How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated Some Cross Country Empirical Evidence

Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing. Using a sample of 44 countries 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits. The results suggest that no single institutional arrangement is superior under all circumstances. The appropriateness of specific arrangements depends upon other institutional characteristics, particularly the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, the existence of any bailout precedent, and the quality of fiscal reporting.

Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing. Using a sample of 44 countries 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits. The results suggest that no single institutional arrangement is superior under all circumstances. The appropriateness of specific arrangements depends upon other institutional characteristics, particularly the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, the existence of any bailout precedent, and the quality of fiscal reporting.

This is the final issue for 2006 (Volume 53), and contains another paper in the occasional Special Data Section that seeks to measure financial development in the Middle East and North Africa by utilizing a new database. The issue also contains a comment from Jacques J. Polak on parity reversion in real exchange rates.

This paper presents various models of control with advantages and disadvantages, the balance of which would make it more or less suitable to a particular country's circumstances. As these circumstances evolve—as fiscal and macro imbalances improve or worsen—the preferable model may change over time. Although appealing in principle, sole reliance on market discipline for government borrowing is unlikely to be appropriate in many circumstances. This is so, because one or more of the conditions for its effective working frequently are not realized in each particular country. The increasing worldwide trend toward devolution of spending and revenue-raising responsibilities to subnational governments seems likely to come into growing conflict with systems of administrative controls by the central government on subnational borrowing. Rules-based approaches to debt control would appear preferable, in terms of transparency and certainty, to administrative controls and also to statutory limits defined in the context of the annual budget process, the outcome of which may be unduly influenced by short-term political bargaining.

This paper studies how fiscal rules interact with the intergovernmental fiscal framework to foster fiscal discipline among European subnational governments. We use political variables describing the fiscal attitudes of the central government as instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of subnational fiscal rules on fiscal balances. The results suggest that the discipline-enhancing effect of fiscal rules is weaker when there are large “vertical fiscal imbalances” that is, large differences in revenue and spending assignments across the different levels of government. These findings imply that separate reforms to reduce excessive vertical fiscal imbalances complement a rules-based fiscal framework that is aimed at fostering fiscal discipline.

Research work by the IMF’s staff on the effectiveness of the country programs the organization supports, which has long been carried out, has intensified in recent years. IMF analysts have sought to “open up the black box” by more closely examining program design and implementation, as well as how these influence programs’ effectiveness. Their efforts have also focused on identifying the lending, signaling, and monitoring features of the IMF that may affect member countries’ economic performance. This book reports on a large portion of both the new and the continuing research. It concludes that IMF programs work best where domestic politics and institutions permit the timely implementation of the necessary measures and when a country is vulnerable to, but not yet in, a crisis. It points to the need for a wider recognition of the substantial diversity among IMF member countries and for programs to be tailored accordingly while broadly maintaining the IMF’s general principle of uniformity of treatment.

Subnational governments can create sizable fiscal risks for central governments. In addition to impacting service delivery at the grassroots level, unsustainable subnational finances can be a continuous drain on central resources. The need for stronger public financial management systems and capacities to analyze and manage risks at the subnational government level cannot be overemphasized. Central governments need to develop sound institutional mechanisms to systematically monitor the health of subnational finances to be able to proactively manage associated risks. This How to Note provides a framework for central governments that seek to assess and manage fiscal risks stemming from weak subnational finances. It analyzes the sources of subnational finance vulnerabilities and argues that central governments would benefit from putting in place the following: (1) a stronger regulatory framework, (2) improved fiscal reporting, and (3) enhanced central oversight. The lessons distilled from the international experience are particularly useful for developing economies where the management of risks can be improved.