Judicial Independence In Context

Judicial Independence in Context is a collection of essays by leading scholars, lawyers, and judges that examines both the theory and practice of judicial independence in Canada and around the world. Contributors assess the legacy of the Supreme Court of Canada's controversial landmark decision in the Provincial Judges Reference while other essays address the need for institutional reform in Canada outside the salary remuneration setting in the areas of court administration and judicial appointments. The book also examines linkages between judicial independence and other issues such as diversity, social context education for judges, public criticism of judges, public policy, and technology. Other contributions examine issues of judicial independence in the United Kingdom, the United States, South Africa, Israel, and Pakistan.

This book examines the legal principle of judicial independence in comparative perspective with the goal of advancing a better understanding of the idea of an independent judiciary more generally. From an initial survey of judicial systems in different countries, it is clear that the understanding and practice of judicial independence take a variety of forms. Scholarly literature likewise provides a range of views on what judicial independence means, with scholars often advocating a preferred conception of a model court for achieving ‘true judicial independence’ as part of a rule of law system. This book seeks to reorient the prevailing approach to the study of judicial independence by better understanding how judicial independence operates within domestic legal systems in its institutional and legal dimensions. It asks how and why different conceptualisations of judicial independence emerge over time by comparing detailed case studies of courts in two legally pluralistic states, which share inheritances of British rule and the common law. By tracing the development of judicial independence in the legal systems of Malaysia and Pakistan from the time of independence to the present, the book offers an insightful comparison of how judicial independence took shape and developed in these countries over time. From this comparison, it suggests a number of contextual factors that can be seen to play a role in the evolution of judicial independence. The study draws upon the significant divergence observed in the case studies to propose a refined understanding of the idea of an independent judiciary, termed the ‘pragmatic and context-sensitive theory’, which may be seen in contradistinction to a universal approach. While judicial independence responds to the core need of judges to be perceived as an impartial third party by constructing formal and informal constraints on the judge and relationships between judges and others, its meaning in a legal system is inevitably shaped by the judicial role along with other features at the domestic level. The book concludes that the adaptive and pragmatic qualities of judicial independence supply it with relevance and legitimacy within a domestic legal system.

Strengthening the rule of law has become a key factor for the transition to democracy and the protection of human rights. Though its significance has materialized in international standard setting, the question of implementation is largely unexplored. This book describes judicial independence as a central aspect of the rule of law in different stages of transition to democracy. The collection of state-specific studies explores the legal situation of judiciaries in twenty states from North America, over Western, Central and South-Eastern Europe to post-Soviet states and engages in a comparative legal analysis. Through a detailed account of the current situation it takes stocks, considers advances in and shortcomings of judicial reform and offers advice for future strategies. The book shows that the implementation of judicial independence requires continuous efforts, not only in countries in transition but also in established democracies which are confronted with ever new challenges.

The Culture of Judicial Independence: Rule of Law and World Peace, is the third book by Shimon Shetreet on Judicial Independence. The first was Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (edited by Shimon Shetreet and Jules Deschênes, Nijhoff,1985). The second was The Culture of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Challenges (Edited by Shimon Shetreet and Christopher Forsyth, Nijhoff, 2012). This volume contains essays by senior academics, judges and practitioners across jurisdictions offering an analysis of several central issues relative to the culture of Judicial Independence. These include judicial review, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and world peace, constitutional position of top courts, relations between the judiciary and the other branches of government, impartiality and fairness of the judicial process, judicial ethics, dispute resolution in arbitral awards and international investments, international courts and cross country issues, judicial selection. The volume also offers an update report on the International Project of Judicial Independence of the International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace, including the relations of top courts and international courts, administrative judges, culture of judicial independence and public inquiries by judges.

