Institutional Corruption

This book integrates theoretical accounts of corruption with practical approaches to combating corruption in various public- and private-sector settings.

​This book discusses the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on the practice of medicine, and the observed and potential pitfalls of such partnerships. It argues that the pharmaceutical industry has become indispensable to many of the activities of the medical profession across the pharmaceutical product lifecycle, and examines the regulatory, ethical, professional and institutional difficulties that arise from these interactions. With data drawn from over 80 qualitative accounts from medical, pharmaceutical, regulatory and healthcare professionals, this book uses both Hungary and the Netherlands as case studies to demonstrate the potential problem of undue pharmaceutical industry influence within the relationships fostered with the profession of medicine. Chapters systematically describe the lifecycle of a pharmaceutical product from research to distribution, demonstrating the interdependency of industry and medicine. Arguing that the medical profession should be a buffer between the pharmaceutical industry interests and patient interests, the book explores how undue industry influence weakens the ability of the medical profession to do so. Using the theory of institutional corruption, the book aims to analyze how conflict of interest and the weakening of institutional imperatives is a result of institutional interactions rather than individual actions. Appropriate for students and researchers of the pharmaceutical industry, corporate corruption, and those working in NGOs and policy making, this unique volume is an comprehensive look at the complex relationship between medicine and pharmacy.

Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring an unreliable reputation. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption similar to the invisible hand that governs competitive markets. This strategy - the 'invisible foot' - shows that the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anti-corruption reform.

Drawing on global empirical evidence, Li offers a novel explanation to the age-old puzzle of why some countries thrive despite corruption.

More members of Congress have been investigated and sanctioned for ethical misconduct in the past decade and a half than in the entire previous history of the institution. But individual members are probably less corrupt than they once were. Stricter ethics codes and closer scrutiny by the press and public have imposed standards no previous representatives have had to face. Dennis Thompson shows how the institution itself is posing new ethical challenges, how the complexity of the environment in which members work creates new occasions for corruption and invites more calls for accountability. Instead of the individual corruption that has long been the center of attention, Thompson focuses on institutional corruption which refers to conduct that under certain conditions is an acceptable part of the job of a representative. Members are required to solicit campaign contributions, and they are expected to help constituents with their problems with government, but some ways of doing these jobs give rise to institutional corruption. The author moves the discussion beyond bribery, extortion, and simple personal gain to delve into implicit understandings, ambiguous favors, and political advantage. Thompson examines many major ethics cases of recent years. Among them: the case of David Durenberger, accused of supplementing his income through book promotions; the case of the Keating Five, accused of using undue influence with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board on behalf of Lincoln Savings and Loan owner Charles Keating; and the case of House Speaker James Wright, accused of several offenses. Thompson shows why neither the electoral process nor the judicial process is sufficient and argues for stronger ethics committees and the creation of a new quasi-independent body to take over some of the enforcement process. He offers more than a dozen recommendations for changes in the procedures and practices of ethics in Congress. The book features a listi

From the spread of kleptocracy in Venezuela at the expense of the country's economy, to President Trump's appointment of family members to high-ranking White House positions, to President Lukashenko's desperate stranglehold on power in Belarus, across the world political corruption is rampant--indeed practically too ubiquitous to keep track of. As these examples illustrate, political corruption is often associated to a variety of instances of abuse of power that either derive from a vicious trait of individual character, or develop within deeply dysfunctional institutions. To Emanuela Ceva and Maria Paola Ferretti, however, this piecemeal view is inadequate: individual and institutional instances of political corruption have a common root that we can understand only by treating corruption and anticorruption as a matter of a public ethics of office. Political corruption is the Trojan horse that undermines public institutions from within via an interrelated action of officeholders. Even well-designed and legitimate institutions can veer off track if the officeholders fail through their conduct to uphold a public ethics of office accountability. This book offers an analytically rigorous definition of political corruption. It also investigates the common normative root of its two manifestations--corrupt individual character, and corrupt institutional mechanisms--as a relationally wrongful practice that consists of an unaccountable use of the power of office by officeholders in public institutions. From this perspective, political corruption must be understood from within, for it is an internal enemy of public institutions that can only be opposed by mobilizing the officeholders to remain accountable and mutually answerable for their conduct. In this way, anticorruption calls on the officeholders' responsibility to work together to maintain an interactively just institutional system.

This book considers how emerging economies around the world face the challenge of building good institutions and effective governance, since so much of economic development depends on having these in place. The promotion of shared prosperity and the battle against poverty require interventions to reach out to the poor and the disadvantaged. Yet time and again we have seen such effort foild or diminished by corruption and leakage. The creation of good governance and institutions and structures to combat corruption require determination and passion but also intricate design rooted in data, analysis, and research. In this book, leading researchers from around the world bring to the table some of the best available ideas to help create better governance structures, design laws for corruption control, and nurture good institutions.

Psychiatry Under the Influence investigates the actions and practices of the American Psychiatric Association and academic psychiatry in the United States, and presents it as a case study of institutional corruption.