Islamic Public Law Islamic Law In Theory And Practice

This book deals with the theory and practice of Islamic law in both the formative classic and modern periods and over a wide range of societies. The book also focuses on the role of Ijtihad in both Sunni and Shi'i fiqh and in collections of fatwa

“Islamic law contains explications and divisions that imply a classification in terms of public and private law. In this book we will explain the outlines of Islamic public law, e.g. First Chapter; Islamic constitutional law (al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyyah) and administrative law (al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyyah); Second Chapter; penal law (al-̒uqūbāt); Third Chapter; financial law (zakāt, ʻushr, ḫarāj and other taxes); Fourth Chapter; trial law (qaḍā), and Fifth Chapter: international public law (al-siyar). The fields of especially Islamic constitutional law, administrative law, financial law, ta‘zīr penalties, and arrangements concerning military law based on the restricted legislative authority vested by Sharī‘ah rules and those jurisprudential decrees based on secondary sources like customs and traditions and the public good (maslahah) all fell under what was variously called public law, al-siyāsah al-shar‘iyyah (Sharī‘ah policy), qānūn (legal code), qānūnnāmah, ‘orfī ḥuqūq etc. Since these laws could not go beyond Sharī‘ah principles either, at least in theory, they should not be regarded as a legal system outside of Islamic law. But Islamic penal law, financial law, trial law, and international law depend mostly on rules that are based directly on the Qur’an and the Sunnah and codified in books of fiqh (Islamic law) called Sharī‘ah rules, Sharʻ-i sharīf, or Sharī‘ah law. Such rules formed 85% of the legal system. In this book, we will focus on some controversial problems in the Muslim world today, such as the form of government in Islamic law and the relation between Islam and democracy. Islamic law does not stipulate a certain method of state government; nonetheless, we may say that the principles it decrees and its concept of sovereignty suggest a religious republic. As a matter of fact, Ḫulafā al-Rāshidūn (the Rightly Guided Caliphs), were both caliphs and religious republican presidents. We could say that this book has three main characteristics. i) We have tried to base our explanations directly on the primary Islamic law sources. For example, after reading some articles on the caliphate or tīmār system in articles or books by some Western scholars and even by some Muslim scholars, one might conclude that there are different views on these subjects among Muslim scholars. This is not true: Muslisms have agreed on the basic rules on legal subjects, but there are some conflicts regarding nuances and interpretations. If one reads works by Imām Gazzali, Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Māwardi, and al-Farrā’, one will not find any disagreement on the main rules, but there are some different interpretations of some concepts. We have tried to discover where they agreed and we have sometimes pointed to where they differed. ii) We have researched practices of Islamic law, especially legal documents in the Ottoman archives. For example, we explain ḥadd-i sariqa but also mention some legal articles from the Ottoman legal codes (qānunnāmes) and some Sharī‘ah court decisions like legal decrees (i‘lāmāt-i shar‘iyyah). It is well known that nobody can understand any legal system without implementing and practicing it. That also holds for Islamic law because theory alone does not yield a complete understanding of Sharī‘ah rules. iii) We have worked hard to correct some misconceptions and misunderstandings about Islamic law. That is why we appeal to the primary sources. For example, some scholars claim that the Ḥanafī jurist Imām Saraḫsī did not accept the idea of punishment for apostasy. We have studied his work al-Mabsūt and found this claim to be unfounded. The comparison between tīmār and fief is another example because the tīmār system is different from the fief system. Some scholars confuse the concept of sovereignty and governance. The Islamic state is not a theocratic state in the sense in which Europeans understand the term.”

