Public Finance And Public Choice

In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion.

Are the way in which governments tax and spend efficient, and are they equitable? These questions are central to public sector economics and this second edition of Public Finance and Public Choice illustrates the controversies which surround them. This new edition continues to focus on both the social optimality and public choice approaches but also includes alternative perspectives. This successful text has been extensively rewritten, offering further microeconomic insight and additional examples of the application of theory. New sections include: The private provision of public goods Privatization The quasi market The EC budget QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Years) Public debt The impact of the public sector on economic growth. This clearly written, rigorous text offers a complete course in the economics of the public sector. It will be an indispensable text for students studying public economics, and also for students taking technical public policy or public administration courses.

Public Finance and Public Choice provides a comprehensive analysis of the economics of the public sector, taking a diagrammatic approach to the subject. Particular emphasis is given to the public choice and behavioural economics schools of thought.

In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion.

The second edition of Public Finance and Public Policy retains the first edition's themes of investigation of responsibilities and limitations of government. The present edition has been rewritten and restructured. Public choice and political economy concepts and political and bureaucratic principal-agent problems are introduced at the beginning for application to later topics. Fairness, envy, hyperbolic discounting, and other concepts of behavioral economics are integrated throughout. The consequences of asymmetric information and the tradeoff between efficiency and ex-post equality are recurring themes. Key themes investigated are markets and governments, institutions and governance, public goods, public finance for public goods, market corrections (externalities and paternalist public policies), voting, social justice, entitlements and equality of opportunity, choice of taxation, and the need for government. The purpose of the book is to provide an accessible introduction to the use of public finance and public policy to improve on market outcomes.

Argues that public finance--the study of the government's role in economics--should incorporate principles from behavior economics and other branches of psychology.

There is a long-standing difference amongst public economists between those who think that collective choice must be formally acknowledged, and those who derive their policy recommendations from a social planning framework in which politics plays no role. The purpose of this book is to contribute to a meaningful dialogue between these two groups, in the belief that the future of both political economy and of normative public finance lies somewhere between the two approaches. Some of the specific questions addressed in the book include: does public finance need political economy? Should collective choice play a role in the standard of reference used in normative public finance? What is a 'failure' in a non-market or policy process? And what have we learned about the theory and practice of public finance from three decades of empirical research on public choice? The book also provides a practitioner's view of the political economy of redistribution.

Recipient of the 1986 Nobel Prize in economics, James Buchanan has won international recognition for his pioneering role in the development of public-choice theory. Among his works that the prize committee specifically cited was Public Finance in Democratic Process, which first appeared in 1967. As James C. Miller, director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, notes in his foreword, "This book is perhaps the best compact exposition of Buchanan's theory of public choice."