Joint Trade Liberalization And Tax Reform In A Small Open Economy

This book brings together research from some of the world s leading tax economists to discuss appropriate directions for tax reform in small open economies. The eminent contributors (including Altshuler, Creedy, Freebairn, Gravelle, Heady, Kalb, Sørensen and Zodrow) investigate the beneficial directions for medium-term tax reform in the light of global developments and lessons from the latest taxation research. In addressing this issue, they review recent advances in both the theoretical and empirical tax literature and reform evidence from individual countries. Topics covered include the impact of taxes on economic performance; international and corporate taxation; personal tax and welfare systems; environmental taxation; and country-specific tax reform experiences. Bringing together leading international experts to explore specific policy reforms, this book will prove essential reading for academics and researchers of public economics, fiscal policy and tax reform. It will also be warmly welcomed both by undergraduate and graduate students of public economics or the economics of taxation, as well as policymakers and government officials working in the area of tax policy.

September 1998 Although trade liberalization has been linked econometrically and through casual empiricism to large income increases, attempts to quantify its impact in static simulation models have shown estimated gains. This paper shows that when the endogenous dynamic effects of trade liberalization are built into simulation models, the estimated gains are indeed very large. But complementary regulatory, financial market, and macroeconomic reforms are important to realize the largest gains. Rutherford and Tarr develop a numerical endogenous growth model approximating an infinite horizon, which allows them to investigate the relationship between trade liberalization and economic growth. Economic theory generally implies that trade liberalization will improve economic growth, and the two phenomena are positively correlated in empirical tests, but the connection is not well-substantiated in numerical general equilibrium models. In the authors' model, an intermediate input affects aggregate output through a Dixit-Stiglitz function. Additional varieties provide the engine of growth in this framework and the existence of this mechanism magnifies the welfare costs. In this model with lump sum revenue replacement, reducing a tariff from 20 percent to 10 percent produces a welfare increase (in terms of Hicksian equivalent variation over the infinite horizon) of 10.7 percent of the present value of consumption in their central model, where the economy is assumed to be unable to borrow on international financial markets. If macroeconomic and financial reforms are in place that would allow international borrowing, however, the same tariff cut is estimated to result in a 37 percent increase in Hicksian equivalent variation. On the other hand, if inefficient replacement taxes must be used in an economy without the capacity to borrow internationally, the gains would be reduced to 4.7 percent. Larger tariff cuts-typical of those in many developing countries over the past 30 years-produce larger estimated welfare gains at least proportionate to the size of the cut. The authors apply the model to five developing countries and estimate the impact of the tariff changes those countries plan to undertake as part of Uruguay Round commitments. Because of the dynamic effects, estimated gains are considerably larger than those found in the literature on the impact of the Uruguay Round. This paper-a product of Trade, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the impact of trade and investment on economic growth. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project The Dynamic Impact of Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries (RPO 681-40). David Tarr may be contacted at [email protected].

This publication is a practitioner's guide for analyzing the distributional impact of reforms to trade, monetary and exchange rate policy, utility provision, agricultural markets, land policy and education. These six areas of policy reform are the ones most likely to have an impact on distribution and poverty. Such analysis helps in policy formulation and development and for implementing poverty reduction strategies in developing countries. Each chapter in this volume provides an overview and guidance on the specific issues arising in the analysis of the distributional impacts of policy and institutional reforms in selected sectors.

