Knowledge Truth And Duty

This text examines epistemic duty, doxastic voluntarism, the normativity of justification, internalism versus externalism, truth as the epistemic goal, and scepticism and the search for justification.

This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.

Donald Davidson has made enormous contributions to the philosophy of action, epistemology, semantics and philosophy of mind and today is recognized as one of the most important analytical philosophers of the late twentieth century. Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge addresses * Davidson's writings on epistemology and theory of language with their implications of ontology and philosophy of mind * the central issue of whether truth is the ultimate goal of enquiry, challenged by contributions from Richard Rorty and Paul Horwich * Davidson's approach to semantics and applied linguistics as addressed by Kirk Ludwig, Gabriel Segal, Peter Pagin, Stephen Neale, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore and Reinaldo Elugardo * Davidson's advances in the philosophy of mind in relation to the views of Williard V. Quine, John McDowell and Peter F. Strawson, in essays by Roger Gibson and Anita Avramides

Having adequate knowledge of the world is not just a matter of survival but also one of obligation. This obligation to "know well" is what philosophers have termed "epistemic responsibility." In this innovative and eclectic study, Lorraine Code explores the possibilities inherent in this concept as a basis for understanding human attempts to know and understand the world and for discerning the nature of intellectual virtue. By focusing on the idea that knowing is a creative process guided by imperatives of epistemic responsibility, Code provides a fresh perspective on the theory of knowledge. From this new perspective, Code poses questions about knowledge that have a different focus from those traditionally raised in the two leading epistemological theories, foundationalism and coherentism. While not rejecting these approaches, this new position moves away from a primary concentration on determinate products and towards an examination of ever-changing processes. Arguing that knowledge never exists as an ungrounded abstraction but rather emerges through dialogue between variously authoritative "knowers" situated within particular social and historical contexts, she draws extensively on examples from lived social experience to illustrate the ways in which human beings have long tried to recognize and meet their epistemic responsibilities. This edition of Epistemic Responsibility includes a new preface from Lorraine Code.

This book is about knowledge and its value. At its heart is a straightforward idea: we can answer many interesting and difficult questions in epistemology by reflecting on the role of epistemic evaluation in human life. Michael Hannon calls this approach function-first epistemology. To Hannon, the concept of knowledge is used to identify reliable informants; this practice is necessary, or at least deeply important, because it plays a vital role in human survival, cooperation, and flourishing. Though a seemingly simple idea, function-first epistemology has wide-reaching implications. From this premise, Hannon casts new light on the very nature and value of knowledge, the differences between knowledge and understanding, the relationship between knowledge, assertion, and practical reasoning, and the semantics of knowledge claims. This book forges new paths into some classic philosophical puzzles, including the Gettier problem, epistemic relativism, and philosophical skepticism. What's the Point of Knowledge? shows that pivotal issues in epistemology can be resolved by taking a function-first approach, demonstrating the significant role that this method can play in contemporary philosophy.

Presents and defends a bold new approach to the ethics of belief and to resolving the internalism-externalism debate in epistemology.

This book provides the first comprehensive philosophical examination of the right to know and other epistemic rights: rights to goods such as information, knowledge, and truth.