House Of Commons Committee Of Public Accounts Civil Service Reform Hc 473

The 2012 Civil Service Reform Plan (the Plan), published in June 2012, outlines plans to transform the civil service so that it is sharper and quicker, more delivery-focused, and has sufficient commercial, digital, project and change management skills. The Cabinet Office is responsible for overseeing implementation of the Plan. The Committee hope that the reforms and enhanced capabilities will help prevent the failures in project and programme delivery it has seen so often, but is concerned, however, that government has not set itself objective measures for assessing the impact of its reforms. If the public is to have confidence in the system for holding permanent secretaries accountable, the Government must be clear about the detail of what each permanent secretary is expected to achieve and how their performance will be assessed. Commercial and contracting skills in the civil service remain weak and underdeveloped, despite the many attempts to address this skills deficiency in recent years. Efforts to fill skills gaps are hindered by real or perceived barriers to recruiting people with the necessary expertise and paying them enough. The process for overseeing major projects lacks real teeth and is seemingly unable to stop ill-conceived or poorly-managed projects. Yet the Government will only be successful in cutting public spending with minimum impact on frontline services if it finds new and innovative ways to deliver its programmes. This innovation can only be implemented if the Civil Service has the necessary skills and competencies.

The New Homes Bonus was introduced as a financial incentive for local authorities to encourage the building of new homes. The scheme is funded from existing local authority grants. £7.5 billion will have been redistributed between councils by 2018-19, so there is a lot of money at stake. It is clearly vital that the incentives work and the Government achieves its aim. It is therefore disappointing that after more than two years of the scheme being up and running, no evaluation is in place and no credible data is available to show whether the scheme is working or not. So far the areas which have gained most money tend to be the areas where housing need is lowest. The areas that have lost most tend to be those where needs are greatest. The Department has yet to demonstrate whether the New Homes Bonus works. Is it helping to create more new homes than would have been built anyway? Is it the best way for Government to use its limited resources to create more homes where they are needed most? Its planned evaluation of the Bonus scheme is now urgent

The Government has failed to deliver meaningful competition in the procurement of its £1.2 billion rural broadband programme, leaving BT effectively in a monopoly position. Despite warnings the Department for Culture, Media and Sport has allowed poor cost transparency and the lack of detailed broadband rollout plans to create conditions whereby alternative suppliers may be crowded out. Whilst BT claims it is making further concessions, this is not impacting on rural communities. Local authorities are still contractually prevented from sharing information to see if they are securing best terms for the public money they spend. Communities can still not access the detailed data they need to understand whether they will be covered by BT's scheme in their area. The lack of transparency on costs and BT's insistence on non-disclosure agreements is symptomatic of BT's exploiting its monopoly position. The Department needs to work urgently with all local authorities to publish detailed mapping of their implementation plans, down to full (7-digit) postcode level. The information should include speed of service, as soon as that is available. The Department should collect, analyse and publish data on deployment costs in the current programme, to inform its consideration of bids from suppliers under the next round of fundingMargaret Hodge was speaking as the Committee published its 50th Report of this Session which, on the basis of evidence from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and BT, examined the roll out of the rural broadband programme

There is at present around £46 billion of outstanding student loans on the Government's books, and this figure is set to rise dramatically to £200 billion by 2042 (in 2013 prices). By 2042 there will be an estimated 6.5 million borrowers of student loans. At the same time estimates for the amount of loans that will not be repaid are also rising and the Government assumes that 35-40% of outstanding loans will never be repaid. That is some £16 billion to £18 billion on the current debt of £46 billion and £70 billion to £80 billion on the estimated value of student loans by 2042. The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (the Department) is not doing enough to secure value for money from its collection arrangements. The Department is unable to accurately forecast student loan repayments, and does not have a sufficient understanding of the likely future cost of non-repayment to the taxpayer. The Student Loans Company is not doing enough to ensure that it identifies and collects all the repayments due, given the substantial size of the financial assets involved, and will need to demonstrate value for money from the proposed sale of the student loans book.

