Journal Of Public Finance And Public Choice 2011

Contents J. R. Clark John Garen Dangling at the Abyss: How Deadweight Costs and Political Attitudes May Prevent Collapse Peter T. Calcagno Lauren Heller Primary Voting Systems and Economic Freedom: An Analysis of U.S. States Adam Hoffer Are Voters R

Contenuto/Contents Wallace E. Oates On the Development of the Theory of Fiscal Federalism: An Essay in the History of (Recent) Economic Thought Yong J. Yoon An Analogy: Symmetric Tragedies and Calculus of Consent Richard J. Cebula An Empirical Analysis of Determinants of Recent Federal Personal Income Tax Evasion in the U.S. Michelle B. Matthews – William F. Shughart II – Taylor P. Stevenson Political Arithmetic: New Evidence on the ‘Small-State Bias' in Federal Spending King Banaian – Örn B. Bodvarsson – Anton D. Lowenberg Determinants of Immigration Policy: An Empirical Study of US Legislative Voting Caterina Astarita Income Inequality and Crime: An Empirical Analysis of the Italian Case Alice M. Crisp – Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. Lincoln's Wartime Incumbency Network: Vertical Trust, Informal Payments, and the U.S. Presidential Election of 1864 Mouna M'Rad – Slaheddine Hallara The Impact of French Privatization on Firms' Performance Yilin Hou – Jason S. Seligman Local Sales Tax and Revenue Volatility Massimo Di Matteo Towards a Social Philosophy for the Twenty First Century: Critical Reflections on an Unpublished Essay by Richard Goodwin Michele G. Giuranno The Logic of Party Coalitions with Political Activism

Public Finance and Public Choice provides a comprehensive analysis of the economics of the public sector, taking a diagrammatic approach to the subject. Particular emphasis is given to the public choice and behavioural economics schools of thought.

Contents RFranklin G. Mixon, Jr. - ErnestW. King - Matthew L. Lawing Modeling the Impact of Localism in U.S. Presidential Elections Alan A. Lockard Campaign Expenditures under Proportional Representation and Plurality Voting Athanassios Pitsoulis - Jens Peter Siebel Political and Economic Effects of Tax Competition and Deficits Dalibor Rohác? Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Problems Reviews

In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion.

Are the way in which governments tax and spend efficient, and are they equitable? These questions are central to public sector economics and this second edition of Public Finance and Public Choice illustrates the controversies which surround them. This new edition continues to focus on both the social optimality and public choice approaches but also includes alternative perspectives. This successful text has been extensively rewritten, offering further microeconomic insight and additional examples of the application of theory. New sections include: The private provision of public goods Privatization The quasi market The EC budget QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Years) Public debt The impact of the public sector on economic growth. This clearly written, rigorous text offers a complete course in the economics of the public sector. It will be an indispensable text for students studying public economics, and also for students taking technical public policy or public administration courses.