Joint Operations And The Vicksburg Campaign

This historical study investigates why Union joint operations between army and navy forces on the Mississippi and other western rivers were effective. It examines the development of a joint doctrine at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Joint riverine warfare on the western rivers was a new experience for the U.S. military. There was no clear delineation between services of specific missions or responsibilities. Joint operations incorporated numerous battlefield operating systems that the leadership had to integrate and synchronize. At the strategic level, Washington attempted to provide adequate vessels and other resources for the war on the rivers. However, the national leadership never did institute an adequate joint command and control structure for the Western Theater. The army operational commanders came to depend on the advice of the naval officers for acquiring vessels and advice on water-borne operations. On the other hand, the naval officers relied on the infrastructure of an established army to facilitate their operations. The personalities of the joint leadership were important factors in the success of joint warfare. Grant, Sherman, and Porter developed a special relationship, which allowed them to overcome tactical disagreements, and maintain a clear focus on the strategic objective of capturing Vicksburg.

In the same week that Union forces triumphed at Gettysburg, they also captured the river fortress at Vicksburg, Mississippi. Although much less memorialized than Gettysburg, the fall of Vicksburg was every bit as crucial to the Union cause. Pitting Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman against John Pemberton and Joseph Johnston, the victorious Vicksburg Campaign helped revive a war-weary North, gave it absolute control of the Mississippi River, severed the western Confederacy from the East, and further constricted the South's ability to wage war as the Union drove ever deeper into its heartland. It also gave Grant-the campaign's chief architect-a dramatic venue for demonstrating his maturing skills and intelligence as a strategist and field commander. Unlike other volumes in the U.S. Army War College Guides to Civil War Battles series, this one examines an entire campaign, looking at many interlinked battles and joint Army-Navy operations as they played out over seven months and thousands of square miles of rivers, streams, swamps, lakes, forests, hills, and plains surrounding Vicksburg. In addition to detailed coverage of the actual Siege of Vicksburg, the book also chronicles the battles at Jackson, Port Gibson, Raymond, Champions Hill, and Big Black Ridge. Like the other volumes in the series, this one combines eyewitness accounts with maps, illustrations, and tour directions to illuminate the events for both tourists and arm-chair travellers. For anyone interested in learning more about this relatively neglected but pivotal Civil War campaign, the Guide to the Vicksburg Campaign is must reading.

This study is a historical analysis of the cavalry raids led by Confederate Major Generals Earl Van Dorn and Nathan Bedford Forrest in December 1862 and Union Colonel Benjamin Grierson in April 1863. Each raid is examined in detail based on the historical data available and focuses on the operational concerns and considerations of Union and Confederate commanders. Some of the conclusions that can be drawn from this investigation are: the use of cavalry had evolved to large, independent units for separate operations; the operational benefit of cavalry was demonstrated first by the Confederacy, then refined and used by the Federals during the Vicksburg Campaign; the synchronization and orchestration of units from different commands against a common target produced significant benefits; and sufficiently strong units, capable of self-sustainment, can be detached from the main body of an army to operate behind enemy lines to destroy the enemy Infrastructure. The study concludes that operational raids can be a significant economical operation to attack an enemy center of gravity without using the bulk of the army. The historical examples from the Vicksburg Campaign can be compared to today’s force structure to show that capability is limited for the modem commander.

The Vicksburg Campaign, November 1862-July 1863 continues the series of campaign brochures commemorating our national sacrifices during the American Civil War. Author Christopher R. Gabel examines the operations for the control of Vicksburg, Mississippi. President Abraham Lincoln called Vicksburg "the key," and indeed it was as control of the Mississippi River depended entirely on the taking of this Confederate stronghold.

Includes over 30 maps and Illustrations The Staff Ride Handbook for the Vicksburg Campaign, December 1862-July 1863, provides a systematic approach to the analysis of this key Civil War campaign. Part I describes the organization of the Union and Confederate Armies, detailing their weapons, tactics, and logistical, engineer, communications, and medical support. It also includes a description of the U.S. Navy elements that featured so prominently in the campaign. Part II consists of a campaign overview that establishes the context for the individual actions to be studied in the field. Part III consists of a suggested itinerary of sites to visit in order to obtain a concrete view of the campaign in its several phases. For each site, or “stand,” there is a set of travel directions, a discussion of the action that occurred there, and vignettes by participants in the campaign that further explain the action and which also allow the student to sense the human “face of battle.” Part IV provides practical information on conducting a Staff Ride in the Vicksburg area, including sources of assistance and logistical considerations. Appendix A outlines the order of battle for the significant actions in the campaign. Appendix B provides biographical sketches of key participants. Appendix C provides an overview of Medal of Honor conferral in the campaign. An annotated bibliography suggests sources for preliminary study.

The Union victory at Gettysburg is widely considered the turning point of the Civil War but many scholars consider the capture of Vicksburg the decisive action. Building on a well-established body of literature—including the author’s previous work—this book provides a comprehensive narrative and single-volume reference work on the Vicksburg Campaign. The action is traced from Farragut’s failed navy-only efforts to bypass the city, through Grant’s botched series of canal schemes, to his brilliant series of maneuvers that left Pemberton and his garrison besieged for more than 40 days. Key Union and Confederate players are identified and the strategic circumstances that made Vicksburg the lynchpin of the Western Theater are described. Appendices include information about Vicksburg National Military Park, the Federal and Confederate Orders of Battle and the Medal of Honor at Vicksburg.

In his introduction John D. Milligan considers Reed's provocative thesis that General George B. McClellan's concept of a grand strategy would have ended the bloodshed sooner.