Korean Endgame

Nearly half a century after the fighting stopped, the 1953 Armistice has yet to be replaced with a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War. While Russia and China withdrew the last of their forces in 1958, the United States maintains 37,000 troops in South Korea and is pledged to defend it with nuclear weapons. In Korean Endgame, Selig Harrison mounts the first authoritative challenge to this long-standing U.S. policy. Harrison shows why North Korea is not--as many policymakers expect--about to collapse. And he explains why existing U.S. policies hamper North-South reconciliation and reunification. Assessing North Korean capabilities and the motivations that have led to its forward deployments, he spells out the arms control concessions by North Korea, South Korea, and the United States necessary to ease the dangers of confrontation, centering on reciprocal U.S. force redeployments and U.S. withdrawals in return for North Korean pullbacks from the thirty-eighth parallel. Similarly, he proposes specific trade-offs to forestall the North's development of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in conjunction with agreements to denuclearize Korea embracing China, Russia, and Japan. The long-term goal of U.S. policy, he argues, should be the full disengagement of U.S. combat forces from Korea as part of regional agreements insulating the peninsula from all foreign conventional and nuclear forces. A veteran journalist with decades of extensive firsthand knowledge of North Korea and long-standing contacts with leaders in Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang, Harrison is perfectly placed to make these arguments. Throughout, he supports his analysis with revealing accounts of conversations with North Korean, South Korean, and U.S. leaders over thirty-five years. Combining probing scholarship with a seasoned reporter's on-the-ground experience and insights, he has given us the definitive book on U.S. policy in Korea--past, present, and future.

From Deterrence to Engagement provides a comprehensive examination of the U.S.-South Korea defense relationship from 1945 to the present. Using deterrence theory as its framework, this work explores the evolving nature of U.S. interests in a region that became a focal point only after the North Korean invasion in 1950. Author Terence Roehrig addresses the changing nature of the threats to U.S. interests in Korea, especially North Korea's buildup and its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and examines specific measures utilized by the United States to implement its deterrence policy. While U.S. policy regarding Korea has changed over the years, this timely and important work argues that although the U.S. commitment to protect its ally has been credible and effective the same cannot be said for its attempts to prevent North Korean nuclear proliferation. From Deterrence to Engagement is certain to find an audience amongst scholars of defense policy, national security, and Korean security relations.

Despite the volatility and unpredictability North Korea has come to symbolize in international diplomacy and security issues, it represents only half of the potential danger on the Korean peninsula. In a notable departure from its past role as guarantor of stability on the Korean peninsula, the United States has, under the stewardship of the Bush administration, come to be regarded as, at best, an obstacle to peace and security, and at worst a potential trigger for hostility. The most immediate result of this shift on the Korean peninsula has been the US failure to undertake an effective policy formulation process, which has manifested itself (on both sides of the 38th parallel) in more reactive and convulsive responses to challenges from the North Korean regime. Without such understanding there is little hope of advancing discussions or resolving North Korea's nuclear program. Fundamental to understanding North Korea's endgame is realizing that its nuclear weapons program, while menacing, is unlikely to be used offensively without major provocation; it functions as a tool of its diplomacy—missile diplomacy—to ensure survival of the regime. Working closely with South Korea, the United States must ensure that any potential resolution reached on North Korea's nuclear program does not undermine its longer-term objectives for securing broader peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Ideally, any resolution brokered over the North's nuclear weapons program will provide a synergistic effect in addressing the conventional war threat posed by North Korea on the Korean peninsula. In short, the United States must undertake constructive engagement. Steadfast unwillingness to engage with North Korea only provides more fodder for the regime to stall any action, and, as part of its endgame, makes U.S. behavior the issue. the issue, which is part of its endgame.

The Korean peninsula, divided for more than fifty years, is stuck in a time warp. Millions of troops face one another along the Demilitarized Zone separating communist North Korea and capitalist South Korea. In the early 1990s and again in 2002-2003, the United States and its allies have gone to the brink of war with North Korea. Misinterpretations and misunderstandings are fueling the crisis. "There is no country of comparable significance concerning which so many people are ignorant," American anthropologist Cornelius Osgood said of Korea some time ago. This ignorance may soon have fatal consequences. North Korea, South Korea is a short, accessible book about the history and political complexites of the Korean peninsula, one that explores practical alternatives to the current US policy: alternatives that build on the remarkable and historic path of reconciliation that North and South embarked on in the 1990s and that point the way to eventual reunification.

For many in the West, North Korea is a secretive, reclusive, and enigmatic country, a rogue state that threatens the world with its nuclear program and ballistic missiles. Confronted with its numerous provocations involving nuclear tests and missile launches, however, the international community still has not formulated a coherent response. So how do we understand the crisis on the Korean peninsula that has persisted well beyond the end of the Cold War? Christoph Bluth presents an in-depth analytical account of North Korea's development from a Soviet satellite to a failed state in the post-Cold War period. He also explains South Korea's transition from a military dictatorship to a modern democracy with a thriving economy. Based on interviews with key policymakers and experts located in South Korea, Bluth's study throws light on Korean hopes for unification and the future of the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance. U.S. policy toward North Korea has been politically controversial, with some supporting engagement and negotiations, and others calling for isolating the regime on the basis that it cannot be trusted. Neither approach will work, according to Bluth, who explains that North Korea's foreign and security policy is the result of both the internal and external threats to the survival of a regime that can no longer sustain itself. A suitable text for undergraduates as well as postgraduates, this book will be of interest to anyone with an interest in Korea, international security, and, in particular, nuclear nonproliferation.

North Korean Review is the first academic journal in North America or Europe to focus exclusively on North Korea. The purpose of NKR is to provide readers with an improved understanding of the country’s complexities and the threat it presents to global stability. International and interdisciplinary, NKR is a refereed journal published twice a year. Topics include culture, history, economics, business, religion, politics and international relations, among others.

Although the current world order is still dominated by the US, there is increasing international concern over the possibility of regional security dilemmas arising from smaller powers’ attempts to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction. A study of US-North Korean interaction using the security dilemma as a conceptual frame of analysis is thus not only hugely topical, but also particularly relevant for the 21st century on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. Is there the prospect of a security dilemma contagion if North Korea acquire nuclear weapons capability leading to an Asia Pacific wide nuclear arms race? This book examines this contentious issue in-depth and explores the difficult choices policymakers face as a result of the uncertainty in international politics.

This title was first published in 2003. After the inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the Korean peace process gained a new momentum and the two Koreas increased mutual contacts and exchanges. However, in 2001 the peace process stalled and was further hindered by Bush's hard-line policy towards Pyongyang and North Korea's inflexible attitudes towards Seoul. Interest in the Korean peninsula by the US, Russia, Japan and China, for geo-strategic and geo-economic reasons means that peace and unification will inevitably become an international problem. Against this backdrop, this original volume deals with the problems and prospects of the inter-Korean peace process and the interests, attitudes and policies of these major powers.