Hume On Causation

Causation is one of the most important and enduring topics in philosophy, going as far back as Aristotle. In this lucid and enthralling account, Helen Beebee covers all the major debates and issues in the philosophy of causation, making it the ideal starting point for those approaching the subject for the first time. Beginning with an introduction to the concept, the book examines the most significant philosopher of causation – David Hume – and assesses the problems of induction and necessary connection in light of his thought. Helen Beebee then investigates different theories of causation and challenges to the Humean approach. She considers the concepts of regularity, causal experience, necessity and essences. Throughout the book, she also critically discusses other key philosophers on causation, including J.L. Mackie, John Wright and Brian Ellis.

The authors demonstrate that Hume's views can stand up to contemporary criticism and are relevant to current debates on causality.

Examines the development of Hume's ideas and their relation to eighteenth-century theories of the imagination and passions.

In the first ever book-length treatment of David Hume's philosophy of action, Constantine Sandis brings together seemingly disparate aspects of Hume's work to present an understanding of human action that is much richer than previously assumed. Sandis showcases Hume's interconnected views on action and its causes by situating them within a wider vision of our human understanding of personal identity, causation, freedom, historical explanation, and morality. In so doing, he also relates key aspects of the emerging picture to contemporary concerns within the philosophy of action and moral psychology, including debates between Humeans and anti-Humeans about both 'motivating' and 'normative' reasons. Character and Causation takes the form of a series of essays which collectively argue that Hume's overall project proceeds by way of a soft conceptual revisionism that emerges from his Copy Principle. This involves re-calibrating our philosophical ideas of all that agency involves to fit a scheme that more readily matches the range of impressions that human beings actually have. On such a reading, once we rid ourselves of a certain kind of metaphysical ambition we are left with a perfectly adequate account of how it is that people can act in character, freely, and for good reasons. The resulting picture is one that both unifies Hume's practical and theoretical philosophy and radically transforms contemporary philosophy of action for the better.

In this revised edition of The Secret Connexion, Galen Strawson explores one of the most discussed subjects in philosophy: David Hume's work on causation. He argues that Hume believes in causal influence, but insists that we cannot know its nature. The regularity theory of causation is indefensible, and Hume never adopted it in any case.

This Companion evaluates Hume's philosophical arguments in A Treatise of Human Nature and considers their historical context, particularly within British empiricism.

Causation has always been a central topic in the history of philosophy. Many theories causation have been advanced, but not one has approached anything like general acceptance. Yet the concept of causation is prevalent in many areas of contemporary philosophy: there are the causal theories of language, of action, of personal identity, of knowledge, of perception, of scientific explanation, and of reference. If causation is doing all this philosophical work, it seems essential to strive for an intelligible account of what a 'cause' actually is. One obvious place to start is Hume's analysis of causation, which is generally thought to be the most significant and influential single contribution to the topic. But despite the widely recognized importance of his analysis, many opposing interpretations surround his causal theory. There are some commentators who believe that his theory is a version of realism and many others who argue that it is a version of anti-realism. There is considerable textual evidence for, and also against, each interpretation. Angela Coventry develops a more conciliatory approach. She argues that Hume's causal theory is best understood as 'quasi-realist' - an intermediate position between realism and anti-realism. This makes sense of some seemingly contradictory passages in Hume's work and also provides an answer to a major objection which is commonly thought to devastate his causal theory. Coventry then goes on to outline a general, topic-independent, conception of quasi-realism as distinct from realistm and anti-realism that allows it to stand as a consistent third alternative.

The "regularity" theory of causation is often regarded as one of Hume's greatest contributions to philosophy. Arguing that the theory is indefensible, Strawson maintains that such a claim about nature would have been utterly contrary to Hume's fundamental philosophical principles, and that he never adopted it in any case.