Iran S Nuclear Program Status

Contents: (1) Background; (2) Recent Nuclear Controversy: Iran¿s Cooperation with the IAEA; (3) Status of Iran¿s Nuclear Programs: Fuel Manufacturing Plant; Uranium Enrichment; Plutonium; Arak Reactor; Bushehr Reactor; (4) Does Iran Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?: The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate; Living with Risk; Other Constraints on Nuclear Weapons Ambitions.

Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. The United States has assessed that Tehran has technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress in February 2016 that "[w]e do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons." Obtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran has also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU would, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the "P5+1"), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran's nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran's declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. Then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government made the decision to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months of this time to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran's compliance with the JCPOA has lengthened this time to one year, according to Clapper's February 2016 testimony. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.

Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities, which can produce both Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) suitable for power plans, and weapons grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), is currently the main source of proliferation concern. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran "halted its nuclear weapons program" in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is "keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons" and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is "inherently reversible." Obtaining fissile material is viewed as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran had also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU would, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the "P5+1"), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which was a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium-the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran's nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran's declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has continued to comply with the JCPOA and resolution. Then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government made the decision to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months of this time to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran's compliance with the JCPOA has lengthened this time to one year, according to U.S. officials. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.

Although Iran claims that its nuclear programs are exclusively for peaceful purposes, they have generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions which imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite this pressure, Iran continues at its Natanz centrifuge facility to enrich uranium, expand the number of operating centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also continued to produce centrifuge feedstock, as well as work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities. Whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is, however, unknown. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program, defined as Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment related work, in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is inherently reversible. Although Iran has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to an extent, the agency says that Tehran has not gone far enough to alleviate all of the agency's concerns about Iran s enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. The IAEA continues to investigate the program, particularly evidence that Tehran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. This report expands and replaces RS21592, Iran s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by Sharon Squassoni, and will be updated as necessary.

This monograph reexamines the strategic implications for the United States in the event Iran moves ahead to acquire nuclear weapons capability. This study draws on expert workshops held in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU) in January and February 2005, as well as meetings, interviews, and research conducted at NDU and elsewhere over the past several years. Chapters are as follows: "Iran's Perspective: National Rights and Nuclear Weapons," "Neighbors, Negotiators, and Nonproliferators," and "U.S. Policy Options." Appendixes include "Timeline of Iran's Path to Nuclear Weapons," "Iran's Nuclear Program: Status, Risks, and Prospects," and "Walking the Tightrope: Israeli Options in Response to Iranian Nuclear Developments."

International suspicion surrounding Iran's nuclear activities was first aroused in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, it was not until the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) launched an intensive investigation into the Iranian nuclear program in 2002, that it was revealed that Iran had enriched uranium and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities in the absence of IAEA safeguards. In January 2006, Iran began to ignore limitations on nuclear fuel cycle activities yet again, in defiance of the broad opinion of the international community and despite both offers of assistance and the threat of sanctions. To discuss the issue of Iran's nuclear program and its possible future repercussions on regional and global security, the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) hosted a symposium entitled Iran's Nuclear Program: Realities and Repercussions, in Abu Dhabi on February 26, 2006. Visiting experts were invited to share their views on the Iranian nuclear program, its likely development and the extent to which the potential threat of nuclear weapons could destabilize the Arabian Gulf and the broader Middle East region. This volume represents a valuable collection of these expert views, covering Iran's current nuclear capability and its potential to develop atomic weapons; the changes and developments in Iran's nuclear program since the 2005 Iranian presidential elections; Israeli foreign policy in relation to Iran; the possible impact that an Iranian nuclear program could have on the security of the GCC; and the prospect of military action against Iran.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran¿s IAEA safeguards agree. The IAEA referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in Feb. 2006. The Security Council required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA¿s investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. This report provides an overview of Iran¿s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA and the Security Council.

Considering the latest Iranian nuclear developments, one might question whether a study now on how best to restrain Tehran is simply one that's come too late. To be sure, estimates vary as to when Iran could build its first bomb. Some believe Tehran could do it before the end of 2005; others think Iran would only be able to do so by the end of the decade. In either case, though, the die seems cast: If Iran wants, it has all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on its own. Certainly, trying to deny Iran further nuclear technology in the hopes that this will prevent it from getting nuclear weapons is no longer a credible strategy. The questions this edited volume addresses are whether or not any strategy can prevent Iran from going nuclear, what the proper goals of such a strategy might be (deterring use, keeping Tehran from deploying weapons, getting it to dismantle its nuclear program, etc.), and what other nonproliferation goals ought to be attempted (including trying to dissuade other nations from following Iran's example). The answers this volume offers are: 1) in the long-run Iran will gain little from going nuclear, and 2) much can be gained by enforcing the nonproliferation rules Iran agreed to and spelling out the costs to Iran of its continuing acquisition of nuclear weapons- related capabilities.