Legal Fictions In Theory And Practice

This multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional collection offers the first ever full-scale analysis of legal fictions. Its focus is on fictions in legal practice, examining and evaluating their roles in a variety of different areas of practice (e.g. in Tort Law, Criminal Law and Intellectual Property Law) and in different times and places (e.g. in Roman Law, Rabbinic Law and the Common Law). The collection approaches the topic in part through the discussion of certain key classical statements by theorists including Jeremy Bentham, Alf Ross, Hans Vaihinger, Hans Kelsen and Lon Fuller. The collection opens with the first-ever translation into English of Kelsen’s review of Vaihinger’s As If. The 17 chapters are divided into four parts: 1) a discussion of the principal theories of fictions, as above, with a focus on Kelsen, Bentham, Fuller and classical pragmatism; 2) a discussion of the relationship between fictions and language; 3) a theoretical and historical examination and evaluation of fictions in the common law; and 4) an account of fictions in different practice areas and in different legal cultures. The collection will be of interest to theorists and historians of legal reasoning, as well as scholars and practitioners of the law more generally, in both common and civil law traditions.

Contemporary legal reasoning has more in common with fictional discourse than we tend to realize. Through an examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s written output during a recent landmark term, this book exposes many of the parallels between these two special kinds of language use. Focusing on linguistic and rhetorical patterns in the dozens of reasoned opinions issued by the Court between October 2014 and June 2015, the book takes nonlawyer readers on a lively tour of contemporary American legal reasoning and acquaints legal readers with some surprising features of their own thinking and writing habits. It analyzes cases addressing a huge variety of issues, ranging from the rights of drivers stopped by the police to the decision-making processes of the Environmental Protection Agency—as well as the term’s best-known case, which recognized a constitutional right to marriage for same-sex as well as different-sex couples. Fiction and the Languages of Law reframes a number of long-running legal debates, identifies other related paradoxes within legal discourse, and traces them all to common sources: judges’ and lawyers’ habit of alternating unselfconsciously between two different attitudes toward the language they use, and a set of professional biases that tends to prevent scrutiny of that habit.

Legal fictions are falsehoods that the law knowingly relies on. It is the most bizarre feature of our legal system; we know something is false, and we still assume it. But why do we rely on blatant falsehood? What are the implications of doing so? Should we continue to use fictions, and, if not, what is the alternative? Legal Fictions in Private Law answers these questions in an accessible and engaging manner, looking at the history of fictions, the theory of fictions, and current fictions from a practical perspective. It proposes a solution to what to do about fictions going forward, and how to decide whether they should be accepted or rejected. It addresses the latest literature and deals with the law in detail. This book is a comprehensive analysis of legal fictions in private law and a blueprint for reform.

This innovative book extensively probes and reveals the existence of legal fictions in international law, developing a theory of their effectiveness and legitimacy. Reece Lewis argues that, since legal fictions exist in all systems and types of law, international law is no different and deserves discrete, detailed examination.

Legal fictions are falsehoods that the law knowingly relies on. It is the most bizarre feature of our legal system; we know something is false, and we still assume it. But why do we rely on blatant falsehood? What are the implications of doing so? Should we continue to use fictions, and, if not, what is the alternative? Legal Fictions in Private Law answers these questions in an accessible and engaging manner, looking at the history of fictions, the theory of fictions, and current fictions from a practical perspective. It proposes a solution to what to do about fictions going forward, and how to decide whether they should be accepted or rejected. It addresses the latest literature and deals with the law in detail. This book is a comprehensive analysis of legal fictions in private law and a blueprint for reform.

Drawing on insights from literary theory and analytical philosophy, this book analyzes the intersection of law and literature from the distinct and unique perspective of fictional discourse. Pursuing an empirical approach, and using examples that range from Victorian literature to the current judicial treatment of rap music, the volume challenges the prevailing fact–fiction dichotomy in legal theory and practice by providing a better understanding of the peculiarities of legal fictionality, while also contributing further material to fictional theory’s endeavor to find a transdisciplinary valid criterion for a definition of fictional discourse. Following the basic presumptions of the early law-as-literature movement, past approaches have mainly focused on textuality and narrativity as the common denominators of law and literature, and have largely ignored the topic of fictionality. This volume provides a much needed analysis of this gap. The book will be of interest to scholars of legal theory, jurisprudence and legal writing, along with literature scholars and students of literature and the humanities.

Offers an algorithmic solution to the problem of legal fictions: enter a fiction and find the answer.