Institutional Design In New Democracies

This volume focuses on the relationship between the tasks of institutional design and the outcomes of the process of economic and political liberalization in Latin America and in Central and Eastern Europe. The contributors emphasize the design of institutions to serve a market economy, the design of electoral laws, and the design of executive-legislative relations. Within this framework each chapter discusses the legacy of the pre-existing authoritarian regime; the range of preferences among various strategic actors with regard to the pace and mix of reforms; and the consequences of final choices for the institutionalization of effective economies and the process of democratization. Countries throughout Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe are moving from semi-closed to open economies and from authoritarian to democratic political systems. Despite important differences between the regions, these transitions involve similar tasks: the establishment of governmental institutions and electoral systems conducive to legitimation of the new and fragile democracies and expansion of the institutional infrastructure of a market economy. This volume looks at both regions, focusing on the relationship between the tasks of institutional design and the outcomes of the process of economic and political liberalization. In particular, the contributors emphasize the design of institutions to serve a market economy, the design of electoral laws, and the design of executive-legislative relations. Each chapter discusses the legacy of the pre-existing authoritarian regime; the range of preferences among various strategic actors (the government, state bureaucracies, opposition parties, and interest groups) with regard to the pace and mix of reforms; and the consequences of final choices for the institutionalization of effective economies and the process of democratization.

The 1990s have witnessed the ascendance of a new orthodoxy which asserts that democracy and development are mutually reinforcing. This is in marked contrast to the dominant consensus that held sway for the previous two decades, which stated that developmental progress in poor societies was best assured by strong states, ruled by authoritarian regimes. Today, however, many new democracies are illiberal, non-participatory, and characterized by enormous inequalities. Developmental democracy cannot therefore be regarded as an assured outcome of a simultaneous process of economic and political liberalization. The central inquiry of this important new study concerns the extent to which it is possible to strive towards a new form of developmental state that can promote broad-based and equitable development in the context of legitimized, inclusive democracy. The argument running through this book is that there is scope for continuous political intervention in the design of democratic institutions that shape the context of state-led development initiatives. Institutional arrangements which foster political participation, the dispersion of political power, and increased representation by women and other disadvantaged groups can make democratic regimes more sensitive to issues of poverty, social welfare, and gender discrimination through remedial action and policy commitments. Oxford Studies in Demcratization is a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volumes will concentrate on the comparative study of the democratization processes that accompanied the decline and termination of the cold war. The geographical focus of the series will primarily be Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant experiences in Africa and Asia. The Series Editor is Laurence Whitehead.

What institutional arrangements should a well-functioning constitutional democracy have? Most of the relevant literatures in law, political science, political theory, and economics address this question by discussing institutional design writ large. In this book, Adrian Vermeule moves beyond these debates, changing the focus to institutional design writ small. In established constitutional polities, Vermeule argues that law can and should - and to some extent already does - provide mechanisms of democracy: a repertoire of small-scale institutional devices and innovations that can have surprisingly large effects, promoting democratic values of impartial, accountable and deliberative government. Examples include legal rules that promote impartiality by depriving officials of the information they need to act in self-interested ways; voting rules that create the right kind and amount of accountability for political officials and judges; and legislative rules that structure deliberation, in part by adjusting the conditions under which deliberation occurs transparently or instead secretly. Drawing upon a range of social science tools from economics, political science, and other disciplines, Vermeule carefully describes the mechanisms of democracy and indicates the conditions under which they can succeed.

Constitution-making for democracy has always been a highly political and contested process. It has never been more ambitious, or more difficult, than today as politicians and experts attempt to build democratic institutions that will foster peace and stability in countries torn by violent conflict. The extended investigation out of which this book has grown has ranged across three continents. It has examined such apparently intractable cases as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sri Lanka and Fiji, as well as apparent 'success stories' like South Africa, Ghana and Uganda. Three groups of questions are explored: * How and by whom were democratic institutions (re)designed? * How have they functioned in practice: what has been the relationship between democratic institutions and democratic politics? * How have they measured up to the pressures placed on them by ongoing violence, poverty, globalization and democratization itself? The authors, while regarding democracy as a general entitlement, refuse to subscribe to a triumphalist view which sees it as a universal panacea. Instead they seek to understand how democratic institutions actually facilitate (or sometimes fail to facilitate) improved governance and the management of conflict in a variety of national settings. This thoughtful and empirical set of explorations is highly relevant to other societies wrestling with similar problems of institutional design in situations of democratic transition and/or deep-seated social conflict.

