Israel S National Security Predicament

This book provides a ground-breaking assessment of the Israeli national security experience from the establishment of the country through to the present day. Seventy-five years after its establishment, the State of Israel continues to face an acute national security predicament as a result of the still unresolved Arab–Israeli conflict. This monograph offers a new framework for analyzing this experience, first exploring the crucial events of the past and present that define it, including interstate wars, asymmetrical wars, low-intensity conflicts, and developments in weapons of mass destruction. The book then probes how Israel’s evolving national security doctrine has addressed these various challenges over the years, highlighting the roles of a number of variables: deterrence, warning, and decision; strategic depth and defensible borders; the quality and quantity of fighting men and machines; intelligence; self-reliance in military matters; foreign policy; and the influence of ethnic demography, societal resilience, economic prosperity, and water security. Written in accessible, non-technical language, the book will appeal to general readers seeking an introduction to Israeli security as well as to specialists and researchers in various fields, including Israeli history, Middle Eastern politics, and security studies.

This book analyses both the substance of Israel's National security law and the dynamics of its historical development. It examines the normative principles upon which Israel's national security law is based, institutional arrangements for the formulation and protection of national security law, and the style in which Israeli national security law is formulated.

This volumes discusses three principal issues: the Israeli army and the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA); Israel's present and future answers to the threays of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and the impact of societal, political, and technological changes on Israel's future war objectives.

For more than forty years Yitzhak Rabin played a critical role in shaping Israeli national security policy and military doctrine. He began as a soldier in the Palmach, the elite underground unit of the Jewish community in Palestine, served in the 1948 War of Independence, and ultimately became chief of staff of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), defense minister in several governments, ambassador to the United States, and, twice, prime minister. As chief of staff, Rabin led the IDF to its triumph in the 1967 Six Day War. He was assassinated in 1995 as prime minister as he left a peace rally. Drawing on unpublished materials and interviews with important sources, including Rabin himself, Efraim Inbar's work offers a systematic study of Rabin's strategic thinking and his policies. Topics include the evolution of Rabin's thinking, his contributions to IDF military buildup, his stress on Israel's relationship to the United States, his attitudes toward the use of force, and his approach to Israel's nuclear status in the Middle East. Inbar's conclusion evaluates Rabin's contribution to Israel's national security and assesses Rabin's personal transition from warrior to peace maker. Because of Rabin's crucial role in Israel's defense establishment at important junctures in its history, this book provides an important view into the security challenges Israel has faced and how the country has responded over four decades.

In Zion's Dilemmas, a former deputy national security adviser to the State of Israel details the history and, in many cases, the chronic inadequacies in the making of Israeli national security policy. Chuck Freilich identifies profound, ongoing problems that he ascribes to a series of factors: a hostile and highly volatile regional environment, Israel's proportional representation electoral system, and structural peculiarities of the Israeli government and bureaucracy.Freilich uses his insider understanding and substantial archival and interview research to describe how Israel has made strategic decisions and to present a first of its kind model of national security decision-making in Israel. He analyzes the major events of the last thirty years, from Camp David I to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, through Camp David II, the Gaza Disengagement Plan of 2005, and the second Lebanon war of 2006.In these and other cases he identifies opportunities forgone, failures that resulted from a flawed decision-making process, and the entanglement of Israeli leaders in an inconsistent, highly politicized, and sometimes improvisational planning process. The cabinet is dysfunctional and Israel does not have an effective statutory forum for its decision-making—most of which is thus conducted in informal settings. In many cases policy objectives and options are poorly formulated. For all these problems, however, the Israeli decision-making process does have some strengths, among them the ability to make rapid and flexible responses, generally pragmatic decision-making, effective planning within the defense establishment, and the skills and motivation of those involved. Freilich concludes with cogent and timely recommendations for reform.

This volumes discusses three principal issues: the Israeli army and the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA); Israel's present and future answers to the threays of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and the impact of societal, political, and technological changes on Israel's future war objectives.

This volume presents a comprehensive analysis of Israel's security challenges since the 1973 October War. Efraim Inbar takes the reader on a historical journey through Israel's relations in the Middle East that begins with an analysis of Israel's strategic thinking after 1973 and ends with an important look at the recent Second Lebanese War and the Iranian nuclear challenge. Israel's National Security delves not only into Israel's responses, but also its relationships in the international community, providing a complete picture of how Israel's strategic environment has evolved over time. Relevant to today's current political atmosphere, the volume dissects the influences of the growing appeal of Islamic extremism on the peace process, Israel strategic partnerships with India and Turkey, and Israel's relations with the Palestinians.

This book examines how the Zionist movement, and later the state of Israel, have dealt with various longstanding efforts to delegitimize Israel’s standing in the international community, including by the Arab League Boycott, the United Nations, and the Boycott, Divest and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Through historical and archival research, as well as discourse analysis of legal and governmental documents, public statements of Israeli officials, and interviews with Israeli policy makers, this book argues that Israel has constructed perceived and real challenges to its legitimacy as ontological threats that undermine its national security, and has securitized its Jewish identity in response to these threats. As a result, the state has adopted extraordinary measures, often marked by illiberalism. Rather than enhance Israel’s international legitimacy, these measures have undermined it further, especially among liberal audiences in the West, whose support is critical for Israel’s continued international legitimacy. Therefore, Israel is locked in a securitization dilemma—where actions taken to enhance its security through increased legitimacy result in further delegitimization. Highlighting the ways this securitization dilemma is at the heart of Israeli policymaking today—particularly in the context of the recent BDS movement—this book brings into focus key problems that Israel faces as it attempts to combat delegitimization movements against its self-constructed identity as a Jewish state. This book will be of great interest to students, scholars, and policy makers engaged with critical security studies and delegitimization, Israeli studies and Jewish identity, and policymaking in the Middle East.