Universal Credit is the DWP's single biggest programme and enjoys cross-party support, yet its implementation has been extraordinarily poor. The failure to develop a comprehensive plan has led to extensive delay and the waste of a yet to be determined amount of public money. £425 million has been spent so far on the programme. It is likely that much of this, including at least £140 million worth of IT assets, will now have to be written off. Lack of day-to-day control meant early warning signs were missed, with senior managers becoming aware of problems only through ad hoc reviews. Pressure to deliver a programme of this magnitude within such an ambitious timescale created a fortress culture where only good news was reported and problems were denied. There has been a shocking absence of control over suppliers, with the Department failing to implement the most basic procedures for monitoring and authorising expenditure. The pilot programme is not a proper pilot. Its scope is limited and does not deal with the key issues that Universal Credit must address: the volume of claims; their complexity; change in claimants' circumstances; and the need for claimants to meet conditions for continuing entitlement to benefit. The programme will not hit its current target of enrolling 184,000 claimants by April 2014. The Department will have to speed up the later stages of the programme if it is to meet the 2017 completion date but that will pose new risks. Meeting any specific timetable from now on is less important than delivering the programme successfully

Police forces pay widely varying prices for very similar items, which means money is being wasted. The price paid for such basic items as standard-issue boots can vary from £25 to £114, or £14 to £43 for handcuffs. This is even the case where items are identical. It cannot be right that prices paid for the same type of high-visibility jacket varied by as much as 33%. With central funding being cut, police forces must ensure they get best value for money from procurement so that they can focus resources on fighting crime. Forces can make big savings through bulk-buying of items, but have been unable to agree on the most simple things, like how many pockets they should have on their uniforms. The Department cannot persuade enough individual forces to cooperate with its attempts to introduce more centralised procurement, in part because forces are sceptical about the commercial competence of procurement officers working at the centre. National contracts with suppliers are not used by enough forces and do not cover many basic goods and services. Forces' use of the new, online police procurement 'hub' is also woefully below the Home Office's expectations. By 2013, a miniscule 2% of items were being bought through this central hub, against a target of 80% by the end of this Parliament. Police and Crime Commissioners have authority over local spending but, as the Department remains accountable for public money voted by Parliament, it cannot step back from value for money issues

Telephone services are a vital part of government support, accounting for 43% of all customer contacts. But departments are continuing to make extensive use of higher rate phone numbers for customer telephone lines despite the fact that many people are put off calling as a result. The most vulnerable callers, on the lowest incomes, face some of the highest charges. Costs to callers are even higher because the caller has to endure long waiting times and poor customer service. In the face of this evidence we welcome the Cabinet Office's acknowledgement that it was "inappropriate" for vulnerable citizens to pay a substantial charge to access public services and its commitment to establish best practice in this field and ensure it is followed across government

The first proposals to modernize the Thameslink route and increase capacity were developed by a succession of rail industry sponsors but nothing much happened until the Department for Transport became sponsor in 2005. The Department has delivered the first phase of the infrastructure project under budget and on time. The other two aspects of the programme are going less well. The procurement of new trains through a £1.6 billion PFI deal has taken over three years longer than expected. And the timetable and approach for letting the new franchise have been revised. The planned completion date has been put back to 2018. But meeting the timetable for delivering the new trains will be very demanding and risky. The Committee is also sceptical about using PFI to fund this project. It is alarming that the Department compared the PFI option against only one other private sector option and did not construct a public sector comparator to understand better the relative costs, risks and rewards of choosing a PFI funding route over a public one. Another source of worry is the small size of the Department's core Thameslink team - just five people for a programme of this size and complexity. The impression that there is a scarcity of these skills is reinforced by the apparent need to move the key civil servant leading the Thameslink team, the man whose experience, skills and continuity have been crucial to the delivery of the programme, over to the High Speed 2 team