Implementation Plan In Response To The Executive Board Endorsed Recommendations For The Ieo Evaluation Report The Imf And The Crises In Greece Ireland And Portugal

This paper sets out Management’s response to the Independent Evaluation Office’s (IEO) report The IMF and the Crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal as part of the Management and staff follow-up to an IEO evaluation. The implementation plan proposes specific actions to address the recommendations endorsed by the Executive Board in its July 19, 2016 discussion. The implementation plan notes the Board’s endorsement of the principles that the IMF’s technical analysis should remain independent, that existing policies should be followed and should not be changed without careful deliberation, and that the Executive Board and Management should reaffirm their commitment to accountability and transparency, as well as the role of independent evaluation in fostering good governance. As to the IEO’s specific recommendations supported by the Board, the implementation plan proposes actions to address the need for the Fund to clarify how guidelines on program design apply to currency union members, the need for the Fund to establish a policy on cooperation with regional financing arrangements, and the need to further strengthen Fund cooperation with the IEO, including on modalities of interactions between the IEO and Fund staff and the IEO’s access to information. The implementation of some of the proposed actions is already underway and some actions have been included in the Fall 2016 Work Program. The paper also explains how implementation will be monitored by the Executive Board.

During the past financial year, the IMF’s 189 member countries faced a number of pressing challenges. IMF work on these challenges - slower trade, declining productivity, gender inequality, inclusive growth, and debt management - is a central focus of this 2017 Annual Report.

"The Ninth Periodic Monitoring Report (PMR) on the Status of Management Implementation Plans (MIPs) in Response to Board-Endorsed Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Recommendations assesses the progress made over the last year on actions contained in two “new” MIPs arising from recent IEO evaluations, and another seven for which individual management actions were classified as “open” in the Eighth PMR. Overall, 42 of the 96 actions included in the Ninth PMR remain open, representing roughly the same proportion as the previous PMR. A 25 percent net increase in open management actions over the past year is accounted for by 24 new actions from two MIPs, and 16 actions that have been implemented over the period. There is positive traction on the last four MIPs, but older actions appear challenging to implement. Better progress has been made with the implementation of the actions contained in recent MIPs. Fourteen of the actions implemented since the Eighth PMR relate to MIPs approved after October 2015, while only two actions (out of 24) from earlier MIPs were implemented. Improvements in the follow-up process approved by the Board in October 2015 have contributed to speedier implementation of recent actions, but some challenges remain. There are lingering challenges with defining measures of success for numerous actions, but accountabilities are now clearer and many actions are at advanced stages at the time of the Board’s discussion of the MIPs. This PMR introduces indicators to support the process for resolving challenges with long-standing actions. Despite the slower progress with the older actions, significant advances have been made over the past year in several key areas. These include: protocols for engaging the IEO; risk management and analysis; the mainstreaming of macrofinancial surveillance; an overarching strategy on data and statistics; guidance on cooperation with other organizations, including Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs); improvements in External Stability Assessments; and ongoing analytical work on surveillance and program, including macrostructural issues, emerging topics, and debt sustainability analysis. On the other hand, progress has been slower on macro forecasting, outward spillovers, and cross-country knowledge sharing."

The Tenth Periodic Monitoring Report (PMR) on the Status of Management Implementation Plans (MIPs) in Response to Board-Endorsed Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Recommendations assesses the progress made over the last year on actions contained in 10 MIPs with open management actions.

In 2008, the IEO undertook an evaluation on the IMF governance and concluded that effectiveness had been the strongest aspect of IMF governance, while accountability and voice had been the weakest. Since then, IMF governance has been strengthened aided by quota and voice reforms to address misalignments in shares and chairs as well as numerous improvements in governance procedures and practices. The update finds that IMF governance has proven its effectiveness in supporting the Fund to fulfill its mandates, but concerns remain on voice and accountability. Challenges remain related to representation and voice, interaction between governance bodies, the selection process for management, and the role of the G20 in IMF governance. Addressing these challenges will take time and may be subject to difficult tradeoffs between governance objectives such as preserving effectiveness while ensuring appropriate representation.

"Despite a long history of program engagement, the Fund has not developed guidance on program design in members of currency unions. The Fund has engaged with members of the four currency unions—the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, the European Monetary Union, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union—under Fund-supported programs. In some cases, union-wide institutions supported their members in undertaking adjustment under Fund-supported programs. As such, several programs incorporated—on an ad hoc basis—critical policy actions that union members had delegated. Providing general guidance on program design for members in a currency union context would fill a gap in Fund policy and help ensure consistent, transparent, and evenhanded treatment across Fund-supported programs. This paper considers two options on when and how the Fund should seek policy assurances from union-level institutions in programs of currency union members. Option 1 would involve amending the Conditionality Guidelines, which would allow the use of standard conditionality tools with respect to actions by union-level institutions. Option 2—which staff prefers—proposes formalizing current practices and providing general guidance regarding principles and modalities on policy assurances from union-level institutions in support of members’ adjustment programs. Neither option would infringe upon the independence (or legally-provided autonomy) of union-level institutions, since the institutions would decide what measures or policy actions to take—just as any independent central bank or monetary authority does, for example, in non-CU members."

The Eleventh Periodic Monitoring Report (PMR) on the Status of Management Implementation Plans (MIPs) in Response to Board-Endorsed Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Recommendations assessed the progress made over the past 18 months on 72 actions contained in 10 MIPs. Significant progress has been made with the implementation of management actions, despite challenges that have arisen from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Overall, 29 of the 72 actions for which implementation progress is assessed in the Eleventh PMR were deemed to have been satisfactorily implemented, while 35 remain open, and eight actions are being reformulated in line with the Board-approved triage framework for long-standing open actions. Despite the effect of reprioritization to make space for the urgent needs of the membership resulting from the pandemic, the pace of implementation observed in the Eleventh PMR, with the 29 actions closed, significantly exceeds the previous trend of about 15 implemented actions per year. Of the 35 open actions, 16 are more than one year past their implementation due dates. The reprioritization of activities owing to the COVID-19 pandemic and resource constraints on account of several years of flat budgets led to delays in the implementation of several actions, partly because of the postponement of important reviews.

The Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) has expanded considerably since 2008, including in the non-traditional elements of the safety net such as Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs). The resulting multi-layered structure of the GFSN makes collaboration between its various elements more important than in the past. Specifically, stronger collaboration between the Fund and RFAs would help increase the effective firepower of the GFSN and ensure a timely deployment of resources. The Fund’s experience in macroeconomic adjustment and its universal risk pooling would combine with the greater regional knowledge and country ownership brought the RFA. In this way, improved collaboration between the Fund and RFAs, including in co-financing, would significantly reduce the risk of contagion by encouraging countries to seek early assistance from the Fund. This paper is part of a broader set of proposals to fortify the GFSN (IMF, 2017b, c, d). It proposes both modalities for collaboration—across capacity development, surveillance, and lending—and some operational principles to help guide future co-lending between the Fund and the various RFAs. To date, the only operational guidance to facilitate collaboration has been limited to the high-level 2011 G20 Principles for Cooperation between the IMF and RFAs. Building on several case studies and the principles derived from them, this paper proposes an operational framework for future engagement. It aims to start a more structured dialogue between the Fund and individual RFAs on the modalities of how best to work together.