How To Be Un Successful

Nowadays it seems like everyone wants to be successful, but how many of us actually feel it? We may know that true success is found in following the one who made us. And yet, in our increasingly polarised and comparison-rife world, many of us find our hearts yearning for an ever-elusive 'success': in money and power, in influence and accolades. It is time for us to remember that success is attainable - not in what we have but how we live. This book invites you to recognise the beauty and complexity of the world we live in and how we, individually and collectively, may have conformed our faith in Jesus to simple consumer culture and cultural preferences. It is an opportunity to redefine success, choosing love over efficiency, depth over volume and real friendship over cold transactions. Jesus' life and teaching are the perfect antidote for a world growing sick with the wrong sort of success. And, he invites us again to experience a success that truly satisfies our souls.

An in-depth 2007 analysis of the sources of success and failure in UN peacekeeping missions in civil wars.

This book examines forty-six UN peacekeeping operations, initiated from 1956 through 2006 to manage cases of intrastate and interstate conflicts, to identify the most significant factors that could help to explain the success or lack of success of such operations. Factor analysis is used to exploit the correlations between independent variables in order to regroup them into a smaller set of factors explaining the success or failure of these operations. The results show that the success of a UN peacekeeping operation can be explained by factors that are related to four categories of variables: i) the scope of resources invested in peacekeeping; ii) the duration and intensity of conflict and time of preparation for peacekeeping intervention; iii) the political support for peacekeeping from the UN Security Council; and iv) the type of conflict.

If you want your startup to succeed, you need to understand why startups fail. “Whether you’re a first-time founder or looking to bring innovation into a corporate environment, Why Startups Fail is essential reading.”—Eric Ries, founder and CEO, LTSE, and New York Times bestselling author of The Lean Startup and The Startup Way Why do startups fail? That question caught Harvard Business School professor Tom Eisenmann by surprise when he realized he couldn’t answer it. So he launched a multiyear research project to find out. In Why Startups Fail, Eisenmann reveals his findings: six distinct patterns that account for the vast majority of startup failures. • Bad Bedfellows. Startup success is thought to rest largely on the founder’s talents and instincts. But the wrong team, investors, or partners can sink a venture just as quickly. • False Starts. In following the oft-cited advice to “fail fast” and to “launch before you’re ready,” founders risk wasting time and capital on the wrong solutions. • False Promises. Success with early adopters can be misleading and give founders unwarranted confidence to expand. • Speed Traps. Despite the pressure to “get big fast,” hypergrowth can spell disaster for even the most promising ventures. • Help Wanted. Rapidly scaling startups need lots of capital and talent, but they can make mistakes that leave them suddenly in short supply of both. • Cascading Miracles. Silicon Valley exhorts entrepreneurs to dream big. But the bigger the vision, the more things that can go wrong. Drawing on fascinating stories of ventures that failed to fulfill their early promise—from a home-furnishings retailer to a concierge dog-walking service, from a dating app to the inventor of a sophisticated social robot, from a fashion brand to a startup deploying a vast network of charging stations for electric vehicles—Eisenmann offers frameworks for detecting when a venture is vulnerable to these patterns, along with a wealth of strategies and tactics for avoiding them. A must-read for founders at any stage of their entrepreneurial journey, Why Startups Fail is not merely a guide to preventing failure but also a roadmap charting the path to startup success.

One of the most vexing issues that has faced the international community since the end of the Cold War has been the use of force by the United Nations peacekeeping forces. UN intervention in civil wars, as in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, has thrown into stark relief the difficulty of peacekeepers operating in situations where consent to their presence and activities is fragile or incomplete and where there is little peace to keep. Complex questions arise in these circumstances. When and how should peacekeepers use force to protect themselves, to protect their mission, or, most troublingly, to ensure compliance by recalcitrant parties with peace accords? Is a peace enforcement role for peacekeepers possible or is this simply war by another name? Is there a grey zone between peacekeeping and peace enforcement? Trevor Findlay reveals the history of the use of force by UN peacekeepers from Sinai in the 1950s to Haiti in the 1990s. He untangles the arguments about the use of force in peace operations and sets these within the broader context of military doctrine and practice. Drawing on these insights the author examines proposals for future conduct of UN operations, including the formulation of UN peacekeeping doctrine and the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force.

Making War and Building Peace examines how well United Nations peacekeeping missions work after civil war. Statistically analyzing all civil wars since 1945, the book compares peace processes that had UN involvement to those that didn't. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that each mission must be designed to fit the conflict, with the right authority and adequate resources. UN missions can be effective by supporting new actors committed to the peace, building governing institutions, and monitoring and policing implementation of peace settlements. But the UN is not good at intervening in ongoing wars. If the conflict is controlled by spoilers or if the parties are not ready to make peace, the UN cannot play an effective enforcement role. It can, however, offer its technical expertise in multidimensional peacekeeping operations that follow enforcement missions undertaken by states or regional organizations such as NATO. Finding that UN missions are most effective in the first few years after the end of war, and that economic development is the best way to decrease the risk of new fighting in the long run, the authors also argue that the UN's role in launching development projects after civil war should be expanded.

Two successful and two unsuccessful senior Allied Army combat leaders are studied to discern whether there are important differences in the qualities and abilities, they demonstrated in combat. The methodology used was to examine materials on the leaders for examples demonstrating courage, determination, coup d’œil, presence of mind, strength of will, and sense of locality—qualities and abilities which Carl von Clausewitz thought important. Any other qualities or abilities which appeared important in the cases studied were also noted. The study, however, represents an initial exploratory look. It is qualitative and judgmental, not quantitative and empirical. It was found that the successful leaders demonstrated a balance of qualities and abilities while the unsuccessful ones either lacked a balance or demonstrated some fatal flaw. Further study by other researchers is recommended.