This book argues that explaining judicial independence-considered the fundamental question of comparative law and politics-requires a perspective that spans the democracy/autocracy divide. Rather than seeking separate explanations in each regime context, in The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy, Brad Epperly argues that political competition is a salient factor in determining levels of de facto judicial independence across regime type, and in autocracies a factor of far greater import. This is because a full " account of independence requires looking not only at the likelihood those in power might lose elections but also the variable risks associated with such an outcome, risks that are far higher for autocrats. First demonstrating that courts can and do provide insurance to former leaders, he then shows via exhaustive cross-national analyses that competition's effects are far higher in autocratic regimes, providing the first evidence for the causal nature of the relationship. Epperly argues that these findings differ from existing case study research because in democratic regimes, a lack of political competition means incumbents target the de jure independence of courts. This argument is illustrated via in-depth case study of the Hungarian Constitutional Court after the country's 2010 " and then tested globally. Blending formal theory, observational and instrumental variables models, and elite interviews of leading Hungarian legal scholars and judges, Epperly offers a new framework for understanding judicial independence that integrates explanations of both de jure and de facto independence in both democratic and autocratic regimes.

Traditional separation of powers theories assumed that governmental despotism will be prevented by dividing the branches of government which will check one another. Modern governments function with unexpected complicity among these branches. Sometimes one of the branches becomes overwhelming. Other governmental structures, however, tend to mitigate these tendencies to domination. Among other structures courts have achieved considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the traditional political branches of power. They tend to maintain considerable distance from political parties in the name of professionalism and expertise. The conditions and criteria of independence are not clear, and even less clear are the conditions of institutional integrity. Independence (including depolitization) of public institutions is of particular practical relevance in the post-Communist countries where political partisanship penetrated institutions under the single party system. Institutional integrity, particularly in the context of administration of justice, became a precondition for accession to the European Union. Given this practical challenge the present volume is centered around three key areas of institutional integrity, primarily within the administration of justice: First, in a broader theoretical-interdisciplinary context the criteria of institutional independence are discussed. The second major issue is the relation of neutralized institutions to branches of government with reference to accountability. Thirdly, comparative experience regarding judicial independence is discussed to determine techniques to enhance integrity.

Judiciaries must be politically impartial and immune from political interference if democracy is to be consolidated in countries in transition from authoritarian rule. Without an independent judiciary there can be no rule of law, and without the rule of law there can be no democracy. Judges and Democratization is based on the premise that democracy cannot be consolidated without the rule of law of which judicial independence is an indispensable part. It pays particular attention to the restraints placed upon judicial independence, and the reforms which are being applied, or remain to be adopted, in order to guard against the different kinds of interference which prevent judicial decisions being taken in a wholly impartial way. It examines the paradox of judicial activism arising from the independence endowed upon the judiciary by post-authoritarian constitutions. The book asks how, in the context of this endowed authority, such accountability can be made compatible with the preservation of judicial independence when the concept of an accountable, independent judiciary appears to be a contradiction in terms. This text will be of key interest to teachers and students of politics, comparative government/politics, combined politics and law, democracy and governance, human rights and democratization, and democratic development.

2011 Winner of the Selection for Professional Reading List of the U.S. Marine Corps The judiciary in the United States has been subject in recent years to increasingly vocal, aggressive criticism by media members, activists, and public officials at the federal, state, and local level. This collection probes whether these attacks as well as proposals for reform represent threats to judicial independence or the normal, even healthy, operation of our political system. In addressing this central question, the volume integrates new scholarship, current events, and the perennial concerns of political science and law. The contributors—policy experts, established and emerging scholars, and attorneys—provide varied scholarly viewpoints and assess the issue of judicial independence from the diverging perspectives of Congress, the presidency, and public opinion. Through a diverse range of methodologies, the chapters explore the interactions and tensions among these three interests and the courts and discuss how these conflicts are expressed—and competing interests accommodated. In doing so, they ponder whether the U.S. courts are indeed experiencing anything new and whether anti-judicial rhetoric affords fresh insights. Case studies from Israel, the United Kingdom, and Australia provide a comparative view of judicial controversy in other democratic nations. A unique assessment of the rise of criticism aimed at the judiciary in the United States, The Politics of Judicial Independence is a well-organized and engagingly written text designed especially for students. Instructors of judicial process and judicial policymaking will find the book, along with the materials and resources on its accompanying website, readily adaptable for classroom use.