Japan S Nuclear Disaster And The Politics Of Safety Governance

In Japan's Nuclear Disaster and the Politics of Safety Governance, Florentine Koppenborg argues that the regulatory reforms taken up in the wake of the Fukushima disaster on March 11, 2011, directly and indirectly raised the costs of nuclear power in Japan. The Nuclear Regulation Authority resisted capture by the nuclear industry and fundamentally altered the environment for nuclear policy implementation. Independent safety regulation changed state-business relations in the nuclear power domain from regulatory capture to top-down safety regulation, which raised technical safety costs for electric utilities. Furthermore, the safety agency's extended emergency preparedness regulations expanded the allegorical backyard of NIMBY demonstrations. Antinuclear protests, mainly lawsuits challenging restarts, incurred additional social acceptance costs. Increasing costs undermined pronuclear actors' ability to implement nuclear power policy and caused a rift inside the "nuclear village." Small nuclear safety administration reforms were, in fact, game changers for nuclear power politics in Japan. Koppenborg's findings contribute to the vibrant conversations about the rise of independent regulatory agencies, crisis as a mechanism for change, and the role of nuclear power amid global interest in decarbonizing our energy supply.

Nuclear Disaster at Fukushima Daiichi is a timely and groundbreaking account of the disturbing landscape of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown amidst an earthquake and tsunami on Japan’s northeast coastline on March 11, 2011. It provides riveting insights into the social and political landscape of nuclear power development in Japan, which significantly contributed to the disaster; the flawed disaster management options taken; and the political, technical, and social reactions as the accident unfolded. In doing so, it critically reflects on the implications for managing future nuclear disasters, for effective and responsible regulation and good governance of controversial science and technology, or technoscience, and for the future of nuclear power itself, both in Japan and internationally. Informed by a leading cast of international scholars in science, technology and society studies, the book is at the forefront of discussing the Fukushima Daiichi disaster at the intersection of social, environmental and energy security and good governance when such issues dominate global agendas for sustainable futures. Its powerful critique of the risks and hazards of nuclear energy alongside poor disaster management is an important counterbalance to the plans for nuclear build as central to sustainable energy in the face of climate change, increasing extreme weather events and environmental problems, and diminishing fossil fuel, peak oil, and rising electricity costs. Adding significantly to the consideration and debate of these critical issues, the book will interest academics, policy-makers, energy pundits, public interest organizations, citizens and students engaged variously with Fukushima itself, disaster management, political science, environmental/energy policy and risk, public health, sociology, public participation, civil society activism, new media, sustainability, and technology governance.

This book begins with the analysis of America’s post-war intelligence operations, propaganda campaigns, and strategic psychological warfare in Japan. Banking on nuclear safety myths, Japan promoted an aggressive policy of locating and building nuclear power plants in depopulated areas suffering from a significant decline of local industries and economies. The Fukushima nuclear disaster substantiated that U.S. propaganda programs left a long lasting legacy in Japan and beyond and created the futile ground for the future nuclear disaster. The book reveals Japan's tripartite organization of the dominating state, media-monopoly, and nuclear-plant oligarchy advancing nuclear proliferation. It details America’s unprecedented pro-nuclear propaganda campaigns; Japan’s secret ambitions to develop its own nuclear bombs; U.S. dumping of reprocessed plutonium on Japan; and the joint U.S.-Nippon propaganda campaigns for "safe" nuclear-power and the current “safe-nuclear particles” myths. The study shows how the bankruptcy of the central state has led to increased burdens on the population in post-nuclear tsunami era, and the ensuing dangerous ionization of the population now reaching into the future.

