Judicial Review And The Law Of The Constitution

In this book, the author presents a new interpretation of the origin of judicial review. She traces the development of judicial review from American independence through the tenure of John Marshall as Chief Justice, showing that Marshall's role was far more innovative and decisive than has yet been recognized. According to the author all support for judicial review before Marshall contemplated a fundamentally different practice from that which we know today. Marshall did not simply reinforce or extend ideas already accepted but, in superficially minor and disguised ways, effected a radical transformation in the nature of the constitution and the judicial relationship to it.

Unlike many other countries, the United States has few constitutional guarantees of social welfare rights such as income, housing, or healthcare. In part this is because many Americans believe that the courts cannot possibly enforce such guarantees. However, recent innovations in constitutional design in other countries suggest that such rights can be judicially enforced--not by increasing the power of the courts but by decreasing it. In Weak Courts, Strong Rights, Mark Tushnet uses a comparative legal perspective to show how creating weaker forms of judicial review may actually allow for stronger social welfare rights under American constitutional law. Under "strong-form" judicial review, as in the United States, judicial interpretations of the constitution are binding on other branches of government. In contrast, "weak-form" review allows the legislature and executive to reject constitutional rulings by the judiciary--as long as they do so publicly. Tushnet describes how weak-form review works in Great Britain and Canada and discusses the extent to which legislatures can be expected to enforce constitutional norms on their own. With that background, he turns to social welfare rights, explaining the connection between the "state action" or "horizontal effect" doctrine and the enforcement of social welfare rights. Tushnet then draws together the analysis of weak-form review and that of social welfare rights, explaining how weak-form review could be used to enforce those rights. He demonstrates that there is a clear judicial path--not an insurmountable judicial hurdle--to better enforcement of constitutional social welfare rights.

This book, first published in 1914, contains five historical essays. Three of them are on the concept of judicial review, which is defined as the power of a court to review and invalidate unlawful acts by the legislative and executive branches of government. One chapter addresses the historical controversy over states' rights. Another concerns the Pelatiah Webster Myth the notion that the US Constitution was the work of a single person.In "Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review," Edward S. Corwin analyzes the legal source of the power of the Supreme Court to review acts of Congress. "We, the People" examines the rights of states in relation to secession and nullification. "The Pelatiah Webster Myth" demolishes Hannis Taylor's thesis that Webster was the "secret" author of the constitution. "The Dred Scott Decision" considers Chief Justice Taney's argument concerning Scott's title to citizenship under the Constitution. "Some Possibilities in the Way of Treaty-Making" discusses how the US Constitution relates to international treaties.Matthew J. Franck's new introduction to this centennial edition situates Corwin's career in the history of judicial review both as a concept and as a political reality.

This collection of essays presents opposing sides of the debate over the foundations of judicial review. In this work,however, the discussion of whether the 'ultra vires' doctrine is best characterised as a central principle of administrative law or as a harmless, justificatory fiction is located in the highly topical and political context of constitutional change. The thorough jurisprudential analysis of the relative merits of models of 'legislative intention' and 'judicial creativity' provides a sound base for consideration of the constitutional problems arising out of legislative devolution and the Human Rights Act 1998. As the historical orthodoxy is challenged by growing institutional independence, leading figures in the field offer competing perspectives on the future of judicial review. “Confucius was wrong to say that it is a curse to live in interesting times. We are witnessing the development of a constitutional philosophy which recognises fundamental values and gives them effect in the mediation of law to the people”. (Sir John Laws) Contributors Nick Bamforth, Paul Craig, David Dyzenhaus, Mark Elliott, David Feldman, Christopher Forsyth, Brigid Hadfield, Jeffrey Jowell QC, Sir John Laws, Dawn Oliver, Sir Stephen Sedley, Mark Walters. With short responses by: TRS Allan, Stephen Bailey, Robert Carnworth, Martin Loughlin, Michael Taggart, Sir William Wade.

Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Comparative Perspective collects, in one volume, a basic description of the most important principles and methods of analysis followed by the major Courts enforcing constitutional Bills of Rights around the world. The Courts include the Supreme Courts of Japan, India, Canada and the United States, the Constitutional Courts of Germany and Italy and the European Court of Human Rights. Each chapter is devoted to an analysis of the substantive jurisprudence developed by these Courts to determine whether a challenged law is constitutional or not, and is written by members of these Courts who have had a prior academic career. The book highlights the similarities and differences in the analytical methods used by these courts in determining whether or not someone's constitutional rights have been violated. Students and scholars of constitutional law and human rights, judges and advocates engaged in constitutional litigation will find the book a unique and valuable resource.

Constitutional courts around the world play an increasingly central role in day-to-day democratic governance. Yet scholars have only recently begun to develop the interdisciplinary analysis needed to understand this shift in the relationship of constitutional law to politics. This edited volume brings together the leading scholars of constitutional law and politics to provide a comprehensive overview of judicial review, covering theories of its creation, mechanisms of its constraint, and its comparative applications, including theories of interpretation and doctrinal developments. This book serves as a single point of entry for legal scholars and practitioners interested in understanding the field of comparative judicial review in its broader political and social context.

First-3d ed. published under title: Judicial review in the English-speaking world.