Iran S Nuclear Program And The Global South

This book studies the reactions of India, Brazil, and South Africa the three main non-proliferation actors of the Global South to Iran's nuclear program. Their responses are explained and situated in wider foreign policy context.

“The most systematic exposition to date about Iran’s nuclear program and its role in world affairs” (Middle East Quarterly). Since the Islamic Republic of Iran admitted that it was secretly producing highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium, nations have struggled to react appropriately. For the first time, and in full detail, this book explains exactly what the Europeans and United Nations have been trying to forestall. Iran could shortly have the ability to strike its immediate Middle Eastern neighbors—and more distant nations—with nuclear weapons. With the size to dominate its region, Iran also has an avowed mission to export its theocratic principles, and in recent decades, has been a notorious supporter of terrorist organizations. Its parallel development of atomic bombs represents the greatest threat to the balance of world power we’ve seen in the new millennium. Here, defense expert Al Venter reveals the extent to which Iran’s weapons program has developed and the clandestine manner in which its nuclear technology has been acquired. He demonstrates how Tehran has violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and details the involvement of several countries shown by the IAEA to have trafficked in illegal nuclear materials. He proves, for the first time, a direct link between the now-defunct South African apartheid regime’s nuclear program and Tehran’s current nuclear ambitions. Venter digs deep into subjects such as Iran’s fervor on behalf of Shiite Islam, its missile program—developed alongside its nuclear one—and the role of the Pasdaran, the Revolutionary Guards, whose tentacles have spread throughout the Middle East and increasingly farther afield. While noting Tehran’s support of terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Venter follows closely how the Persian homeland itself has progressed toward a strategic nuclear capability that would make recent terrorist attacks look obsolete. Iran’s Nuclear Option is essential reading for anyone with an interest in global security, the perilous volatility of the Middle East, and America’s options, should it be willing and able to counter the threat while time remains.

Diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to end its uranium enrichment activities appear to have been ineffective. Tehran wants to press ahead with its nuclear program but not so rashly as to blatantly show its nuclear weapons aspirations and therefore attract forceful international intervention. Instead, Tehran is concealing those aspirations in a cloud of ambiguity by claiming that its nuclear activities are merely for the production of civilian electrical power. All the while, Tehran is probably hiding a military component to its nuclear activities. Iran's conventional military capabilities have been steadily deteriorating over the past generation, which severely hampers Tehran's power to challenge the United States in the Gulf. However, armed with nuclear weapons, the Iranians might calculate that in some future Gulf crisis they could pose an aggressive challenge to the United States in the military sphere. US military planners might argue that Iran would never be able to threaten or use its nuclear weapons against US forces because the United States would retaliate in kind with devastating consequences. But the Iranians, for their part, might reason that the Americans, who take measures to minimize civilian casualties in war, would be self-deterred from nuclear retaliation because of the untold Iranian civilian casualties that would result from a nuclear strike on Iran. The Gulf states, with Saudi leadership, recently announced joint interest in developing nuclear power. Officials from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE discussed a shared nuclear program for peaceful purposes at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting in Riyadh in December 2006. If the likes of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were to eventually become nuclear-armed powers all within the narrow geographic confines of the Middle East region, they would be sitting on "hair triggers" and be under strong incentives to "use them or loose them" and to fire nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in a crisis. Many states in the Middle East have little geography and time in which to hide their leaderships from enemy attack. In a volatile region prone to crises, Middle East leaders would be under enormous psychological and emotional duress to launch their nukes first at an adversary's capital to physically decapitate its leadership and to eliminate the chances of retaliatory nuclear strikes. The "use or lose" mindset would permeate the Middle East and cause millions of innocent civilians to teeter on the brink of extinction. This picture of doom and gloom underscores the critical importance of sparing no effort today to head off the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran.

This book studies the reactions of India, Brazil, and South Africa the three main non-proliferation actors of the Global South to Iran's nuclear program. Their responses are explained and situated in wider foreign policy context.

This book, written by a leading expert on Iran's foreign and nuclear affairs, provides a fresh and insightful perspective on Iran's nuclear program. Based on in-depth interviews with the key nuclear decision-makers in Iran, Europe, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the book is a welcome addition that sheds new light on the present international crisis over Iran's nuclear program. In a lucidly-written narrative intended for both general readers as well as academics and policy-makers, the book covers the history of Iran's nuclear program, the Iran-Europe negotiations, the IAEA reports and other similar reports, the media's coverage, and the prospects for a successful resolution of the nuclear standoff with Iran. Afrasiabi presents a compelling case for non-proliferation in Iran and the Middle East, drawing on his first-hand knowledge of the region. The book has been divided into 20 chapters and has an appendix that documents Iran's nuclear standpoint.

This book offers an in-depth historical and technical description of Iran's nuclear program in political, economic, and strategic contexts. The author points out this issue's connections with the evolution of global and regional strategic balances, as well as the stability of the international regime against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

What are Iran's nuclear ambitions? How will these ambitions affect regional and global security? International suspicion surrounding Iran's nuclear activities was first aroused in the late 1980s but it was not until the International Atomic Energy agency (IAEA) launched an investigation into the Iranian nuclear program, that it was revealed Iran had enriched uranium and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities in the absence of IAEA safeguards. Iran's failure to acknowledge limitations on nuclear fuel cycle activities, despite both offers of assistance and the threat of sanctions, has alarmed the international community. 'Iran's Nuclear Program' analyses the most important issues surrounding Iran's nuclear capability and its potential to develop atomic weapons; the changes and developments in Iran's nuclear program since the 2005 Iranian presidential elections; Israeli foreign policy in relation to Iran; the possible impact of an Iranian nuclear program on the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); and the prospect of military action against Iran. This is essential reading for anyone wanting to understand Iran's atomic development, a threat that has the ability to destabilize the Gulf and the broader Middle East region.

"The Institute of Science and International Security’s new book Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons chronicles the Islamic Republic of Iran’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. The book draws from original Iranian documents seized by Israel’s Mossad in 2018 in a dramatic overnight raid in Tehran. The “Nuclear Archive” allows deep insight into the country’s effort to secretly build nuclear weapons. The book relies on unprecedented access to archive documents, many translated by the Institute into English for the first time. The first part of the book concentrates on Iran’s crash nuclear weapons program in the early 2000s to build five nuclear weapons and an industrial complex to produce many more. By 2003, responding to growing pressure from European powers to freeze its publicly known nuclear programs and fearing a possible U.S. military attack, Iran’s leaders decided to downsize, but not stop, their secret nuclear weapons effort. The second part of the book discusses Iran’s nuclear path post-2003, revealing a careful plan to continue nuclear weapons work, overcome bottlenecks and better camouflage nuclear weapons development activities. Since 2003, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear scientists and weaponeers have concentrated on establishing capabilities to make weapon-grade uranium and developing more reliable, longer-range ballistic missiles."--Publisher description.