relation to other people. Sartre’s famous discussion of ‘the Look’ in his early treatise, Being and Nothingness, is the point of departure and central text. Since Sartre critically responds to his three famous predecessors, these thinkers are given an independent hearing. The book demonstrates various ways in which persons are internally related to one another, shows that one’s access to other people typically does not compare unfavourably with one’s access to oneself, and establishes the importance of a prior comprehension of the status of other people for an adequate treatment of knowing them.

Heidegger is one of the most controversial thinkers of the 20th century. This book assesses his life and the background, ideas and text of his first major book, Being and time.