Governance Of The Imf

The author-a top decision maker at the IMF for two decades-first focuses on the system of quotas and voting power in the IMF and concludes that it calls for reforms to enhance equity among the membership. He then examines decision making in the Executive Board, with an emphasis on consensus building in a cooperative institution, and the record of political oversight of the international monetary system through the Interim Committee and its successor, the International Monetary and Financial Committee. In that context, the author also comments on the impact on IMF decision making of the activities of groups of members, and of the differing interests of major shareholders. Thereafter, he recalls the distinctive features of the financial crises of the 1990s and examines their evolving implications for IMF governance. The essay concludes with an appraisal of IMF governance.

The papers in this volume draw on background work done in preparation for the study Governance of the IMF: An Evaluation, Independent Evaluation Office, International Monetary Fund, May 28, 2008 (available at http://www.ieo-imf.org). This compilation presents in one collection the most recent work to date on the subject of governance of the IMF and contributes to the ongoing dialogue on how best to strengthen the governance of this important global institution. Good governance can contribute to the IMF’s legitimacy by ensuring appropriate voice and representation for the membership, by allowing the Fund to fulfill its mandates effectively and efficiently, and by facilitating accountability for relevant stakeholders. Three main conclusions follow from the studies in this volume. First, to strengthen its legitimacy and effectiveness, the Fund needs greater, higher level and more transparent involvement of member country authorities in its governance. Second, the Board needs to play a stronger role in strategy development and oversight, which requires a shift away from the day-to-day business of the organization. Finally, there are significant accountability gaps that need to be addressed if the IMF is to remain effective and regain legitimacy.

This paper assesses the degree to which the IMF governance is effective and efficient, and whether it provides sufficient accountability and channels for stakeholders to have their views heard. The focus is on institutional structures as well as on the formal and informal relationships between the IMF’s main bodies of governance: the Executive Board, Management, and the International Monetary and Financial Committee. The evaluation highlights that for much of the past six decades, gradual reforms in its governance allowed the IMF to remain relevant in a changing world economy.

Drawing on the Fund’s analytical and capacity development work, including Public Investment Management Assessments (PIMAs) carried out in more than 60 countries, the new book Well Spent: How Strong Infrastructure Governance Can End Waste in Public Investment will address how countries can attain quality infrastructure outcomes through better infrastructure governance—an issue becoming increasingly important in the context of the Great Lockdown and its economic consequences. It covers critical issues such as infrastructure investment and Sustainable Development Goals, controlling corruption, managing fiscal risks, integrating planning and budgeting, and identifying best practices in project appraisal and selection. It also covers emerging areas in infrastructure governance, such as maintaining and managing public infrastructure assets and building resilience against climate change.

Good governance is important for countries at all stages of development... Our approach is to concentrate on those aspects of good governance that are most closely related to our surveillance over macroeconomic policies- namely, the transparency of government accounts, the effectiveness of public resource management, and the stability and transparency of the economic and regulatory environment for privalte sector activity. Michael Camdessus, IMF Managing Director

This paper attempts to set out the principal issues that need to be resolved in formulating a proposal for quotas and voice reform in the IMF that could command broad support. Following John Rawls, we argue that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions," and we use his theory of justice to provide a method for understanding what should be the case, in the context of voice and voting shares, before international institutions, such as the IMF, are to be justifiable to their members. The implementation of this process suggests, among other things, that a major revision of the quota formulas is long overdue, and leaving this unaddressed raises serious questions regarding the IMF's governance which could develop into a core mission risk and jeopardize the relevance of the institution.

The papers included in this book cover different aspects of the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions. They explore different options for reform and show that enhancing the participation of developing and emerging market countries in resolving the major monetary and financial problems confronting the world economy, would improve global economic performance and contribute to the elimination of world poverty.

A radical and comprehensive review of the practices of governance within one of the world's most important and influential organizations.