“The world today has become one large village. Muslims and non-Muslims live side by side and have to learn about one another, share commonalities and respect differences. At this time more than one and a half billion Muslims live in this village. Some of them are pious Muslims, trying to live in accordance with Islamic rules, whereas others do not while believing that these rules come from God (the Qur’an), from interpretations of His Messenger (the Sunnah) or the consensus of Muslim jurists (ijmâ‘), and are at least rules derived via analogy (qiyâs) from the main sources of Islam. Most Muslims think along these lines and agree with the above. The reader should remember that Muslim individuals should live according to Islamic rules in private, but no individual is responsible for implementing Islamic law. In any event, the need to learn the facts about Islamic law is necessary for Muslims as well as for non-Muslims if they live in the same society with Muslims, at least in the sense of general information. In any event, the need to learn the facts about Islamic law is necessary for Muslims as well as for non-Muslims if they live in the same society with Muslims, at least in the sense of general information. We should keep in mind here that only sovereign Muslim states/governments have the legal authority to implement Islamic law. An individual Muslim has no legal authority or power to implement Islamic law. The law of Islam certainly does not say that every Muslim is obliged to implement Islamic law. It matters not how efficient and popular that individual may be as a brave warrior or a meticulous planner of unlawful and immoral schemes of hatred, terror and destruction. Only people who are properly qualified and trained, and hold a license from Muslim governmental authorities, have the authority to issue fatwâs. Not every Muslim individual qualifies as a Muftî (a jurist-consult or scholar of law who has been given a license to issue fatwâs.). For this reason Bediuzzaman says: “And we know that the fundamental aims of the Qur’an and its essential elements are fourfold: divine unity (al-tawhîd), prophethood (al-nubuwwah), the resurrection of the dead (al-hashr), and justice (al-ʿadalah). Al-Adâlah means law. He adds in another treatise: “Let our ulul-amr (satesmen and political authorities) think over implementing these rules”. This book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter I.Because of the many misunderstandings that arise, some terms related to Islamic Law, such as Sharî‛ah, fiqh, qânûn, ‘urf, Islamic Law, and Muhammadan Law are explained. Chapter II.Here, in this chapter dedicated to references on Islamic Law, the real added value of this book is found. Chapter III. This chapter looks at four periods of Islamic Law: the period of the Prophet Muhammad, the period of the Companions, the period of the Tabi‘în, and an introduction to the period of Mujtahidîn. Chapter IV. We will provide detailed information here on the different law schools and theological divisions. Chapter V. This chapter will be devoted to a period of Islamic law that has been neglected in both old and new books and articles, i.e. the period of Islamic Law after the Turks converted to Islam (960-1926). Chapter VI. This chapter will focus also on three main subjects: Anglo-Muhammadan law (Indo-Muslim law), Syariah or Islamic Law in Southeast Asia, and Islamic Law in contemporary Muslim states like Egypt, Pakistan, Morocco, Indonesia and Jordan. Chapter VII. We will explain the system and methodology of Islamic Law in this chapter. Chapter VIII. We will give some brief information here on the implementation of Islamic Law, its future; some encyclopedical works on Islamic law, and new institutions of Islamic fiqh.”

This volume addresses the structural interrelations of Islamic theoretical and practical legal reasoning, based on an analysis of six works of Islamic jurisprudence by authors who lived in Uzbekistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Algeria between 970 and 1600 CE.

