Larry Teaches Modern Bidding Volume 1

Larry Cohen Teaches Opening Bids and Responses in modern contract bridge. Many quizzes and examples.

Larry Cohen teaches Opener's rebid in modern bridge bidding.

Larry Cohen teaches the 4th bid of the auction and competitive auctions. Numerous examples and quizzes.

This books contains articles adapted into book form that have been designed for all levels of player: by starting with the basics on the topic and gradually filling in details up to expert level, I hope to frame the issues in a way all can understand and also raise issues for a partnership to discuss. The techniques in this book are sustainable and can be incorporated into any bidding system. Learn from the best and see instant improvement in your results at the bridge table.

Larry Cohen teaches Opening Leads at bridge

To bid or not to bid -- the perennial dilemma in competitive auctions. The easy answer to the question lies in the correct use of the Law of Total Tricks. The LAW has been part of bridge literature since the 1950s, but it was in this book that Larry Cohen brought it to the attention of the majority of bridge players. Still the most lucid explanation of the LAW ever published, this is a book that every bridge player needs to own, to read, to re-read, and to study in order to improve their results.

Following the LAW, the sequel to To Bid or Not to Bid, was published in 1994, and took the basic concepts explained in the first book to a higher level of sophistication, while giving many practical examples from expert play of how to use the Law of Total Tricks correctly. Both books are must-reads for every improving bridge player.

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.