Imf History 1972 1978 Volume 3

IMF economists work closely with member countries on a variety of issues. Their unique perspective on country experiences and best practices on global macroeconomic issues are often shared in the form of books on diverse topics such as cross-country comparisons, capacity building, macroeconomic policy, financial integration, and globalization.

IMF History (1972-1978) Volume 2

IMF History (1972-1978), Volume 1

This book presents the lifelong and ongoing research of Lawrence H. Officer in a systematic way. The result is an authoritative treatment of such issues as market structure and economic efficiency where more than one characteristic of a commodity is priced, both in general and in application to shipping conferences; financing of the United Nations and International Monetary Fund; monetary history of the UK and US; and central-bank preferences between gold and dollars, The book first examines multidimensional pricing, defined as pricing when a commodity or service has several characteristics that are priced. The second part is concerned with country-group conflicts in the United Nations and International Monetary Fund. The book then takes a fresh look at historical experiences of monetary-standard upheavals and the final part considers a crucial time (1958-67), during which central-bank gold-dollar decisions were power-politically determined.

This paper comprises documents relating to the history of the IMF, including some that preceded the drafting of the Articles of Agreement. The paper highlights that the first draft of Lord Keynes’ plan for a Clearing Union was circulated within the British Treasury on September 8, 1941. A fourth draft was given to Ministers on February 11, 1942. The first definitive version of Mr. White’s plan for a stabilization fund was a mimeographed draft dated April 1942. This covered both the IMF and the World Bank.

A decade of crises has reminded us of the fragility of the international financial system. Conventional wisdom holds that uncertainty is the basic problem of financial governance, and attempts to contain ambiguity have dominated recent financial reform efforts. Jacqueline Best, however, contends that ambiguity can play a valuable role in international political and economic stability. The stability of the postwar era depended, Best suggests, on a carefully maintained balance between coherence and ambiguity. In her view, the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange-rate regime was caused in large part by the increasing rigidity of the system and its corresponding inability to accommodate ambiguity.This is a novel argument in an area much discussed by economists and political scientists. Their debate has focused on uncertainty as a technical problem and transparency as the solution. Although such policies are presented as technical, Best demonstrates that they are also political, have cultural consequences, and may prove counterproductive. Rather than assume that transparency is the ultimate goal, Best argues, we must recognize that ambiguity is pervasive, substantive, and potentially constructive. To read this book is to comprehend more deeply the ways in which politics is fundamental to economic theory and practice and to understand why the economy requires political leadership in order to flourish.

This book discusses theories of monetary and financial innovation and applies them to key monetary and financial innovations in history – starting with the use of silver bars in Mesopotamia and ending with the emergence of the Eurodollar market in London. The key monetary innovations are coinage (Asia minor, China, India), the payment of interest on loans, the bill of exchange and deposit banking (Venice, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London). The main financial innovation is the emergence of bond markets (also starting in Venice). Episodes of innovation are contrasted with relatively stagnant environments (the Persian Empire, the Roman Empire, the Spanish Empire). The comparisons suggest that small, open and competing jurisdictions have been more innovative than large empires – as has been suggested by David Hume in 1742.