The authors consider how service liberalization differs from goods liberalization in terms of welfare, the level and composition of output, and factor prices within a developing economy, in this case Tunisia. Despite recent movements toward liberalization, Tunisian service sectors remain largely closed to foreign participation and are provided at high cost relative to many developing nations. The authors develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Tunisian economy with multiple products and services and three trading partners. They model goods liberalization as the unilateral removal of product tariffs. Restraints on services trade involve both restrictions on cross-border supply (mode 1 in the GATS) and on foreign ownership through foreign direct investment (mode 3 in the GATS). The former are modeled as tariff-equivalent price wedges while the latter are comprised of both monopoly-rent distortions (arising from imperfect competition among domestic producers) and inefficiency costs (arising from a failure of domestic service providers to adopt least-cost practices). They find that goods-trade liberalization yields a gain in aggregate welfare and reorients production toward sectors of benchmark comparative advantage. However, a reduction of services barriers in a way that permits greater competition through foreign direct investment generates larger welfare gains. Service liberalization also requires lower adjustment costs, measured in terms of sectoral movement of workers, than does goods-trade liberalization. And it tends to increase economic activity in all sectors and raise the real returns to both capital and labor. The overall welfare gains of comprehensive service liberalization amount to more than 5 percent of initial consumption. The bulk of these gains come from opening markets for finance, business services, and telecommunications. Because these are key inputs into all sectors of the economy, their liberalization cuts costs and drives larger efficiency gains overall. The results point to the potential importance of deregulating services provision for economic development.

This book examines the dynamics of open regionalism, the expansion of domestic markets from increased FDI and monetary stability, and the optimal mix of regional trade agreements.

A Brookings Institution Press and the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES) publication Improving the economic performance of Arab countries is now more critical than ever. The region faces high population growth rates, rising unemployment, and modest economic growth coupled with increasingly intense competition from emerging markets in eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Meeting these challenges requires finding ways to overcome political obstacles that impede socially beneficial economic reforms. Despite fifty years of repeated attempts at Arab economic integration, the results in terms of intraregional trade and investment flows have been very modest. This book explains why and discusses possible ways forward. The authors draw especially on the success of the European Union to assess the scope of Arab economic integration as an instrument for narrowing the persistent gap between the region¡¯s economic potential and its performance.

Abstract: May 1999 - Preferential trade agreements that are limited to the elimination of tariffs for merchandise trade flows are of limited value at best and may be as easily welfare-reducing as welfare-enhancing. It is important that preferential trade agreements go beyond eliminating tariffs and quotas to eliminating regulatory and red tape costs and opening up service markets to foreign competition. Deep integration-explicit government actions to reduce the market-segmenting effect of domestic regulatory policies through coordination and cooperation-is becoming a major dimension of some regional integration agreements, led by the European Union. Health and safety regulations, competition laws, licensing and certification regimes, and administrative procedures such as customs clearance can affect trade (in ways analogous to nontariff barriers) even though their underlying intent may not be to discriminate against foreign suppliers of goods and services. Whether preferential trade agreements (PTAs) can be justified in a multilateral trading system depends on the extent to which formal intergovernmental agreements are technically necessary to achieve the deep integration needed to make markets more contestable. The more need for formal cooperation, the stronger the case for regional integration. Whether PTAs are justified regionally also depends on whether efforts to reduce market segmentation are applied on a nondiscriminatory basis. If innovations to reduce transaction or market access costs extend to both members and nonmembers of a PTA, regionalism as an instrument of trade and investment becomes more attractive. Using a standard competitive general equilibrium model of the Egyptian economy, Hoekman and Konan find that the static welfare impact of a deep free trade agreement is far greater than the impact that can be expected from a classic shallow agreement. Under some scenarios, welfare may increase by more than 10 percent of GDP, compared with close to zero under a shallow agreement. Given Egypt's highly diversified trading patterns, a shallow PTA with the European Union could be merely diversionary, leading to a small decline in welfare. Egypt already has duty-free access to the European Union for manufactures, so the loss in tariff revenues incurred would outweigh any new trade created. Large gains in welfare from the PTA are conditional on eliminating regulatory barriers and red tape-in which case welfare gains may be substantial: 4 to 20 percent growth in real GNP. This paper-a product of the Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze regional integration agreements. The authors may be contacted at bhoekman@@worldbank.org or konan@@hawaii.edu.