How Should The Army Use Contractors On The Battlefield

Can the Army improve the way it measures the risks of using civilian contractors in combat? This report proposes a method for comparing the "residual risks" of using military and contract sources to perform specific support activities on the battlefield. It applies the Army's standard approach to risk assessment, which identifies sources of risk, or "threat"; the risks the threats present; the opportunities to mitigate these risks; and the risks that remains - the residual risk - when the Army chooses a particular course of action to mitigate risks. The approach considers choices of military and contract sources, with appropriate mitigation strategies, as alternative courses of action and compares the residual risks associated with each choice. The approach offers an orderly way to translate relative inherent capabilities of military and contract sources, terms of applicable statue-of-forces agreements, and threats at any particular place and time on the battlefield into a comparison of the residual risks associated with military outcomes, the safety of contract personnel, resource costs, and other policy factors of greatest importance outside a particular contingency setting.

Using contractors on the battlefield is risky, but the U.S. Army has relied on contractors on the battlefield throughout its history. Beginning with the Vietnam War, a variety of factors have led to growing dependence on contractors. Given the risks that contractors impose, is this increasing dependence appropriate? Throughout history, Army leaders have decried the risks associated with using contractors even as they continued to bring them to the battlefield to provide critical combat service support (CSS) activities. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA [M AND RA]) was concerned that many parts of the Army may make decisions that affect the use of contractors on the battlefield without adequately considering the effects of their decisions on military readiness. ASA (M AND RA) asked the Arroyo Center to examine this issue and recommend improvements. This report identifies the major decisions that shape the Army's use of contractors on the battlefield. It explains the arguments that have shaped these decisions. Drawing on the Army's own approach to assessing risk, Army and other Department of Defense (DoD) documents, field interviews, literature by Army personnel about their own experiences with contractors in deployments, and a detailed case study of the largest contract supporting Army deployed forces at the time, the report offers a conceptual framework the Army could use to revisit these decisions. The framework should make the connection between these decisions and their sourcing consequences more visible and lead to Army sourcing decisions more nearly consistent with its strategic goals. The report focuses on a choice between contract and military sources, but the framework could easily be applied to a broad set of alternatives.

The U.S. military is no longer based on a Cold War self-sufficient model. Today's armed forces are a third smaller than they were during the Cold War, and yet are expected to do as much if not more than they did during those years. As a result, a transformation is occurring in the way the U.S. government expects the military to conduct operations—with much of that transformation contingent on the use of contractors to deliver support to the armed forces during military campaigns and afterwards. Contractors and War explains the reasons behind this transformation and evaluates how the private sector will shape and be shaped by future operations. The authors are drawn from a range of policy, legislative, military, legal, and academic backgrounds. They lay out the philosophical arguments supporting the use of contractors in combat and stabilization operations and present a spectrum of arguments that support and criticize emergent private sector roles. The book provides fresh policy guidance to those who will research, direct, and carry out future deployments.

Department of Defense (DoD) initiatives to use contractors on deployed military operations remains a contentious issue in U.S. military transformation. Despite the intense debates surrounding the benefits and costs of DoD outsourcing, little attention has focussed on a similar Ministry of Defence (MoD) initiatives underway in the United Kingdom. Since the UK and United States are likely to remain close allies in future expeditionary deployments, the MoD's approach to contractor support is a salient case study for the DoD and U.S. armed services. The author examines the controversies surrounding deployed contractor support, the ways that the MoD has harnessed private sector capacity, and the lessons this provides for U.S. policymakers and military planners. In doing so, he provides important insights into a significant theme in contemporary defense and security policy. --

"The United States has long utilized private military contractors to augment regular military forces in support of its national foreign policy and security needs. Commonly referred to as Private Military Companies (PMCs), contractors employ and manage civilian personnel from the private sector in areas of active military operations. Frequently, regular troops become dependent on the services contractors provide a situation that may negatively impact military effectiveness. Since 1991, contractor support on and off the battlefield has become increasingly more visible, varied, and commonplace. Given the current manpower and resource limitations of the national military, the US will likely continue its extensive use of PMCs in support of military operations. This work addresses historical precedents and trends in American logistics, the current scope of contractor involvement in support of regular military forces, and the challenges posed as traditional military institutions integrate increasing numbers of civilian workers and privately owned assets into the battlespace. These problems increase the risk to US personnel and can induce budget overruns rather than savings, disrupt civil-military relations, and have detrimental consequences for the American economy and society. The work concludes by proposing a useful rubric to evaluate this new American way of war. This work considers PMCs and their interdependence with regular and reserve military units in a broad sense. It derives from unclassified material widely available; understandably, these sources limit the analysis. Lessons learned from the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) theaters may alter findings. However, this study endeavors to frame the continuing dialog concerning the appropriate use of PMCs to support regular troops."--Abstract from DTIC web site.

Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq examines the controversial role of military contractors in the reconstruction of Iraq. When 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' was launched in March 2003, few, if any, of the Coalition's political leaders could have envisaged that within a few months the number of private contractors engaged to keep the troops supplied would exceed their actual combat strength. This alternative 'army' was not only to become the largest assemblage of contractors in living memory to accompany a military force into a war zone, but was also responsible for a fundamental transformation of how military logistics were delivered. This book explains how and why the US and UK governments became so dependent upon military contractors during the war in Iraq. It also examines the ramifications this new dependency will have on future military operations, as the conflict in Iraq has shown that private contractors are now indispensable to the attainment of both the military and political objectives of war. Finally, the book discusses what advantages and disadvantages these companies have brought to the reconstruction of Iraq, and what lessons need to be learned from this experience. This book will be of great interest to students of military and strategic studies, Middle Eastern politics and international security, and as well as policymakers and military professionals. Christopher Kinsey is a lecturer in international security at King's College London, Defence Studies Department, at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham. His previous publications include Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies (Routledge: 2006)

The U. S. Military is becoming increasingly dependent upon civilian commercial contractors to provide logistical support on the battlefield. Despite the current military philosophy on outsourcing, the increasing dependence of our war fighters on this support, the emphasis on partnership with the commercial industry, the Army and Joint Vision statements which stress "Focused Logistics" and "On Time Delivery," and the demands for multinational and host nation logistics support, these concepts and the use of civilians on the Battlefield remain highly volatile issues.. Little definitive policy guidance and training are provided. Commanders' and war fighter's attitudes and training remain entrenched in the" Iron Mountain" paradigm. Contractor loyalty to the "almighty dollar" as opposed to support for/of the front-line soldier remains serious questions which will be difficult to test in a non-warfare environment. Budgetary constraints as well as technological advances will continue to drive policy in this direction and put pressure on the Logistics community to provide the necessary support. However, can we depend on paid contractors to meet the demands and face the stresses that our current military and non-contractor logicians face? Failure in this area is not an option. Our American fighting forces require, deserve, and must have the best support to defeat any prospective enemy on any battlefield. This book will endeavor to address these issues and proposed solutions for ensuring the support necessary to help our soldiers maintain, survive, and win on the modem battlefield.