This book proposes a new institution - the 'People's Forum' - to enable democratic governments to effectively address long-running issues like global warming and inequality. It would help citizens decide what strategic problems their government must fix, especially where this requires them to suffer some inconvenience or cost.The People's Forum is first based on a new diagnosis of government failure in democracies. The book tests its own analyses of government failure by seeing whether these might help us to explain the failures of particular democracies to address (and in some cases, to even recognize) several crucial environmental problems. The essential features of a new design for democracy are described and then compared with those of previous institutional designs that were also intended to improve the quality of democratic government. In that comparison, the People's Forum turns out to be not only the most effective design for developing and implementing competent policy, but also the easiest to establish and run. The latter advantage is crucial as there has been no success in getting previous designs into actual trial practice. It is hoped that this book may inspire a small group to raise the money to set up and run the People's Forum. Then, as citizens see it operating and engage with it, they may come to regard the new Forum as essential in helping them to deliberate long-running issues and to get their resulting initiatives implemented by government. Smith also discusses how the People's Forum must be managed and how groups with different political ideologies may react to it.An Afterword sets out the method by which this design was produced, to help those who might want to devise an institution themselves. The new concepts in environmental science that the book develops to test its diagnosis are applied in an Appendix to outline crucial options for the future of Tasmania. Similar options apply to many countries, states and provinces. As indicated above, those choices are currently beyond the capacity of democratic governments to address and in some cases, even to recognize. But the People's Forum may lift them out of that morass.

The authors of this book have developed a new and stimulating approach to the analysis of the transitions of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia to democracy and a market economy. They integrate interdisciplinary theoretical work with elaborate empirical data on some of the most challenging events of the twentieth century. Three groups of phenomena and their causal interconnection are explored: the material legacies, constraints, habits and cognitive frameworks inherited from the past; the erratic configuration of new actors, and new spaces for action; and a new institutional order under which agency is institutionalized and the sustainability of institutions is achieved. The book studies the interrelations of national identities, economic interests, and political institutions with the transformation process, concentrating on issues of constitution making, democratic infrastructure, the market economy, and social policy.

By examining the institutions of government through the lens of constitution-making, Crafting Constitutional Democracies provides a broad and insightful introduction to comparative politics. Drawn from a series of lectures given in Jakarta, Indonesia, on the drafting of the U.S. constitution, the book illustrates the problems faced by generations of founders, through numerous historic and contemporary examples. Both Indonesia in 1999 and the United States in 1789 faced the same basic issue: how to construct a central government for a large and diverse nation that allowed the majority of the people to govern themselves without intruding on the rights of minorities. What kinds of institutions make for 'good government'? What factors need to be considered in designing a government? Author Edward Schneier explores these questions through a rich variety of examples from both recent and historic transitions to democracy. Drawing frequently upon the arguments of the American Federalist Papers and more contemporary theories of democratization, Crafting Constitutional Democracies lucidly explores the key questions of how and why democracies succeed and fail. A concluding chapter on constitutional change and decline raises provocative and important questions about the lessons that citizens of the world's older democracies might take from the struggles of the new.

This title was first published in 2001. This text addressses the variations in democratic institutional design and seeks to determine not only if these differences matter, but also to explain how they matter. Using data from established, economically weel-off systems, the book shows that not only are there a multitude of ways to construct a democracy but also how a democracy is constructed influences the outcomes produced by that system. That is to say, institutional differences create distinct incentives for behaviour that in turn influence the type of outcome produced.