Levelling Up Left Behind Places

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS The nature of the problem: • Geographical inequalities in the UK are a longstanding and persistent problem rooted in deepseated and cumulative processes of local and regional divergence with antecedents in the inter-war years and accelerating since the early 1980s. • This spatial divergence has been generated by the inability of some places to adapt to the emergence of the post-industrial service and knowledge-based economy whose geographies are very different from those of past heavy industries. As a consequence, the "left behind" problem has become spatially and systemically entrenched. • Challenging ideas of market-led adjustment, there is little evidence that real cost advantages in Northern areas are correcting and offsetting the geographically differentiated development of skilled labour and human capital and the quality of residential and business environments. • A variety of different types of "left behind place" exist at different scales, and these types combine common problems with distinctive economic trajectories and varied causes. These different types will need policies that are sensitive and adaptive to their specific problems and potentialities. • Contemporary economic development is marked by agglomeration in high-skilled and knowledge-intensive activities. Research-based concentrations of high-skilled activity in the UK have been limited and concentrated heavily in parts of London and cities in the Golden Triangle, especially Oxford and Cambridge. Even in London, the benefits have been unevenly spread between boroughs. • Existing analyses of the predicaments of left behind places present a stark division between rapid growth in "winning" high-skilled cities and relative decline in "losing" areas. This view is problematic because it oversimplifies the experience in the UK and other countries. A false binary distinction is presented to policymakers which offers only the possibility of growth in larger cities and derived spillovers and other compensations elsewhere. • Yet, the post-industrial economy involves strong dispersal of activity and growth to smaller cities, towns and rural areas. However, this process has been highly selective between local areas and needs to be better understood. The institutional and policy response: • Past policies in the UK have lacked recognition of the scale and importance of the left behind problem and committed insufficient resources to its resolution. The objective of achieving a less geographically unequal economy has not been incorporated into mainstream policymaking. When compared with other countries, the UK has taken an overcentralized, "top-down" approach to policy formulation and implementation, often applying "one size fits all" policy measures to different geographical situations. • Political cycles have underpinned a disruptive churn of institutions and policies. In contrast with other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, particularly in Europe, there has been limited long-term strategy and continuity, and inadequate development of local policymaking capacity and capabilities, especially for research, analysis, monitoring and evaluation. • Past policies have been underfunded, inconsistent, and inadequately tailored and adapted to the needs of different local economies. We estimate that, on average over the period 1961–2020, the UK government invested on average £2.9 billion per annum in direct spatial policy (2020 prices), equivalent to around 0.15% of gross national income (GNI) per annum over the period. European Union Structural and Cohesion Policy support has added around 0.12% GNI (2020 prices) per annum to this over the period from the late 1970s. • These broad estimates suggest that discretionary expenditure in the UK on urban and regional policy when both domestic and European Union spatial policy was in operation was equivalent to 0.27% per annum of UK GNI (2020 prices). This is dwarfed by mainstream spending programmes (by comparison, the UK committed £14.5 billion (0.7% of GNI) to international aid in 2019). The level of resources devoted to spatial policy has been modest given the entrenched and cumulative nature of the problem. • Policies for "levelling up" need clearly to distinguish different types of left behind places and devise a set of place-sensitive and targeted policies for these types of "clubs" of left behind areas. This shift will need a radical expansion of "place-based" policymaking in the UK which allows national and local actors to collaborate on the design of appropriate targeted programmes. • A key priority for "levelling up" is revitalizing Northern cities and boosting their contribution to the national economy. Underperformance in these urban centres has been a major contributor to persistent geographical inequality in the UK. • Addressing the UK’s geographical economic inequalities and the plight of left behind places requires substantially more decentralization of power and resources to place-based agencies. This would enable the current UK government’s "levelling up" agenda to capitalize on the many advantages of more "place-based" policymaking to diagnose problems, build on local capabilities, strengthen resilience and adapt to local changes in circumstances. • Crucially, place-based efforts need to be coordinated and aligned with place-sensitive national policies. The key challenge of a levelling up mission is to integrate "place-based" policies with greater place sensitivity in national policies and in regulation and mainstream economic spending. • It is important to develop policies that spread the benefits from agglomeration and ensure that the income effects and innovations produced by high-skill concentrations diffuse to the wider cityregional economies and their firms (especially small and medium-sized enterprises) and workers. There is a clear need for more policy thinking on how this can be achieved. • Policy for levelling-up needs to align and coordinate with the other national missions for net zero carbon and post-pandemic recovery. This suggests that a strong "place-making" agenda focused on quality of life, infrastructure and housing in many left behind places is important for post-industrial and service growth. • Genuine place-making is a long-term process involving public, private and civic participation which allows local responses to those economic, environmental, and social constraints and problems that most strongly reduce the quality of life in local areas. A truly "total place" approach is required. The quality of infrastructure, housing stock and public services is crucial for the quality of place as well as the ability to secure and attract more dispersed forms of growth. There is little hope of delivering "place-making" if public sector austerity is once again allowed to cut back public services more severely in poorer and more deprived areas. The way forward: • The scale and nature of the UK’s contemporary "left behind places" problem are such that only a transformative shift in policy model and a resource commitment of historic proportions are likely to achieve the "levelling up" ambition that is central to the current government’s political ambitions. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS In summary, our recommendations are that the UK government should: • Grasp the transformative moment for local, regional and urban development policy as the UK adjusts to a post-Covid-19 world and seeks a net zero carbon future. • Establish a clear and binding national mission for "levelling up". • Realize the potential of place in policymaking. • Decentralize and devolve towards a multilevel federal polity. • Strengthen subnational funding and financing and adopt new financing models involving the public, private sector and civic sectors to generate the resources required. • Embed geography in the national state and in national policy machinery. • Improve subnational strategic research, intelligence, monitoring and evaluation capacity. A failure to learn from the lessons of the last 70 years of spatial policy risks the UK becoming an ever more divided nation, with all the associated economic, social and political costs, risks and challenges that this presents.