Libertarianism Defended

Ever since the publication in 1974 of Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, libertarianism has been much discussed within political philosophy, science and economy circles. Yet libertarianism has been so strongly identified with Nozick's version of it that little attention has been devoted to other than Nozick's ideas and arguments. While Nozick's version of libertarianism has preoccupied the academic discussion Nozick himself did not respond to the many criticisms raised and yet other defenders of libertarianism have not remained silent. Jan Narveson, Loren Lomasky, Eric Mack, Douglas Rasmussen, Douglas Den Uyl and many others have contributed impressive arguments of their own in support of the libertarian idea that a political system is just when it successfully secures the rights of individuals understood within the Lockean classical liberal tradition. In this book Tibor R. Machan analyses the state of the debate on libertarianism post Nozick. Going far beyond the often cursory treatment of libertarianism in major books and other publications he examines closely the alternative non-Nozickian defenses of libertarianism that have been advanced and, by applying these arguments to innumerable policy areas in the field, Machan achieves a new visibility and prominence for libertarianism.

Michael Otsuka's ingenious and exciting book vindicates left-libertarianism, a political philosophy which combines stringent rights of control over one's own mind, body, and life with egalitarian rights of ownership of the world. He reclaims the ideas of John Locke from the libertarian right, and defends a view which is both more libertarian and more egalitarian than the Kantian liberalism of John Rawls. Otsuka endorses a fully egalitarian principle of equal opportunity for welfare and defends a pluralistic, decentralized ideal of political society. Libertarianism without Inequality is a book which everyone interested in political theory should read.

Libertarianism: For and Against offers dueling perspectives on the scope of legitimate government. Tibor R. Machan, a well-known political philosopher with libertarian convictions, argues for a minimal government devoted solely to protecting individual rights to life, liberty, and property. Stressing the sovereignty of each individual, Machan argues in favor of limiting democracy's scope and against the redistribution of wealth, or any other sort of taxation. In opposition to libertarianism, philosopher Craig Duncan defends democratic liberalism, which aims to ensure that all citizens have fair access to a life of dignity. This requires measures to protect equality of opportunity, as well as measures to ensure all have access to a decent minimum standard of living. In a dynamic exchange of arguments, critiques, and rebuttals, the two philosophers cut to the heart of this important debate, articulating and defending competing conceptions of such core values as political freedom and equality.

In A Consequentialist Defense of Libertarianism, Richard Fumerton argues that empirical facts concerning consequences must always play a crucial role in a plausible defense of freedom. After making distinctions between morality and law, he defends the view that it is a fundamental mistake to think that the law should always, or even usually, attempt to mirror morality. With this framework in place, Fumerton addresses various controversial questions concerning when the law ought to side with freedom. He offers a nuanced defense of several positions shared by many "moderate" libertarians. This consequentialist defense of freedom offers a fresh perspective on some very old philosophical debates. As more people become frustrated with a perceived lack of principled attempts by established political parties to appreciate important concerns people have involving their desire for freedom, the issues discussed in this book are particularly timely.

Explaining Libertarianism: four theses: 1. Interpersonal liberty requires an explicit, pre-propertarian, purely factual, theory. 2. Liberty is and need only be morally desirable in systematic practice, not in every logically possible case. In practice, there is no clash between the two main moral contenders: rights and consequences. 3. Nothing can ever justify, support or ground any theory of liberty or its applications because it is logically impossible to transcend assumptions. Theories can only be explained, criticised and defended within conjectural frameworks. 4. The state is inherently authoritarian and also negative-sum. It reduces welfare overall, with the losses compounding over time. Libertarian anarchic order is the positive-sum solution to illiberal political chaos. J C Lester is a philosopher of libertarianism. He has written widely on the subject in books, articles and dialogues. His solution to the crucial philosophical problem of interpersonal liberty provides an explicit theory of liberty and explains how its application entails self-ownership and external property, and relates to all other interpersonal matters.

A tiny American town's plans for radical self-government overlooked one hairy detail: no one told the bears. Once upon a time, a group of libertarians got together and hatched the Free Town Project, a plan to take over an American town and completely eliminate its government. In 2004, they set their sights on Grafton, NH, a barely populated settlement with one paved road. When they descended on Grafton, public funding for pretty much everything shrank: the fire department, the library, the schoolhouse. State and federal laws became meek suggestions, scarcely heard in the town's thick wilderness. The anything-goes atmosphere soon caught the attention of Grafton's neighbors: the bears. Freedom-loving citizens ignored hunting laws and regulations on food disposal. They built a tent city in an effort to get off the grid. The bears smelled food and opportunity. A Libertarian Walks Into a Bear is the sometimes funny, sometimes terrifying tale of what happens when a government disappears into the woods. Complete with gunplay, adventure, and backstabbing politicians, this is the ultimate story of a quintessential American experiment -- to live free or die, perhaps from a bear.

This book probes the depths of libertarian philosophy and highlights the need for laws that protect all individuals in society. This book defines libertarianism as a theory of what is just law, it is predicated upon the non-aggression principle (NAP). This legal foundation of the libertarian philosophy states that it should be illicit to threaten or engage in initiatory violence against innocent people. Ultimately, this book presents the notion, defend the "undefendable." This book defines that as; any person, institution, professional, worker, which is either reviled by virtually everyone, or prohibited by law, and does not violate the NAP. Weaved throughout, this book uses political philosophy to present three fundamental premises to explain this libertarian point of view. Firstly, this book defines the non-aggression principle (NAP). Secondly, demonstrates the importance and relevance of private property rights in this context. This book uses practical examples to demonstrate the theoretical application of freedom rights using libertarianism principles. .

In this book, Christopher Evan Franklin develops and defends a novel version of event-causal libertarianism. This view is a combination of libertarianism--the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the causal upshots of nondeterministic processes--and agency reductionism--the view that the causal role of the agent in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agent. Franklin boldly counteracts a dominant theory that has similar aims, put forth by well-known philosopher Robert Kane. Many philosophers contend that event-causal libertarians have no advantage over compatibilists when it comes to securing a distinctively valuable kind of freedom and responsibility. To Franklin, this position is mistaken. Assuming agency reductionism is true, event-causal libertarians need only adopt the most plausible compatibilist theory and add indeterminism at the proper juncture in the genesis of human action. The result is minimal event-causal libertarianism: a model of free will with the metaphysical simplicity of compatibilism and the intuitive power of libertarianism. And yet a worry remains: toward the end of the book, Franklin reconsiders his assumption of agency reductionism, arguing that this picture faces a hitherto unsolved problem. This problem, however, has nothing to do with indeterminism or determinism, or even libertarianism or compatibilism, but with how to understand the nature of the self and its role in the genesis of action. Crucially, if this problem proves unsolvable, then not only is event-causal libertarianism untenable, so also is event-causal compatibilism.