Intelligence Success And Failure

Machine generated contents note: -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part One: The Theoretical Framework -- Chapter I. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion -- Chapter II. Examining the Learning Process -- Part Two: The Empirical Evidence -- The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow -- The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War -- Case study I: Failing to Forecast the War -- Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950 -- The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War of Yom Kippur -- Case Study I: The Failure -- Case Study II: The Success -- Chapter VI. Conclusions

How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings.

The disciplines of strategic intelligence at the governmental level and competitive business intelligence constitute accepted methods of decision-supporting to prevent mistakes and strategic surprise. This research discovered that many researchers in the intelligence field feel that intelligence methodology in both contexts has reached a “glass ceiling.” Thus far, research has focused separately on national intelligence and intelligence in business, without any attempt to benchmark from one field to the other. This book shows that it is possible to use experience gained in the business field to improve intelligence practices in national security, and vice versa through mutual learning. The book’s main innovation is its proposition that mutual learning can be employed in the context of a model distinguishes between concentrated and diffused surprises to provide a breakthrough in the intelligence field, thereby facilitating better prediction of the surprise development. We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence focuses on a comparison between how states, through their intelligence organizations, cope with strategic surprises and how business organizations deal with unexpected movement in their field. Based on this comparison, the author proposes a new model which can better address the challenge of avoiding strategic surprises. This book can contribute significantly to the study of intelligence, which will become more influential in the coming years.

The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.

The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published research in the field determines that such large-scale military failures often stem from defective information-processing systems. Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases. Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes. Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.

Over the last few decades, the growth of Business Intelligence has enabled companies to streamline many processes and expand into new markets on an unprecedented scale. New BI technologies are also enabling mass collaboration and innovation. However, implementation of these BI solutions often gives rise to new challenges. Business Intelligence Success Factors shows you how to turn those challenges into opportunities by mastering five key skills. Olivia Parr Rud shares insights gained from her two decades of experience in Business Intelligence to offer the latest practices that are emerging in organizational development. Written to help enhance your understanding of the current business climate and to provide the tools necessary to thrive in this new global economy, Business Intelligence Success Factors examines the components of chaos theory, complex adaptive systems, quantum physics, and evolutionary biology. A scientific framework for these new corporate issues helps explain why developing these key competencies are critical, given the speed of change, globalization, as well as advancements in technology and Business Intelligence. Divided into four cohesive parts, Business Intelligence Success Factors explores: The current business landscape as well as the latest scientific research: today's business realities and how and why they can lead to chaos New scientific models for viewing the global economy The five essential competencies—Communication, Collaboration, Innovation, Adaptability, and Leadership—that improve an organization's ability to leverage the new opportunities in a volatile global economy Profiles of several amazing leaders who are working to make a difference Cutting-edge research and case studies via invited contributors offering a wealth of knowledge and experience Move beyond mere survival to realize breakaway success in the global economy with the practical guidance found in Business Intelligence Success Factors.

The CIA and the Culture of Failure follows the CIA through a series of crises from the Soviet collapse to the war in Iraq and explains the political pressures that helped lead to the greatest failures in U.S. intelligence history.

An Intelligence failure can be defined where there was intelligence available about a particular event, but either it was not collected or was mishandled later in the assessment cycle, as opposed to the failure of an intelligence operation. The Historical Dictionary of Intelligence Failures covers the history of intelligence failures through a chronology, an introductory essay, an extensive bibliography, and over 100 cross-referenced dictionary entries on the Ardennes Offensive, the Six Day War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Prague Spring, the Arab Spring, 9/11. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about the intelligence industry.