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS The nature of the problem: • Geographical inequalities in the UK are a longstanding and persistent problem rooted in deepseated and cumulative processes of local and regional divergence with antecedents in the inter-war years and accelerating since the early 1980s. • This spatial divergence has been generated by the inability of some places to adapt to the emergence of the post-industrial service and knowledge-based economy whose geographies are very different from those of past heavy industries. As a consequence, the "left behind" problem has become spatially and systemically entrenched. • Challenging ideas of market-led adjustment, there is little evidence that real cost advantages in Northern areas are correcting and offsetting the geographically differentiated development of skilled labour and human capital and the quality of residential and business environments. • A variety of different types of "left behind place" exist at different scales, and these types combine common problems with distinctive economic trajectories and varied causes. These different types will need policies that are sensitive and adaptive to their specific problems and potentialities. • Contemporary economic development is marked by agglomeration in high-skilled and knowledge-intensive activities. Research-based concentrations of high-skilled activity in the UK have been limited and concentrated heavily in parts of London and cities in the Golden Triangle, especially Oxford and Cambridge. Even in London, the benefits have been unevenly spread between boroughs. • Existing analyses of the predicaments of left behind places present a stark division between rapid growth in "winning" high-skilled cities and relative decline in "losing" areas. This view is problematic because it oversimplifies the experience in the UK and other countries. A false binary distinction is presented to policymakers which offers only the possibility of growth in larger cities and derived spillovers and other compensations elsewhere. • Yet, the post-industrial economy involves strong dispersal of activity and growth to smaller cities, towns and rural areas. However, this process has been highly selective between local areas and needs to be better understood. The institutional and policy response: • Past policies in the UK have lacked recognition of the scale and importance of the left behind problem and committed insufficient resources to its resolution. The objective of achieving a less geographically unequal economy has not been incorporated into mainstream policymaking. When compared with other countries, the UK has taken an overcentralized, "top-down" approach to policy formulation and implementation, often applying "one size fits all" policy measures to different geographical situations. • Political cycles have underpinned a disruptive churn of institutions and policies. In contrast with other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, particularly in Europe, there has been limited long-term strategy and continuity, and inadequate development of local policymaking capacity and capabilities, especially for research, analysis, monitoring and evaluation. • Past policies have been underfunded, inconsistent, and inadequately tailored and adapted to the needs of different local economies. We estimate that, on average over the period 1961–2020, the UK government invested on average £2.9 billion per annum in direct spatial policy (2020 prices), equivalent to around 0.15% of gross national income (GNI) per annum over the period. European Union Structural and Cohesion Policy support has added around 0.12% GNI (2020 prices) per annum to this over the period from the late 1970s. • These broad estimates suggest that discretionary expenditure in the UK on urban and regional policy when both domestic and European Union spatial policy was in operation was equivalent to 0.27% per annum of UK GNI (2020 prices). This is dwarfed by mainstream spending programmes (by comparison, the UK committed £14.5 billion (0.7% of GNI) to international aid in 2019). The level of resources devoted to spatial policy has been modest given the entrenched and cumulative nature of the problem. • Policies for "levelling up" need clearly to distinguish different types of left behind places and devise a set of place-sensitive and targeted policies for these types of "clubs" of left behind areas. This shift will need a radical expansion of "place-based" policymaking in the UK which allows national and local actors to collaborate on the design of appropriate targeted programmes. • A key priority for "levelling up" is revitalizing Northern cities and boosting their contribution to the national economy. Underperformance in these urban centres has been a major contributor to persistent geographical inequality in the UK. • Addressing the UK’s geographical economic inequalities and the plight of left behind places requires substantially more decentralization of power and resources to place-based agencies. This would enable the current UK government’s "levelling up" agenda to capitalize on the many advantages of more "place-based" policymaking to diagnose problems, build on local capabilities, strengthen resilience and adapt to local changes in circumstances. • Crucially, place-based efforts need to be coordinated and aligned with place-sensitive national policies. The key challenge of a levelling up mission is to integrate "place-based" policies with greater place sensitivity in national policies and in regulation and mainstream economic spending. • It is important to develop policies that spread the benefits from agglomeration and ensure that the income effects and innovations produced by high-skill concentrations diffuse to the wider cityregional economies and their firms (especially small and medium-sized enterprises) and workers. There is a clear need for more policy thinking on how this can be achieved. • Policy for levelling-up needs to align and coordinate with the other national missions for net zero carbon and post-pandemic recovery. This suggests that a strong "place-making" agenda focused on quality of life, infrastructure and housing in many left behind places is important for post-industrial and service growth. • Genuine place-making is a long-term process involving public, private and civic participation which allows local responses to those economic, environmental, and social constraints and problems that most strongly reduce the quality of life in local areas. A truly "total place" approach is required. The quality of infrastructure, housing stock and public services is crucial for the quality of place as well as the ability to secure and attract more dispersed forms of growth. There is little hope of delivering "place-making" if public sector austerity is once again allowed to cut back public services more severely in poorer and more deprived areas. The way forward: • The scale and nature of the UK’s contemporary "left behind places" problem are such that only a transformative shift in policy model and a resource commitment of historic proportions are likely to achieve the "levelling up" ambition that is central to the current government’s political ambitions. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS In summary, our recommendations are that the UK government should: • Grasp the transformative moment for local, regional and urban development policy as the UK adjusts to a post-Covid-19 world and seeks a net zero carbon future. • Establish a clear and binding national mission for "levelling up". • Realize the potential of place in policymaking. • Decentralize and devolve towards a multilevel federal polity. • Strengthen subnational funding and financing and adopt new financing models involving the public, private sector and civic sectors to generate the resources required. • Embed geography in the national state and in national policy machinery. • Improve subnational strategic research, intelligence, monitoring and evaluation capacity. A failure to learn from the lessons of the last 70 years of spatial policy risks the UK becoming an ever more divided nation, with all the associated economic, social and political costs, risks and challenges that this presents.

