Joint Operations And The Vicksburg Campaign

This historical study investigates why Union joint operations between army and navy forces on the Mississippi and other western rivers were effective. It examines the development of a joint doctrine at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Joint riverine warfare on the western rivers was a new experience for the U.S. military. There was no clear delineation between services of specific missions or responsibilities. Joint operations incorporated numerous battlefield operating systems that the leadership had to integrate and synchronize. At the strategic level, Washington attempted to provide adequate vessels and other resources for the war on the rivers. However, the national leadership never did institute an adequate joint command and control structure for the Western Theater. The army operational commanders came to depend on the advice of the naval officers for acquiring vessels and advice on water-borne operations. On the other hand, the naval officers relied on the infrastructure of an established army to facilitate their operations. The personalities of the joint leadership were important factors in the success of joint warfare. Grant, Sherman, and Porter developed a special relationship, which allowed them to overcome tactical disagreements, and maintain a clear focus on the strategic objective of capturing Vicksburg.

While the United States assumes the role of the world's only superpower, the armed forces are experiencing reductions in both funding and manpower. If the military is to effectively implement National Military Strategy, there must be unity of effort among the services. In an effort to learn from history, this study examines the Vicksburg campaign of 1863 to determine if it offers an example of effective joint operations. It argues that the eventual success of the Vicksburg campaign was the result of excellent relationships between the theater commanders, not insightful guidance from Washington or a shared perspective of how to win the war among the service secretaries.

The Vicksburg Campaign of 1863 was conducted as a joint operation that involved forces of the United States Army, the United States Navy, and the United States Marine Corps. Additionally, during the Vicksburg Campaign military forces from both the active and reserve components, of that time, were utilized to conduct combat operations against the Confederate Army. The Vicksburg Campaign of 1863 can serve as a historical case study of early Joint Operations with relevant lessons for today. The Vicksburg Campaign of 1863 is justified in being called a Joint Operation for several reasons. The campaign, and the series of battles of which it consisted, was planned and executed by forces of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Many of these forces conducted combat operations while under the command of a single Joint Force Commander. Additionally, a simplified version of the Joint Operations Planning Process was used by the commanders of the Land Force Component and the Maritime Component. During the campaign Joint Fires, Joint Intelligence, Joint Communication, and Joint Logistics were conducted in support of combat operations. Finally, both the Army and Navy commanders were given Coordinating Authority to conduct Joint Operations by their respective chains of command. The campaign to capture Vicksburg is one of the most daring in American military history. The commanders of both the Army and Naval forces were convinced that only by acting jointly could the campaign succeed. Today, the military forces of the United States are committed by law and by doctrine to operating jointly, with an integrated force of both active and reserve components. We can learn much from General Grant and Admiral Porter about embracing the spirit of cooperation and teamwork that is needed to fight and win with such a joint force.

This analysis examines joint operations in the Vicksburg Campaign. It first focuses on the commanders and their personalities, and then discusses the significance of the relationship between Generals Grant and Sherman, and Admiral Porter. With the absence of formalized doctrine for joint operations and unity of command, unity of effort became critical to success. A brief overview of the campaign is provided for orientation, and to show its strategic significance. A discussion of the actual joint operations, with emphasis on the principles of unity of command and unity of effort follows the general overview. In concluding, the paper asserts that joint operations were essential to success at Vicksburg, and that these operations were only possible because of the commanders and the unity of effort they were able to achieve. A valuable lesson derived from this study is that a systemized unity of command is essential in operational warfare. Future campaigns may not have commanders like Grant, Sherman, and Porter, who develop such a strong unity of effort and focus toward a commonly recognized objective, as was accomplished at Vicksburg.

This study analyzes Union and Confederate strategic and operational decisions, resources, and actions taken during joint operations conducted during the Vicksburg Campaign of 1863. The primary operation examined, the Yazoo Pass Expedition, was authorized by Major General Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the Department of the Tennessee, and Rear Admiral David D. Porter, commanding the Mississippi Squadron. Grant and Porter hoped to open a line of operations extending from the Mississippi River along the Coldwater, Tallahatchie, Yalobusha, and Yazoo Rivers. This line of operations would be used to establish a lodgement on the Confederate right flank north of Vicksburg in order to outflank Confederate defenders at Vicksburg, Mississippi. The Yazoo Pass Expedition was one of the longest flanking maneuvers attempted during the war. Joint operations were essential to maneuver along an inland water route of over 400 river miles. However, no joint structure or doctrine existed at the time to compel either service to submit to the command of the other. Experience gained from this joint cooperation and the ultimate failure of the expedition helped Grant develop as a strategic and operational commander. Modern joint staff officers can benefit from this experience to improve future operations.

In the same week that Union forces triumphed at Gettysburg, they also captured the river fortress at Vicksburg, Mississippi. Although much less memorialized than Gettysburg, the fall of Vicksburg was every bit as crucial to the Union cause. Pitting Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman against John Pemberton and Joseph Johnston, the victorious Vicksburg Campaign helped revive a war-weary North, gave it absolute control of the Mississippi River, severed the western Confederacy from the East, and further constricted the South's ability to wage war as the Union drove ever deeper into its heartland. It also gave Grant-the campaign's chief architect-a dramatic venue for demonstrating his maturing skills and intelligence as a strategist and field commander. Unlike other volumes in the U.S. Army War College Guides to Civil War Battles series, this one examines an entire campaign, looking at many interlinked battles and joint Army-Navy operations as they played out over seven months and thousands of square miles of rivers, streams, swamps, lakes, forests, hills, and plains surrounding Vicksburg. In addition to detailed coverage of the actual Siege of Vicksburg, the book also chronicles the battles at Jackson, Port Gibson, Raymond, Champions Hill, and Big Black Ridge. Like the other volumes in the series, this one combines eyewitness accounts with maps, illustrations, and tour directions to illuminate the events for both tourists and arm-chair travellers. For anyone interested in learning more about this relatively neglected but pivotal Civil War campaign, the Guide to the Vicksburg Campaign is must reading.

This study is a historical analysis of the cavalry raids led by Confederate Major Generals Earl Van Dorn and Nathan Bedford Forrest in December 1862 and Union Colonel Benjamin Grierson in April 1863. Each raid is examined in detail based on the historical data available and focuses on the operational concerns and considerations of Union and Confederate commanders. Some of the conclusions that can be drawn from this investigation are: the use of cavalry had evolved to large, independent units for separate operations; the operational benefit of cavalry was demonstrated first by the Confederacy, then refined and used by the Federals during the Vicksburg Campaign; the synchronization and orchestration of units from different commands against a common target produced significant benefits; and sufficiently strong units, capable of self-sustainment, can be detached from the main body of an army to operate behind enemy lines to destroy the enemy Infrastructure. The study concludes that operational raids can be a significant economical operation to attack an enemy center of gravity without using the bulk of the army. The historical examples from the Vicksburg Campaign can be compared to today’s force structure to show that capability is limited for the modem commander.