Institutional Arrangements For Public Debt Management

Abstract: This paper analyzes institutional arrangements for public debt management by reviewing the experience of OECD countries during the late 1980s and 1990s. It discusses principal-agent issues arising from the delegation of authority from the Minister of Finance to the debt management office and describes how countries have designed governance structures and control and monitoring mechanisms to deal with these issues. The paper also discusses what lessons emerging market countries and transition countries can draw from the experience of advanced OECD countries. The OECD experience clearly indicates that"regardless of whether the debt management office is located inside or outside the Ministry of Finance"four issues are of vital importance: Giving priority to strategic public policy objectives rather than tactical trading objectives; Strengthening the institutional capacity to deal with financial portfolio management and with the public policy aspects of debt management; Modernizing debt management; Creating mechanisms to ensure successful delegation and accountability to the Ministry of Finance and Parliament. This paper"a joint product of the Office of the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Development Economics, and Public Debt Management Group, Banking, Capital Markets, and Financial Engineering Department"is part of a larger effort in the Bank to analyze the institutional dimentions of effective government policy.

In 2009, the Boards of the IMF and World Bank jointly endorsed a capacity building program to help developing countries strengthen their public debt management frameworks. A key aspect of the program was to help developing countries implement the framework developed by staffs to formulate an effective medium-term debt management strategy (MTDS). The Boards also supported the continued use of the complementary framework—the Debt Management Performance Assessment (DeMPA)—developed in 2007, to assess the effectiveness of the broader institutional arrangements for public debt management. This paper provides an update on the implementation of the program since its endorsement in 2009.

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Edited by V. Sundararajan, Peter Dattels, and Hans Blommestein, this volume outlines strategies for managing public debt, developing government securities markets, and coordinating those activities with monetary management through legal, administrative, and operational arrangements. Both transition and market economies are surveyed. The analysis draws partly on the literature on the microstructure of markets and auction systems and on selected country experiences.

Sustainable public debt has gained renewed attention as countries implement fiscal consolidation measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Sound public debt policies and debt management practices require robust legal underpinnings. Complex legal issues however arise in the design of the legal framework, and tradeoffs are required in many instances. This paper analyzes key features of modern public debt management legal frameworks, drawing from examples in advanced, emerging, and frontier markets. It aims to provide guidance for countries that seek to review and strengthen their public debt management legal frameworks.

In economies in transition, the development of financial markets is a common objective linking the monetary and fiscal authorities, while monetary and public debt management cannot be strictly separated. This calls for close coordination of objectives and instruments of monetary and debt management, and the development of supporting institutional and operational arrangements. Key aspects of these arrangements are surveyed.

The unprecedented rise and persistence of large-scale budget deficits in many developed and developing nations during the past three decades has caused great concern. The widespread presence of such deficits has proved difficult to explain. Their emergence in otherwise diverse nations defies particularistic explanations aimed at internal economic developments within a specific country. Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance shifts emphasis away from narrow economic factors to more broadly defined political and institutional factors that affect government policy and national debt. This collection brings together new theoretical models, empirical evidence, and a series of in-depth case studies to analyze the effect of political institutions, fiscal regulations, and policy decisions on accumulating deficits. It provides a fascinating overview of the political and economic issues involved and highlights the role of budgetary institutions in the formation of budget deficits.