Israeli Politics And The Middle East Peace Process 1988 2002

The book is a fresh interpretation of Israeli foreign policy vis-à-vis the peace process, one that deems domestic political factors as the key to explain the shift within Israel from war to peace. The main assumption is that peacemaking that entails territorial compromise is an issue that can only be completely comprehended by understanding the interaction of domestic factors such as inter-party politics, ideology, personality and the politics of coalition. Although the bulk of the book focuses on how internal inputs informed the peace process, the book takes into account the external factors and how they impacted on the internal constellation of political forces in Israel.

This book argues that domestic Israeli politics have been a key factor in determining Israeli-Palestinian peacmaking in the period from 1988 to the present.

There has been a serious deterioration of the peace process since 1996, particularly regarding the Palestinians and Israelis. The stalemate can be attributed to domestic variables in Israel, such as the fragmented political system, internal contests and the balance of power. The factional power base, ideology and personalities of leaders like Netanyahu, Barak and Sharon have played a crucial role, as well as the responses of Israelis to the actions of some Palestinians. This study demonstrates that there is a strong link between Israel's internal political system and its foreign policy.

Political stability is a crucial precondition for peace in the Middle East. In The Middle East Peace Process: Vision versus Reality, Joseph Ginat, Edward J. Perkins, and Edwin G. Corr have assembled a comprehensive overview of the complex peace negotiations taking place among Middle Eastern nations to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and forge normal relations between Arab nations and Israel. More than thirty academics and practitioners probe, discuss, and engage themselves with issues concerning the peace process. The volume focuses first on the Oslo Agreement and the Palestinian Track; then addresses Israeli relations with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq; and concludes with an examination of relations between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem. The Middle East Peace Process is the result of the Center for Peace Studies conference “The Peace Process in the Middle East,” cosponsored by the International Program Center at the University of Oklahoma and the University of Haifa in Israel. The volume features a foreword by HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan and a preface by David L. Boren, President of the University of Oklahoma.

The book is a fresh interpretation of Israeli foreign policy vis-à-vis the peace process, one that deems domestic political factors as the key to explain the shift within Israel from war to peace. The main assumption is that peacemaking that entails territorial compromise is an issue that can only be completely comprehended by understanding the interaction of domestic factors such as inter-party politics, ideology, personality and the politics of coalition. Although the bulk of the book focuses on how internal inputs informed the peace process, the book takes into account the external factors and how they impacted on the internal constellation of political forces in Israel.

One message of Peace Process is that the United States has had, and will continue to have, a crucial role in helping Israel and her Arab neighbors reach peace. If American presidents play their role with skill, they can make a lasting contribution. But just as likely, they may misread the realities of the Middle East and add to the impasse by their own errors.

Eight years after the second Palestinian uprising, the Oslo accords signed in 1993 seem to have failed. This book explores one of the major aspects of the bilateral peace process - the composition and behaviour of the Palestinian negotiating team, which deeply impacted the outcome of the negotiations between 1991 and 1997.

Drawing on a newly developed theoretical definition of “missed opportunity,” Chances for Peace uses extensive sources in English, Hebrew, and Arabic to systematically measure the potentiality levels of opportunity across some ninety years of attempted negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict. With enlightening revelations that defy conventional wisdom, this study provides a balanced account of the most significant attempts to forge peace, initiated by the world’s superpowers, the Arabs (including the Palestinians), and Israel. From Arab-Zionist negotiations at the end of World War I to the subsequent partition, the aftermath of the 1967 War and the Sadat Initiative, and numerous agreements throughout the 1980s and 1990s, concluding with the Annapolis Conference in 2007 and the Abu Mazen-Olmert talks in 2008, pioneering scholar Elie Podeh uses empirical criteria and diverse secondary sources to assess the protagonists’ roles at more than two dozen key junctures. A resource that brings together historiography, political science, and the practice of peace negotiation, Podeh’s insightful exploration also showcases opportunities that were not missed. Three agreements in particular (Israeli-Egyptian, 1979; Israeli-Lebanese, 1983; and Israeli-Jordanian, 1994) illuminate important variables for forging new paths to successful negotiation. By applying his framework to a broad range of power brokers and time periods, Podeh also sheds light on numerous incidents that contradict official narratives. This unique approach is poised to reshape the realm of conflict resolution.