Leo Strauss And The Invasion Of Iraq

The political philosophy of Leo Strauss has been the subject of significant scholarly and media attention in recent years, particularly in the context of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Allegations that a group of Strauss-inspired Neo-conservatives intervened in the foreign policy establishment of the US in order to realise the policy of 'regime change' began to emerge soon after the invasion, and unanswered questions remain a decade later. This book addresses these claims, focusing specifically on a group of Straussians active in the spheres of intelligence production, think tanks, and the media during the period from the 9/11 attacks to the invasion in 2003. Such an examination is intended not simply to identify and expose their activities promoting the policy of 'regime change' in Iraq during this period, but also to challenge them and the Straussian logics underpinning them. Utilising the thought of Jacques Derrida, the book enacts a deconstructive challenge to Strauss’ political philosophy which unsettles the fundamental assumptions it relies upon. In doing so, it exposes the securitising imperative underpinning Straussian thought and the Straussian interventions. It thereby simultaneously addresses crucial issues in political theory and contemporary foreign policy studies, while asserting that these dimensions of international politics can and should be dealt with in conjunction with each other. This book would be of interest to students and scholars of Global Politics, Political Theory, Security Studies and US Foreign Policy, and those outside the academy interested in Neo-conservatism and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

It is now commonly acknowledged that numerous key players in and around the Bush administration’s planning of the Iraq invasion were connected through a common background in the political philosophy of Leo Strauss, a German-born University of Chicago professor who died in 1973. These Straussian "neocons" were held responsible for exploiting the September 11th attacks in order to further their own foreign policy agenda. Cloaked in Virtue is the first book to take a critical view of the political ideas of Leo Strauss himself by careful attention to his own writings before and after his emigration to the United States. The result is a critical examination of the political theory of Leo Strauss, lifting the veil of intentional obfuscation, and its influence on the neoconservative foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of politics and international relations.

The Iraq war "e; its causes, agency and execution "e; has been shrouded in an ideological mist. Now, Muhammad Idrees Ahmad dispels the myths surrounding the war, taking a sociological approach to establish the war's causes, identify its agents and describe how it was sold. Ahmad presents a social history of the war's leading agents "e; the neoconservatives "e; and shows how this ideologically coherent group of determined political agents used the contingency of 9/11 to overwhelm a sceptical foreign policy establishment, military brass and intelligence apparatus, propelling the US into a war that a significant portion of the public opposed. The book includes an historical exploration of American militarism and of the increased post-WWII US role in the Middle East, as well as a reconsideration of the debates that John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt sparked after the publication of 'The Israel lobby and US Foreign Policy'.

This provocative book examines the teachings of political theorist Leo Strauss and the ways in which they have been appropriated, or misappropriated, by senior policymakers.

The first comprehensive effort to examine Strauss's astonishingly wide-ranging writings of the 1930s (some of which have only recently been made available to English-speaking readers, including several herein) with a view to their unifying theme of recovering classical political philosophy.

Leo Strauss was a political philosopher who died in 1973 but came to came to prominent attention in the United States and also Britain around the beginning of the War in Iraq. Charges began emerging that architects of the war such as Paul Wolfowitz and large numbers of staff in the US State and Defense Departments had studied with, or been influenced by, the academic work of Strauss and his followers. A vague, but powerful, idea was generated in the popular press that a group known as the Straussians had been instrumental in the long-range strategic planning of American foreign policy, both to advance American interests and to encourage democratic revolutions outside the West. This volume of essays opens up the topic of Leo Strauss and the Straussians to those outside the relatively narrow circles who have been concerned with him and his followers up to now.

This is the first book-length examination of the impact Leo Strauss’ immigration to the United States had on this thinking. Adi Armon weaves together a close reading of unpublished seminars Strauss taught at the University of Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s with an interpretation of his later works, all of which were of course written against the backdrop of the Cold War. First, the book describes the intellectual environment that shaped the young Strauss’ worldview in the Weimar Republic, tracing those aspects of his thought that changed and others that remained consistent up until his immigration to America. Armon then goes on to explore the centrality of Karl Marx to Strauss’s intellectual biography. By analyzing an unpublished seminar Strauss taught with Joseph Cropsey at the University of Chicago in 1960, Armon shows how Strauss’ fragmentary, partial engagement with Marx in writing obscured the important role that Marxism actually played as an intellectual challenge to his later political thinking. Finally, the book explores the manifestations of Straussian doctrine in postwar America through reading Strauss’ The City and Man (1964) as a representative of his political teaching.

Presents a critique of the Bush Administration's Iraq policy, arguing that it stemmed from misconceptions about the realities of the situation in Iraq and a squandering of the goodwill of American allies following September 11th.