Kant S Theory Of Emotion

Williamson explains, defends, and applies Kant's theory of emotion. Looking primarily to the Anthropology and the Metaphysics of Morals, she situates Kant's theory of affect within his theory of feeling and focuses on the importance of moral feelings and the moral evaluation of our emotions.

This book is open access and available on www.bloomsburycollections.com. It is funded by Knowledge Unlatched. Though Kant never used the word 'emotion' in his writings, it is of vital significance to understanding his philosophy. This book offers a captivating argument for reading Kant considering the importance of emotion, taking into account its many manifestations in his work including affect and passion. Emotion, Reason, and Action in Kant explores how, in Kant's world view, our actions are informed, contextualized and dependent on the tension between emotion and reason. On the one hand, there are positive moral emotions that can and should be cultivated. On the other hand, affects and passions are considered illnesses of the mind, in that they lead to the weakness of the will, in the case of affects, and evil, in the case of passions. Seeing the role of these emotions enriches our understanding of Kant's moral theory. Exploring the full range of negative and positive emotions in Kant's work, including anger, compassion and sympathy, as well as moral feeling, Borges shows how Kant's theory of emotion includes both physiological and cognitive aspects. This is an important new contribution to Kant Studies, suitable for students of Kant, ethics, and moral psychology.

First essay collection devoted to Kant's faculty of feeling, a concept relevant to issues in ethics, aesthetics, and the emotions.

This book is open access and available on www.bloomsburycollections.com. It is funded by Knowledge Unlatched. Though Kant never used the word 'emotion' in his writings, it is of vital significance to understanding his philosophy. This book offers a captivating argument for reading Kant considering the importance of emotion, taking into account its many manifestations in his work including affect and passion. Emotion, Reason, and Action in Kant explores how, in Kant's world view, our actions are informed, contextualized and dependent on the tension between emotion and reason. On the one hand, there are positive moral emotions that can and should be cultivated. On the other hand, affects and passions are considered illnesses of the mind, in that they lead to the weakness of the will, in the case of affects, and evil, in the case of passions. Seeing the role of these emotions enriches our understanding of Kant's moral theory. Exploring the full range of negative and positive emotions in Kant's work, including anger, compassion and sympathy, as well as moral feeling, Borges shows how Kant's theory of emotion includes both physiological and cognitive aspects. This is an important new contribution to Kant Studies, suitable for students of Kant, ethics, and moral psychology.

Editorial Board: Karl P. Ameriks (Notre Dame University, West Bend, USA), Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, USA), Frederick Beiser (Syracuse University, Syracuse, USA), Fabien Capeillères (Université de Caen, France), Faustino Fabbianelli (Universitá di Parma, Italia), Daniel Garber (Princeton University, Princeton, USA), Rudolf A. Makkreel (Emory University, Atlanta, USA), Steven Nadler (University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA), Alan Nelson (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA), Christof Rapp (LMU München, D), Ursula Renz (Universität Klagenfurt, Österreich), Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann (FU Berlin, D), Denis Thouard (HU Berlin, D), Paul Ziche (Universiteit Utrecht, NL), Günter Zöller (LMU München, D) The series publishes monographs and essay collections devoted to the history of philosophy as well as studies in the theory of writing the history of philosophy. A special emphasis is placed on the contextualization of philosophical historiography into the areas of the history of science, culture, and the wider scope of intellectual history.

Distinguished international scholars discuss the connection between emotion and value in Kant's philosophy, from his ethics to his philosophy of mind, aesthetics, religion and politics. Through a mixture of interpretation and critical discussion, this collection demonstrates the continuing relevance of Kant's work to philosophical debates.

Kant was one of the inventors of anthropology, and his lectures on anthropology were the most popular and among the most frequently given of his lecture courses. This volume contains the first translation of selections from student transcriptions of the lectures between 1772 and 1789, prior to the published version, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), which Kant edited himself at the end of his teaching career. The two most extensive texts, Anthropology Friedländer (1772) and Anthropology Mrongovius (1786), are presented here in their entirety, along with selections from all the other lecture transcriptions published in the Academy edition, together with sizeable portions of the Menschenkunde (1781–2), first published in 1831. These lectures show that Kant had a coherent and well-developed empirical theory of human nature bearing on many other aspects of his philosophy, including cognition, moral psychology, politics and philosophy of history.

You may have an inclination to do it, but there is still a moment when you can decide to do it or not. This "moment of drama" is more puzzling than it first appears. When you are inclined to do something, are you related to your inclination as rider to horse? As ruler to subject? As thinker to thoughts? Schapiro shows that these familiar pictures fail to confront the central puzzle. Inclinations are motives with respect to which we are distinctively passive. But to be motivated is to be active—to be self-moved. How can you be passive in relation to your own activity? Schapiro puts forward an "inner animal" view, inspired by Kant, which holds that when you are merely inclined to act, the instinctive part of yourself is already active, while the rest of you is not. At this moment, your will is at a crossroads. You can humanize your inclination, or you can dehumanize yourself. Feeling Like It provides a concise and accessible investigation of a new problem at the intersection of ethics, philosophy of action, and philosophy of mind.