Legal Naturalism

Legal Naturalism advances a clear and convincing case that Marx's theory of law is a form of natural law jurisprudence. It explicates both Marx's writings and the idea of natural law, and makes a forceful contribution to current debates on the foundations of law. Olufemi Taiwo argues that embedded in the corpus of Marxist writing is a plausible, adequate, and coherent legal theory. He describes Marx's general concept of law, which he calls "legal naturalism." For Marxism, natural law isn't a permanent verity; it refers to the basic law of a given epoch or social formation which is an essential aspect of its mode of production. Capitalist law is thus natural law in a capitalist society and is politically and morally progressive relative to the laws of preceding social formations. Taiwo emphasizes that these formations are dialectical or dynamic, not merely static, so that the law which is naturally appropriate to a capitalist economy will embody tensions and contradictions that replicate the underlying conflicts of that economy. In addition, he discusses the enactment and reform of "positive law"—law established by government institutions—in a Marxian framework.

In legal jurisprudence, the phenomenon of “hard cases” presents itself as a dilemma between the legal positivists and the natural law realists. Of the former, without the metaphysical underpinnings of an objective legal or moral standard, the legal positivists cannot supply convincing arguments to supplant the sovereign as the origin and authority of law. The natural law realists face the problem of justifying the natural law. Against both views, S. Zinaich Jr. defends a middle position, Analytical Legal Naturalism (ALN). It represents an analytic norm, both necessarily true and known a posteriori. Against the legal positivists, it supplies an objective legal standard by removing--at least for hard cases--the necessity of the will of a sovereign authority. Against the natural law realists, ALN provides a nonmoral standard which, because of its analyticity and necessity, avoids the need for metaethical speculation. Finally, ALN provides a standard that not only supplies the universalizable punch to avoid political subjectivism, but does so in a conventional manner. Thus, ALN does not require a moral or modal reality as truth-making characteristics. Rather, it makes what is legally valuable or disvaluable dependent upon empirically verifiable facts that are legally relevant.

Brian Leiter is widely recognized as the leading philosophical interpreter of the jurisprudence of American Legal Realism, as well as the most influential proponent of the relevance of the naturalistic turn in philosophy to the problems of legal philosophy. This volume collects newly revisedversions of ten of his best-known essays, which set out his reinterpretation of the Legal Realists as prescient philosophical naturalists; critically engage with jurisprudential responses to Legal Realism, from legal positivism to Critical Legal Studies; connect the Realist program to themethodology debate in contemporary jurisprudence; and explore the general implications of a naturalistic world view for problems about the objectivity of law and morality. Leiter has supplied a lengthy new introductory essay, as well as postscripts to several of the essays, in which he responds tochallenges to his interpretive and philosophical claims by academic lawyers and philosophers.This volume will be essential reading for anyone interested in jurisprudence, as well as for philosophers concerned with the consequences of naturalism in moral and legal philosophy.

This book argues that analytical legal naturalism, which avoids the arbitrary principles associated with legal positivism and the odd properties associated with natural law, is a superior alternative for solving hard legal cases, where no close precedent arises or where conflicting precedents seem relevant.

This comparative historical study explores the broad sociocultural factors at play in the relationships among U.S. obscenity laws and literary modernism and naturalism in the early twentieth century. Putting obscenity case law’s crisis of legitimation and modernism’s crisis of representation into dialogue, Erik Bachman shows how obscenity trials and other attempts to suppress allegedly vulgar writing in the United States affected a wide-ranging debate about the power of the printed word to incite emotion and shape behavior. Far from seeking simply to transgress cultural norms or sexual boundaries, Bachman argues, proscribed authors such as Wyndham Lewis, Erskine Caldwell, Lillian Smith, and James T. Farrell refigured the capacity of writing to evoke the obscene so that readers might become aware of the social processes by which they were being turned into mass consumers, voyeurs, and racialized subjects. Through such efforts, these writers participated in debates about the libidinal efficacy of language with a range of contemporaries, from behavioral psychologists and advertising executives to book cover illustrators, magazine publishers, civil rights activists, and judges. Focusing on case law and the social circumstances informing it, Literary Obscenities provides an alternative conceptual framework for understanding obscenity’s subjugation of human bodies, desires, and identities to abstract social forces. It will appeal especially to scholars of American literature, American studies, and U.S. legal history.

MacCormick's `Institutions of Law' is the culmination of a lifetime's work in legal theory by one of the world's most respected legal theorists. Featuring an impressive collection of contributions from well-known legal theorists from around the world, all of whom are familiar with MacCormick’s work, this collection provides a cutting edge account of the book’s significance.

The essay discusses one of the challenges to the methodology of the law - a new wave of naturalistic approaches. The book aims to outline how these new developments affect studying and explaining the law. It distinguishes two fundamentally different models of the scientific inquiry of the law and discusses the nature of its scientific status....

Talk about law often includes reference to ideals of justice, equality or freedom. But what do we refer to when we speak about ideals in the context of law? This book explores the concept of ideals by combining an investigation of different theories of ideals with a discussion of the role of ideals in law. A comparison of the theories of Gustav Radbruch and Philip Selznick leads up to a pragmatist theory of legal ideals, which provides an interesting new position in the debate about values in law between legal positivists and natural law thinkers. Attention for law's central ideals enables us to understand law's autonomous character, while at the same time tracing its connection to societal values. Essential reading for anyone interested in the role of values or ideals in law.