This book aims to understand the predicaments of 'left behind places' and the scale of the policy challenge of 'levelling up' their economic prosperity. The case is made for a new, mission-oriented policy model to achieve this, which is now a prominent refrain in the political lexicon.

This book explores the making, unmaking and remaking of social infrastructure in ‘left-behind places’. Such places, typically once flourishing industrial communities that have been excluded from recent economic growth, now attract academic and policy attention as sites of a political backlash against globalisation and liberal democracy. The book focuses on the role of social infrastructure as a key component of this story. Seeking to move beyond a narrowly economistic of reading ‘left behind places’, the book addresses the understudied affective dimensions of ‘left-behindness’. It develops an analytical framework that emphasises the importance of place attachments and the consequences of their disruption; considers ‘left behind places’ as ‘moral communities’ and the making of social infrastructure as an expression of this; views the unmaking of social infrastructure through the lens of ‘root shock’; and explains efforts at remaking it in terms of the articulation of ‘radical hope’. The analysis builds upon a case study of a former mining community in County Durham, North East England. Using mixed methods, it offers a ‘deep place study’ of a single village to understand more fully the making, unmaking and remaking of social infrastructure. It shows how a place once richly endowed with social infrastructure, saw this endowment wither and the effects this had on the community. However, it also records efforts of the local people to rebuild social infrastructure, typically drawing the lessons of the past. Although the story of one village, the methods, results and policy recommendation have much wider applicability. The book will be of interest to researchers, policy makers and others concerned with the fate of ‘left behind places’.