There is no explicit separation in Islâmic law between public and private law, but a special system has been used throughout history. Some scholars use the term Muslim personal law, which derived from the term al-aḥwâl al-shaḫṣiyyah in Fiqh books. But we prefer Islâmic private law; because Muslim personal law indicates different legal meaning – rules governing natural and legal persons. In this book, we will elaborate on Islâmic rules relating to seven branches of private law: personal law, family law, inheritance law, obligations and contracts’ law, property law, commercial law, and international private law. We will explain or summarize Islâmic rules in this book, rather than my (the author’s) personal views. Unfortunately, there is a misunderstanding in Western countries: if any Muslim scholar writes an article or book or grants an interview to a journalist to explain Islâmic rules on any issue, most Westerners, and especially people ignorant of Islâmic Law attribute these views to this scholar and holds him or her accountable. For example, a Dutch journalist came to see me and asked about the issue of beating women in the Qur’an, I explained the verse in the Qur’an and some interpretations by the Prophet Muhammed and Muslim jurists. The journalist did not understand what I explained, and many people have accused me of advising Muslims to beat their women. This is absolutely false. This is why we have to explain the following points. The first point is this: All the regulations in Islâmic law are divided into two groups with respect to to legal authority. First, rules that were based directly on the Qur’an and the Sunnah and codified in books on Fiqh (Islâmic Law) are called Sharî‘ah rules, Shar‘-i Sharîf, or Sharî‘ah law; these rules constitute 85% of the legal system. The exclusive sources of these rules are the Qur’an, the consensus of Muslim jurists, and true analogy (qiyâs). All explanations of these rules based completely on the Qur’an and the Sunnah. If any Muslim scholar writes an article on ‘beating women’ or ‘polygamy,’ he is responsible only for his/her interpretations. Could any scholar be responsible for the religious ideology that he/she explains? Are his/her explanations to be considered propaganda for that religion or ideology? Absolutly not. Western authorities, politicians and journalists should know that Muslims hold that every machine has a manual. If the manual is not followed when the machine is being used or operated, it will break. Allah sent the Qur’an as the manual for human beings. If a society does not take the Qur’an as its guide, it is destined to have the same fate as a machine that is operated without the manual. This is a basic creed for Muslims. A Muslim cannot disagree with a explicit verse of the Qur’an. Second, financial law, land law, ta‘zîr penalties, arrangements concerning military law and administrative law in particular were based on the restricted legislative authority vested by Sharî‘ah decrees and those jurisprudential decrees that were founded on secondary sources such as customs and traditions and the public good, which fell under public law, al-Siyâsah al-Shar‘iyyah (Sharî‘ah policies), Qânûn (Legal Code), and the like. Since these could not exceed the limits of Sharî‘ah principles either, they should not be viewed as a legal system outside of Islâmic Law. The second point is that another classification of the Islâmic rules should be explained. Many Muslims and non-Muslims think that all injunctions in Islâmic Law, such as polygamy and slavery, were established by the Qur’an or the Sunnah directly, and Islâmic Law has been criticized severely for this. The supposition here is false. A further point that causes confusion is the view that there was no slavery, male or female, before Islâm and that Islâm introduced it. There are, however, two kinds of injunctions in Islâmic law. 1) The first are injunctions that were laid down by Islâm as principles for the first time since they did not exist in previous legal systems. Islâm established these principles, such as zakâh, waqf(endowments) and inheritance shares. Muslim scholars state that these are completely beneficial for humankind as a whole. They also contain many instances of wisdom and purpose, even if people are not aware of them. 2) The second are injunctions that Islâm did not introduce; they already existed and Islâm modified them. That is, Islâm was not the first to set them down; rather, they were part of the law systems of other societies and were applied in a savage form. Since it would have been contrary to human nature to abolish injunctions of this kind suddenly and completely, Islâmic Law modified them so that they were no longer barbaric but civilized. Slavery and polygamy are good examples of this.[2] My third point is that I have explained theoretical rules of Islâmic Law in this book, but have not neglected the practice aspect of Islâmic private law. We have focused on the practice of the Ottoman State for Sharî‘ah especially because the Ottoman State practiced Islâmic Law completely, and we have archival documents proving this claim. The study of Shar‘iyyah Records (Shari‘iyyah Sijilleri) proves that in the Ottoman State Sharî‘ah rules were taken as the basis for personal law, family law, inheritance law, jus obligationum, law of commodities, commercial law, and all the branches of private law with respect to international private law. The analysis of the two essential sources of information regarding Ottoman law, viz. legal codices and Shar‘iyyah Records, leads to the following irrefutable conclusion: the Ottoman legislative authorities only and solely codified administrative law, with the exception of various subjects of constitutional law, property law, laws regarding state land, military law, financial law, ta‘zîr(punishment by way of reproof), crimes in criminal law and their penalties and decrees regarding some exceptional issues of private law. In issuing decrees on these it codified Sharî‘ah principles – if any – since matters transferred to the rulers’ arrangements would be made in consideration of such secondary sources as the public good, customs, and traditions. Because it could never be alleged that a state’s legal system consisted solely in the above-mentioned subjects, it could also not be claimed that the stated issues were arranged in disregard of Shar‘-i Sharîf. The explanations below will clarify this matter.[3] The fourth point is that contemporary Islâmic codes from different Muslim countries were not negleced. I have sometimes looked at the Morroccan Family Code (al-Mudawwana),[4] Egyptian laws that are the root of Muslim Middle Eastern countries’ legal systems, Pakistan’s law code which was based on the Ḥanafî Law School. We could say that in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, the effects of Ottoman legal codes, like Majallah and family law continue. The fifth point is as follows. This book is based principally in the Ḥanafî School and Ottoman practice. Nonetheless, comparisons with other schools have been made, especially with the Mâlikî School, which is the official school in Morrocco, the United Arab Emirates, and some other countries, the Shâfi‘î School, which is the official school in Indonesia and some other countries, the Ḥanbalî School, the official school in Saudi Arabia, and some other countries, and finally the Ja’farî School, which is the official school especially in Iran. For comparison between schools, this work has benefitted from some major works on Islâmic law. These works include: M. Zarqa, Al-Fıqh al-İslâmî Fî Thawbih al-Jadîd, c. I-II, Dimaşk 1395/1975; ‘abd al-Rahman al-Jaziri, Al-Fiqh ‘ala al-maḏâhib al-arba‘a, Cairo, 1969; Al-Shahid al Thani (Zayn al-Din Muḥammad ibn ‘Ali al–Jab’i al-‘Amili [d. 965/1558]), Al-Rawdat al-bahiyya fi sharh al-lum‘at al-Dimashqiyya, Beirut, 1967; Abdullah ibn Ahmad ibn Qudâmah al-M’aqdisî, Al-Muqni‘, Cairo, 2005; Ḫalil bin Isḥaq, Al-Tawdîh Sharhu Muḫtasar ibn al-Hâjib, Casablanca, 2012. Some comparative works have also been of benefit. These include: Imran Ahsan Ḫan Nyazee, Outlines of Muslim Personal Law, Advanced Legal Studies Institute, Islâmabad, Pakistan, 2011; Chibli Malla, “Identity and Community Rights Islâmic Family Law: Variations on State,” in Islâmic Family Law, edited by Chibli Mallat & Jane Connors, Graham & Trotman Limited, London 1993; Ahmad Nasir, The Status of Women under Islâmic Law and Modern Islâmic Legislation, Brill, Leiden and An Introduction to the Law of Obligations of Afghanistan, edited by Trevor Kempner, Andrew Lawrence, and Ryan Nelson, Stanford Law School, (PDF). We should not forget some official or semi-official legal codes in Muslim countries that are completely based on Sharî‘ah. For example, Muḥammad Qadri Pasha’a (1306/1889), Murshid al-Hayrân (Guide for the Perplexed), which consists of 1,045 articles; Al-‘Adl Wal Insâf Fi Hall Mushkilât al-Awqâf (Justice and Equity in Solving the Problems of Endowments), which consists of 343 articles; and Al-Aḥkâm al-Shar‘iyyah Fi al-Aḥwâl al-Shaḫṣiyyah (Legal Rulings on Personal Status Law), which consists of 647 articles; Morroccan Family Law (Mudawwanah); The Egyptian Civil Code was written in 1949, whose primary author was Abdel-Razzak al-Sanhuri, who was assisted by Dean Edouard Lambert of the University of Lille; The Egyptian Civil Code has been the source of law and inspiration for numerous other Middle Eastern jurisdictions, including the pre-dictatorship kingdoms of Libya, Jordan, and Iraq (both drafted by Al-Sanhuri himself and a team of native jurists under his guidance), Bahrain, as well as Qatar (the last two merely inspired by his notions) and the commercial code of Kuwait (drafted by Al-Sanhuri); Pakistan Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1961. This book is divided into seven chapters: 1) personal law, 2) family law, 3) inheritance law, 4) obligations and contract Law, 5) property law, 6) commercial law, 7) international private law. We repeat again that we have preferred to write what Muslim jurists (fuqahâ) have argued is how the Qur’an and the Sunnah should be interpreted. Our success will be measured by our ability to correctly reproduce what existed in Islâmic sources. Every human enterprises falls short; we are ready to perfect our study with the help of contributions by readers and constructive criticism. I would like to thank all those who read this book and contribute constructively to it. I am thankful to God Who enabled me to complete this book.

