Inference Consequence And Meaning

Inferentialism as a theory of meaning builds on the idea that what a linguistic expression means depends exclusively on the inferential rules that govern its use. Following different strategies and exploring various case studies, the authors of this collection of essays discuss under what circumstances and to what extent the central tenets of inferentialism are tenable. The essays in this volume present the results of a three-year research project “Representation and Inference” which was conducted from the beginning of 2008 to the end 2010. The aim of the project was to assess the research program of inferentialism as it has been pursued recently by Robert Brandom, Mark Lance, and Jaroslav Peregrin. Earlier versions of these texts were presented at the conference “Inference, Consequence, and Meaning” held in Sofia on the 3rd and 4th of December, 2008.

Inferentialism as a theory of meaning builds on the idea that what a linguistic expression means depends exclusively on the inferential rules that govern its use. Following different strategies and exploring various case studies, the authors of this collection of essays discuss under what circumstances and to what extent the central tenets of inferentialism are tenable. The essays in this volume present the results of a three-year research project â oeRepresentation and Inferenceâ which was conducted from the beginning of 2008 to the end 2010. The aim of the project was to assess the research program of inferentialism as it has been pursued recently by Robert Brandom, Mark Lance, and Jaroslav Peregrin. Earlier versions of these texts were presented at the conference â oeInference, Consequence, and Meaningâ held in Sofia on the 3rd and 4th of December, 2008.

This volume is dedicated to Prof. Dag Prawitz and his outstanding contributions to philosophical and mathematical logic. Prawitz's eminent contributions to structural proof theory, or general proof theory, as he calls it, and inference-based meaning theories have been extremely influential in the development of modern proof theory and anti-realistic semantics. In particular, Prawitz is the main author on natural deduction in addition to Gerhard Gentzen, who defined natural deduction in his PhD thesis published in 1934. The book opens with an introductory paper that surveys Prawitz's numerous contributions to proof theory and proof-theoretic semantics and puts his work into a somewhat broader perspective, both historically and systematically. Chapters include either in-depth studies of certain aspects of Dag Prawitz's work or address open research problems that are concerned with core issues in structural proof theory and range from philosophical essays to papers of a mathematical nature. Investigations into the necessity of thought and the theory of grounds and computational justifications as well as an examination of Prawitz's conception of the validity of inferences in the light of three “dogmas of proof-theoretic semantics” are included. More formal papers deal with the constructive behaviour of fragments of classical logic and fragments of the modal logic S4 among other topics. In addition, there are chapters about inversion principles, normalization of p roofs, and the notion of proof-theoretic harmony and other areas of a more mathematical persuasion. Dag Prawitz also writes a chapter in which he explains his current views on the epistemic dimension of proofs and addresses the question why some inferences succeed in conferring evidence on their conclusions when applied to premises for which one already possesses evidence.

Manhattan Prep’s LSAT Logical Reasoning guide, fully updated for the digital exam, will teach you how to untangle Logical Reasoning problems confidently and efficiently. Manhattan Prep’s LSAT guides use officially-released LSAT questions and are written by the company’s instructors, who have all scored a 172 or higher on the official LSAT—we know how to earn a great score and we know how to teach you to do the same. This guide will train you to approach LSAT logical reasoning problems as a 99th-percentile test-taker does: Recognize and respond to every type of question Deconstruct the text to find the core argument or essential facts Spot—and avoid—trap answers Take advantage of the digital format to work quickly and strategically Each chapter in LSAT Logical Reasoning features drill sets—made up of real LSAT questions—to help you absorb and apply what you’ve learned. The extensive solutions walk you through every step needed to master Logical Reasoning, including an in-depth explanation of every answer choice, correct and incorrect.

Logical consequence is the relation that obtains between premises and conclusion(s) in a valid argument. Orthodoxy has it that valid arguments are necessarily truth-preserving, but this platitude only raises a number of further questions, such as: how does the truth of premises guarantee the truth of a conclusion, and what constraints does validity impose on rational belief? This volume presents thirteen essays by some of the most important scholars in the field of philosophical logic. The essays offer ground-breaking new insights into the nature of logical consequence; the relation between logic and inference; how the semantics and pragmatics of natural language bear on logic; the relativity of logic; and the structural properties of the consequence relation.

Above all other titles, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) prized that of logician. He thought of logic broadly, such that it includes not merely formal logic but an examination of the entire process of inquiry. His works are replete with detailed investigations into logical questions. Peirce is especially concerned to show that valid inferential processes, diligently followed, will eventually root out error and alight on the truth. Peirce on Inference draws together diverse strands from Peirce's lifelong reflections on logic in order to develop a comprehensive perspective on Peirce's theory of inference. Peirce argues that each genus of inference--deduction, induction, and abduction--has a different truth-producing virtue. An inference is valid just in case the procedure used in fact has the truth-producing virtue claimed for it and the person making the inference adheres to the procedure. In successive chapters, this book shows how Peirce supports the thesis that these genera of inference have the truth-producing virtues claimed for them and how Peirce responds to objections. Among the objections given consideration are the liar paradox, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's new riddle of induction, that this may be a chance world, and that we are incapable of conceiving the true hypothesis. The book defends several controversial theses, including that Peirce does not so strongly object to Bayesianism as is sometimes claimed and that prior to 1900 Peirce had no explicit theory of abduction. It also proposes a novel account of abduction.

The question of what types of data and evidence can be used is one of the most important topics in linguistics. This book is the first to comprehensively present the methodological problems associated with linguistic data and evidence. Its originality is twofold. First, the authors' approach accounts for a series of unexplained characteristics of linguistic theorising: the uncertainty and diversity of data, the role of evidence in the evaluation of hypotheses, the problem solving strategies as well as the emergence and resolution of inconsistencies. Second, the findings are obtained by the application of a new model of plausible argumentation which is also of relevance from a general argumentation theoretical point of view. All concepts and theses are systematically introduced and illustrated by a number of examples from different linguistic theories, and a detailed case-study section shows how the proposed model can be applied to specific linguistic problems.