Killer Acquisitions In Digital Markets An Analysis Of The Eu Merger Control Regime

In her PhD thesis, Giulia Aurélie Sonderegger analyses killer acquisitions, which, in short, are acquisitions that aim to pre-empt potential future competition at an early stage. While this phenomenon was originally discovered in pharmaceutical markets, this thesis exclusively discusses killer acquisitions in the context of digital markets, thereby primarily focusing on the current European Merger Control Regulation (EUMR). The main research question is whether the EUMR is appropriate to tackle killer acquisitions occurring in digital markets, and if not, in what ways it needs to be amended to better address the challenges in the future. To tackle this question, the author assesses both the economic and legal effects of killer acquisitions on merger control in digital markets and, based on her findings, suggests amendments to the current European merger control regime. For a more comprehensive analysis, this thesis also includes an assessment of the recently enacted Digital Markets Act (DMA) to ascertain whether this regulation may serve as an additional tool to remedy such transactions.

Twenty years of experience have inevitably brought to light challenges and tensions in the enforcement of the European merger control system. Some of these challenges have been faced, some have been solved and some remain latent. This very valuable study starts from the proposition that the EU has never fully acknowledged those fundamental challenges which relate to the rationale behind merger control in Europe. The author shows how the Commission's focus on adapting the rules of merger control to the economic realities of the future business environment, although designed with a view to facilitating European integration, has compromised attainment of legal certainty, transparency and welfare enhancement. In its detailed evaluation of the 'future market structure prediction process' embedded in European merger control policy, this book approaches two rock-bottom, far-reaching questions: In what ways does merger control promote consumer and societal welfare? Is the Commission able to correctly predict the outcome of any given concentration transaction? These considerations take the reader through a deep and searching analysis that calls into question the very credibility and transparency of the system, leading to alternatives which promise a new clarity of purpose and procedure. The author describes how these recommendations can be integrated into the functioning framework of the European project. Taken fully into account along the way is a wide spectrum of relevant source material, including the following: applicable articles and chapters of the founding and subsequent European Treaties; secondary European legislation concerning competition and merger activity; domestic competition laws; guidelines, notices and action plans; competition law reviews, statements of intentions; draft legislative attempts; speeches on the enactment and purpose of merger control; Member States' views concerning European merger control as expressed during Council negotiations; officially available concentration-related statistics; and a wide-ranging literature review covering both the legal and economic sides of merger control. Throughout, the author substantiates theoretical assertions with case law examples, clearly exposing doctrines arising from such cases as Continental Can, Phillip Morris/Rothmans and the Airtours, Schneider and Tetra Laval trilogy. A unique feature of the analysis draws on the author's personal experience while working for a Brussels competition law firm. This book is a remarkable compound of academic guide to the roots and rationales of the European Merger Control System, practical guide to the day-to-day intricacies of merger control enforcement, and 'raw' guide for decision makers and merger control law enforcers. It will be of immense value in all three contexts.

In her PhD thesis, Giulia Aurélie Sonderegger analyses killer acquisitions, which, in short, are acquisitions that aim to pre-empt potential future competition at an early stage. While this phenomenon was originally discovered in pharmaceutical markets, this thesis exclusively discusses killer acquisitions in the context of digital markets, thereby primarily focusing on the current European Merger Control Regulation (EUMR). The main research question is whether the EUMR is appropriate to tackle killer acquisitions occurring in digital markets, and if not, in what ways it needs to be amended to better address the challenges in the future. To tackle this question, the author assesses both the economic and legal effects of killer acquisitions on merger control in digital markets and, based on her findings, suggests amendments to the current European merger control regime. For a more comprehensive analysis, this thesis also includes an assessment of the recently enacted Digital Markets Act (DMA) to ascertain whether this regulation may serve as an additional tool to remedy such transactions.

As a country on the way to integration with the European Union (EU), Turkey has been following EU principles in establishing and improving its merger control regime, as well as overall competition law, keeping pace with changes in relevant EU legislation and case law. This book presents, for the first time, a description and analysis of the relationship between the EU and Turkish merger control law and practice. The second edition of the book considers the legislative changes that occurred in 2020-2021, including the reform of the Turkish Competition Law which introduced the significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC) test into the Turkish concentration control. The authors—all three, both practicing lawyers and academicians in Turkey—focus on comparing substantive, procedural and jurisdictional issues and draw parallels on their regulation in the two jurisdictions. These matters include the following: determining whether a transaction shall be regarded as a notifiable merger, hence be subject to control; financial thresholds used for allocating jurisdictions; extraterritoriality of merger control; relationship between the SIEC test and the dominance test; determination of the relevant market; techniques used for assessment of horizontal and non-horizontal mergers; notification requirements; procedural duties of competition authorities in relation to remedies; third-party rights; gun-jumping fines and other sanctions for failure to comply with merger control requirements; and peculiarities of assessment of mergers in the Big Data world. Each chapter provides an overview of the respective issues in the EU and Turkey, projecting a clear understanding of the main similarities and differences in the two regimes. A notable feature is an in-depth analysis of applicable case law concerning each issue, with most of the Turkish decisions available in English for the first time. The book’s comparative approach will prove to be of great value. With its clear answers to questions about what transactions are subject to merger control, what criteria are used in assessing those transactions, and the main issues that a foreign company should be aware of while merging with another foreign company with effect in Turkey and/or EU, the book will be of immeasurable value for lawyers and their business clients dealing with multijurisdictional merger cases. Interested academics and policymakers will also find much here to attract their attention.

This book provides a critical analysis of merger control regimes in the former socialist countries with small market economies, looking at the unique challenges facing these economies. Questions will be asked as to what extent these countries have had to follow dictation from the EU and whether this implementation of EU merger control rules has been justified from the point of view of these countries' economic situations. The book will analyse the merger control regimes in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia. However, reference will be made to other small market economies of the EU including Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta in order to evaluate the particular difficulties the former socialist countries with small market economies have had in the implementation and further development of merger control rules.

Document from the year 2017 in the subject Law - Civil / Private / Trade / Anti Trust Law / Business Law, grade: A, , language: English, abstract: The major problem associated with the regulation of transnational mergers, which affect several national markets, is the allocation of jurisdiction. Each country concerned may wish to exert jurisdiction and apply its national competition law to regulate the anti-competitive effects a merger may have in its territory. However, this approach may lead to risks of inconsistent decisions regarding the legality of mergers. Indeed, the national competition laws applied by the regulating authorities may diverge in several aspects, which raise the likelihood of inconsistency. The authors advocates the creation of an international merger control framework (IMCF) for the regulation of transnational mergers. This framework will rest on an informal and a formal pillar. The former includes non-legally binding competition principles. Consistency of these principles with the concepts of legitimacy and efficiency, as well as the presence of peer reviews and assistance programmes, should lower the risk of non-implementation. The formal pillar includes bilateral cooperation agreements which apply to merger affecting the countries which have concluded the agreements. As essential pre-condition for the application of bilateral agreements, the level of cooperation achieved by such agreements should be at least equal to that ensured by the informal pillar. The last part of the study addresses and examines the long and complex processes in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions. M&A arbitration faces certain difficulties during the transaction. Such difficulties the author seeks to underline. Two main problems of arbitration in M&A transactions, particullarly, have been covered. Firstly, the problem of consent in consolidation of parallel proceedings during M&A transactions, and, secondly parties' consent that validate arbitration agreements/clauses in “assignment” or “succession” after M&A transactions have been completed. The author also tries to clarify the content of consent of parties to a transaction. Finally, a criticism of parallel proceedings is enhanced.