This book explores the relationship between custom and Islamic law and seeks to uncover the role of custom in the construction of legal rulings. On a deeper level, however, it deals with the perennial problem of change and continuity in the Islamic legal tradition (or any tradition for that matter).

The traditional doctrine of Islamic law in regard to international re lations is well known. The Shari'a includes many excellent provisions about declarations of war, treaties of peace, armistices, diplomatic envoys, negotiations and guarantees of safe conduct. But the fact remains that it divides the world, broadly speaking, into the "Abode of Islam" and the "Abode of 'War," and that it envisages the continu ance of intermittent war between them until the latter is absorbed in the former. In the course of such fighting, and in the intervals in be tween, many civilities were to be meticulously observed; but prisoners of war could be killed, sold or enslaved at the discretion of the Muslim authorities, and the women of those who resisted the advance of Islam could be taken as slave-concubines, regardless of whether they were single or married. The "Abode of Islam" did not, indeed, consist ex clusively of Muslims, for those whose religion was based on a book accepted by Islam as originally inspired and in practice, indeed, those other religions too - were not forced to embrace Islam but only to accept Muslim rule. They were granted the status of dhimmis, were protected in their persons and their property, were allowed to follow their own religion in an unobtrusive fashion, and were accorded the position of essentially second-class citizens. They were also of course, perfectly free to embrace Islam; but for a Muslim to be converted to another faith involved the death penalty.

This handbook is a detailed reference source comprising original articles covering the origins, history, theory and practice of Islamic law. The handbook starts out by dealing with the question of what type of law is Islamic law and includes a critical analysis of the pedagogical approaches to studying and analysing Islamic law as a discipline. The handbook covers a broad range of issues, including the role of ethics in Islamic jurisprudence, the mechanics and processes of interpretation, the purposes and objectives of Islamic law, constitutional law and secularism, gender, bioethics, Muslim minorities in the West, jihad and terrorism. Previous publications on this topic have approached Islamic law from a variety of disciplinary and pedagogical perspectives. One of the original features of this handbook is that it treats Islamic law as a legal discipline by taking into account the historical functions and processes of legal cultures and the patterns of legal thought. With contributions from a selection of highly regarded and leading scholars in this field, the Routledge Handbook of Islamic Law is an essential resource for students and scholars who are interested in the field of Islamic Law.