The triple disaster that struck Japan in March 2011 forced people living there to confront new risks in their lives. Despite the Japanese government’s reassurance that radiation exposure would be small and unlikely to affect the health of the general population, many questioned the government’s commitment to protecting their health. The disaster prompted them to become vigilant about limiting their risk exposure, and food emerged as a key area where citizens could determine their own levels of acceptable risk. Food Safety after Fukushima examines the process by which notions about what is safe to eat were formulated after the nuclear meltdown. Its central argument is that as citizens informed themselves about potential risks, they also became savvier in their assessment of the government’s handling of the crisis. The author terms this “Scientific Citizenship,” and he shows that the acquisition of scientific knowledge on the part of citizens resulted in a transformed relationship between individuals and the state. Groups of citizens turned to existing and newly formed organizations where food was sourced from areas far away from the nuclear accident or screened to stricter standards than those required by the state. These organizations enabled citizens to exchange information about the disaster, meet food producers, and work to establish networks of trust where food they considered safe could circulate. Based on extensive fieldwork and interviews with citizens groups, mothers’ associations, farmers, government officials, and retailers, Food Safety after Fukushima reflects on how social relations were affected by the accident. The author vividly depicts an environment where trust between food producers and consumers had been shaken, where people felt uneasy about their food choices and the consequences they might have for their children, and where farmers were forced to deal with the consequences of pollution that was not of their making. Most poignantly, the book conveys the heavy burden now attached to the name “Fukushima” in the popular imagination and explores efforts to resurrect it.

Confronting the challenges of nuclear power governance, this book provides pathways to nuclear safety cooperation between countries in East Asia where regional cooperation is challenged by geopolitical tensions. The book is split into three parts: first looking at nuclear risk and safety communications, second on nuclear policy and harmonization of safety standards, and third a comparative analysis of nuclear regulatory agencies in East Asia. Taken as a whole, the contributors recommend the establishment of a nuclear safety system that, which allows for mutual verification of safety standards at the regional level, and a regulatory framework with international credibility, which will help standardize risk communication. They suggest that the exchange of experiences involving nuclear power plant safety, efforts toward common safety standards, safety management, and collaborative efforts between Japan, China, and South Korea are extremely urgent issues. By comparing the European system of nuclear governance with that of East Asia, the book highlights the need for nuclear safety organizations in East Asia to strengthen interconnections and build regional linkages. This book will be of interest to policymakers, academics, and researchers in the field of energy policy, energy economics, nuclear safety, nuclear governance, and nuclear engineering.

The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. "Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants" is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. "Lessons Learned" makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, "Lessons Learned" is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations.

When the Nuclear Safety Commission in Japan reviewed safety-design guidelines for nuclear plants in 1990, the regulatory agency explicitly ruled out the need to consider prolonged AC power loss. In other words, nothing like the catastrophe at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station was possible—no tsunami of 45 feet could swamp a nuclear power station and knock out its emergency systems. No blackout could last for days. No triple meltdown could occur. Nothing like this could ever happen. Until it did—over the course of a week in March 2011. In this volume and in gripping detail, the Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, a civilian-led group, presents a thorough and powerful account of what happened within hours and days after this nuclear disaster, the second worst in history. It documents the findings of a working group of more than thirty people, including natural scientists and engineers, social scientists and researchers, business people, lawyers, and journalists, who researched this crisis involving multiple simultaneous dangers. They conducted over 300 investigative interviews to collect testimony from relevant individuals. The responsibility of this committee was to act as an external ombudsman, summarizing its conclusions in the form of an original report, published in Japanese in February 2012. This has now been substantially rewritten and revised for this English-language edition. The work reveals the truth behind the tragic saga of the multiple catastrophic accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.It serves as a valuable and essential historical reference, which will help to inform and guide future nuclear safety and policy in both Japan and internationally.

The Fukushima Effect offers a range of scholarly perspectives on the international effect of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown four years out from the disaster. Grounded in the field of science, technology and society (STS) studies, a leading cast of international scholars from the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the United States examine the extent and scope of the Fukushima effect. The authors each focus on one country or group of countries, and pay particular attention to national histories, debates and policy responses on nuclear power development covering such topics as safety of nuclear energy, radiation risk, nuclear waste management, development of nuclear energy, anti-nuclear protest movements, nuclear power representations, and media representations of the effect. The countries featured include well established ‘nuclear nations’, emergent nuclear nations and non-nuclear nations to offer a range of contrasting perspectives. This volume will add significantly to the ongoing international debate on the Fukushima disaster and will interest academics, policy-makers, energy pundits, public interest organizations, citizens and students engaged variously with the Fukushima disaster itself, disaster management, political science, environmental/energy policy and risk, public health, sociology, public participation, civil society activism, new media, sustainability, and technology governance.