This book contributes to emerging debates about Levelling Up the UK Economy, considering these alongside the nature of, and trends in, both the political economy and spatial disparities. Drawing on a complex systems framing, the book pulls together a range of evidence to provide insights about the agenda from macro, meso and micro levels of analyses, including utilising qualitative data from a small scoping study with Directors of Regeneration across several ‘left behind’ places and 25 residents of ‘left behind’ Redcar & Cleveland in Teesside. The book outlines phases in capitalism’s development, particularly the shift from post-war capitalism to a post-industrial and neoliberal society and the implications for spatial inequalities. The 2022 Levelling Up White Paper is analysed alongside a focus on the role of local government relative to the agenda. The book offers an empirical case study of ‘left behind’ Redcar & Cleveland, exposing deindustrialisation, insecure employment, crime, anti-social behaviour and sentiments on a North South divide and Levelling Up. We suggest that only a transformative change in the political economy, including significant and sustained investment at different spatial levels, is likely to achieve the ambition to Level Up.

From the USA TODAY bestselling author of Sweet Thing and Nowhere But Here comes a love story about a Craigslist “missed connection” post that gives two people a second chance at love fifteen years after they were separated in New York City. To the Green-eyed Lovebird: We met fifteen years ago, almost to the day, when I moved my stuff into the NYU dorm room next to yours at Senior House. You called us fast friends. I like to think it was more. We lived on nothing but the excitement of finding ourselves through music (you were obsessed with Jeff Buckley), photography (I couldn’t stop taking pictures of you), hanging out in Washington Square Park, and all the weird things we did to make money. I learned more about myself that year than any other. Yet, somehow, it all fell apart. We lost touch the summer after graduation when I went to South America to work for National Geographic. When I came back, you were gone. A part of me still wonders if I pushed you too hard after the wedding… I didn’t see you again until a month ago. It was a Wednesday. You were rocking back on your heels, balancing on that thick yellow line that runs along the subway platform, waiting for the F train. I didn’t know it was you until it was too late, and then you were gone. Again. You said my name; I saw it on your lips. I tried to will the train to stop, just so I could say hello. After seeing you, all of the youthful feelings and memories came flooding back to me, and now I’ve spent the better part of a month wondering what your life is like. I might be totally out of my mind, but would you like to get a drink with me and catch up on the last decade and a half? M

*NOW A NETFLIX LIMITED SERIES—from producer and director Shawn Levy (Stranger Things) starring Mark Ruffalo, Hugh Laurie, and newcomer Aria Mia Loberti* Winner of the Pulitzer Prize and National Book Award finalist, the beloved instant New York Times bestseller and New York Times Book Review Top 10 Book about a blind French girl and a German boy whose paths collide in occupied France as both try to survive the devastation of World War II. Marie-Laure lives with her father in Paris near the Museum of Natural History where he works as the master of its thousands of locks. When she is six, Marie-Laure goes blind and her father builds a perfect miniature of their neighborhood so she can memorize it by touch and navigate her way home. When she is twelve, the Nazis occupy Paris, and father and daughter flee to the walled citadel of Saint-Malo, where Marie-Laure’s reclusive great uncle lives in a tall house by the sea. With them they carry what might be the museum’s most valuable and dangerous jewel. In a mining town in Germany, the orphan Werner grows up with his younger sister, enchanted by a crude radio they find. Werner becomes an expert at building and fixing these crucial new instruments, a talent that wins him a place at a brutal academy for Hitler Youth, then a special assignment to track the Resistance. More and more aware of the human cost of his intelligence, Werner travels through the heart of the war and, finally, into Saint-Malo, where his story and Marie-Laure’s converge. Doerr’s “stunning sense of physical detail and gorgeous metaphors” (San Francisco Chronicle) are dazzling. Deftly interweaving the lives of Marie-Laure and Werner, he illuminates the ways, against all odds, people try to be good to one another. Ten years in the writing, All the Light We Cannot See is a magnificent, deeply moving novel from a writer “whose sentences never fail to thrill” (Los Angeles Times).

If he had been with me everything would have been different... I wasn't with Finn on that August night. But I should've been. It was raining, of course. And he and Sylvie were arguing as he drove down the slick road. No one ever says what they were arguing about. Other people think it's not important. They do not know there is another story. The story that lurks between the facts. What they do not know—the cause of the argument—is crucial. So let me tell you...