Independent Commission On Banking Final Report

The Independent Commission on Banking's final recommendations aim to create a more stable and competitive basis for UK banking for the long term. The result would be a banking system that is much less likely to cause, or succumb to, financial crises and the huge costs they bring; is self-reliant, so that the taxpayer does not have to bear the losses that banks make; and is effective and efficient at providing the basic banking services of safeguarding retail deposits, operating secure payments systems, and efficiently channelling savings to productive investments in the economy. Stability is crucial and UK banks should have more equity capital and loss-absorbing debt - beyond what has so far been internationally agreed - and their retail banking activities should be structurally separated, by a ring-fence, from wholesale and investment banking activities. The Commission also address competition, which has not been properly effective in UK retail banking. They recommend a seamless switching system based on redirection for personal and small business current accounts, free of cost and risk, complemented by measures to enhance transparency. The new Financial Conduct Authority should have a clear duty to promote effective competition. Structural reform should be complete by the Basel implementation date of 2019 at the latest. These reforms would result in better-capitalised, less leveraged banking more focused on the needs of savers and borrowers in the domestic economy. At the same time UK banks would be free to flourish in global markets, but without UK taxpayer support.

In its final report the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) recommended a package of measures, consisting of ring-fencing vital banking services and increasing banks' loss-absorbency. The Government strongly supports the ICB's objectives and dual approach. The Government agrees that vital banking services - in particular, the taking of retail deposits - should only be provided by 'ring-fenced' banks', and that these banks should be prohibited from undertaking certain investment banking activities. On increased loss-absorbency, also supported are the ICB recommendations for higher equity requirements for large ring-fenced banks, a minimum leverage ratio, loss-absorbing debt, insured depositor preference and higher levels of loss-absorbing capacity for banks that are difficult to resolve. With regards to the principle that systemically important banks hold a minimum about of loss-absorbing capacity on a group-wide basis, however, the requirement should not apply to non-UK operations where it can be shown that those operations to do not pose a risk to UK financial stability. The Government also believes that depositor preference needs further analysis and consultation. On competition, the Government also strongly supports all the ICB recommendations. The Government estimates the aggregate private costs to UK banks at £3.5bn - £8bn, producing a gross reduction in GDP of £0.8bn - £1.8bn. Against these costs though should be set the potentially much larger benefits with the ICB's recommendations yielding an estimated incremental economic benefit of £9.5bn per annum. Significantly too the Government wants to see relevant legislation completed by the end of this Parliament in May 2015 as opposed to the ICBs recommended 2019

This Interim Report sets out the Commission's current and provisional views on possible reforms to improve stability and competition in UK banking, and seeks responses to those views. The Commission's final report will be published in September. The financial crisis that began in 2007 exposed fundamental weaknesses in the global financial system and has had enormous economic costs in terms of lost output, higher unemployment and weakened public finances. The report covers the need for reform in the UK banking sector; current reform initiatives; reform options - financial stability; reform options - competition and consultation questions. One of the policy approaches discussed would be structural radicalism, for example to require retail banking and wholesale and investment banking to be in wholly separate firms. Another would be to be laisser-faire about structure and to seek to achieve stability by very high capital requirements across the board. The Commission believes the most effective approach is likely to be a complementary combination of more moderate measures towards loss-absorbency and structure.This Interim Report discusses three initiatives (beyond the continued application of general competition and merger law) that could improve competition. The first concerns structural measures to improve competition. Second, competition among incumbent banks, and between them and challengers, is blunted by the actual and perceived difficulties for customers switching accounts, by poor conditions for consumer choice more generally, and by barriers to entry. This Interim Report suggests that it may be possible to introduce greatly improved means of switching at reasonable cost, in which case the industry should be required to do this within a short timescale, and that barriers to entry may be able to be reduced. Thirdly, the Commission regards the Financial Conduct Authority proposed as part of the Government's reforms of the regulatory architecture as potentially a vital spur to competition in banking.

Incorporating HC 1534, session 2010-12

Financial regulation has entered into a new era, as many foundational economic theories and policies supporting the existing infrastructure have been and are being questioned following the financial crisis. Goodhart et al’s seminal monograph "Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now?" (Routledge:1998) took stock of the extent of financial innovation and the maturity of the financial services industry at that time, and mapped out a new regulatory roadmap. This book offers a timely exploration of the "Why, How and Where Now" of financial regulation in the aftermath of the crisis in order to map out the future trajectory of financial regulation in an age where financial stability is being emphasised as a key regulatory objective. The book is split into four sections: the objectives and regulatory landscape of financial regulation; the regulatory regime for investor protection; the regulatory regime for financial institutional safety and soundness; and macro-prudential regulation. The discussion ranges from theoretical and policy perspectives to comprehensive and critical consideration of financial regulation in the specifics. The focus of the book is on the substantive regulation of the UK and the EU, as critical examination is made of the unravelling and the future of financial regulation with comparative insights offered where relevant especially from the US. Running throughout the book is consideration of the relationship between financial regulation, financial stability and the responsibility of various actors in governance. This book offers an important contribution to continuing reflections on the role of financial regulation, market discipline and corporate responsibility in the financial sector, and upon the roles of regulatory authorities, markets and firms in ensuring the financial health and security of all in the future.