Living Weapons

"Biological weapons are widely feared, yet rarely used. Biological weapons were the first weapon prohibited by an international treaty, yet the proliferation of these weapons increased after they were banned in 1972. Biological weapons are frequently called 'the poor man's atomic bomb,' yet they cannot provide the same deterrent capability as nuclear weapons. One of my goals in this book is to explain the underlying principles of these apparent paradoxes."—from Living Weapons Biological weapons are the least well understood of the so-called weapons of mass destruction. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are composed of, or derived from, living organisms. In Living Weapons, Gregory D. Koblentz provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique challenges that biological weapons pose for international security. At a time when the United States enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority, biological weapons have emerged as an attractive means for less powerful states and terrorist groups to wage asymmetric warfare. Koblentz also warns that advances in the life sciences have the potential to heighten the lethality and variety of biological weapons. The considerable overlap between the equipment, materials and knowledge required to develop biological weapons, conduct civilian biomedical research, and develop biological defenses creates a multiuse dilemma that limits the effectiveness of verification, hinders civilian oversight, and complicates threat assessments. Living Weapons draws on the American, Soviet, Russian, South African, and Iraqi biological weapons programs to enhance our understanding of the special challenges posed by these weapons for arms control, deterrence, civilian-military relations, and intelligence. Koblentz also examines the aspirations of terrorist groups to develop these weapons and the obstacles they have faced. Biological weapons, Koblentz argues, will continue to threaten international security until defenses against such weapons are improved, governments can reliably detect biological weapon activities, the proliferation of materials and expertise is limited, and international norms against the possession and use of biological weapons are strengthened.

Soma, Aina, and Lina have begun their journey in search of a way to use magic. With no leads and no other means of making money, the three decide to register as adventurers at a guild. There they meet the mysterious Sierra, who tells them of ancient ruins where a mystical power lies dormant. Soma can’t pass up the chance that whatever it is might grant him the ability to use magic, but traversing the ruins will pit them against forces they don’t understand.

Describes the history of the nuclear arms race, examines the dangers of nuclear war, and discusses strategies for stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.

Defining "genocide" as an international crime, this two-volume set provides a comparative study of historical cases of genocide and mass atrocity—clearly identifying the factors that produced the attitudes and behaviors that led to them—discusses the reasons for rules in war, and examines how the five principles laid out in the Geneva Conventions and other international agreements have functioned in modern warfare. Written by an expert on international politics and law, Genocide, Mass Atrocity, and War Crimes in Modern History: Blood and Conscience is an easy-to-understand resource that explains why genocides and other atrocities occur, why humanity saw the need to create rules that apply during war, and how culture, rules about war, and the nature of war intersect. The first volume addresses the history and development of the normative regime(s) that define genocide and mass atrocity. Through a comparative study of historical cases that pay particular attention to the factors involved in producing the attitudes and behaviors that led to the incidents of mass slaughter and mistreatment, the author identifies the reasons that genocides and mass atrocities in the 20th century were largely ignored until the early 1990s and why even starting then, responses were inconsistent. The second book discusses why rules in war exist, which factors may lead to the adoption of rules, what defines a war "crime," and how the five fundamental principles laid out in the Geneva Conventions and other international agreements have actually functioned in modern warfare. It also poses—and answers—the interesting question of why we should obey rules when our opponents do not. The final chapter examines what actions could serve to identify future situations in which mass atrocities may occur and identifies the problems of timely humanitarian intervention in international affairs.

What is a Werewolf supposed to do when he finds out he's descended from fallen angels? Hang on for another unexpected adventure, Mac and KC are back. From Montana to Delaware be prepared for new friends and old acquaintances to cross your path. From The Weapon Bearer's Son: "What evil in its right mind is gonna attack a ranch protected by a pack of heavily armed Montanan cowboy werewolves?"

Biological weapons have threatened U.S. national security since at least World War II. Historically, however, the U.S. military has neglected research, development, acquisition, and doctrine for biodefense. Following September 11 and the anthrax letters of 2001, the United States started spending billions of dollars per year on medical countermeasures and biological detection systems. But most of this funding now comes from the Department of Health and Human Services rather than the Department of Defense. Why has the U.S. military neglected biodefense and allowed civilian organizations to take the lead in defending the country against biological attacks? In American Biodefense, Frank L. Smith III addresses this puzzling and largely untold story about science, technology, and national security.Smith argues that organizational frames and stereotypes have caused both military neglect and the rise of civilian biodefense. In the armed services, influential ideas about kinetic warfare have undermined defense against biological warfare. The influence of these ideas on science and technology challenges the conventional wisdom that national security policy is driven by threats or bureaucratic interests. Given the ideas at work inside the U.S. military, Smith explains how the lessons learned from biodefense can help solve other important problems that range from radiation weapons to cyber attacks.

This monograph introduces current genome editing technologies—clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeat (CRISPR)-CRISPR-associated (Cas) systems, transcription activator-like effector nucleases (TALENs), and zinc-finger nucleases (ZFNs)—and provides an assessment of the risk of misuse of these technologies based on the following parameters: accessibility, ease of misuse, magnitude of potential harm, and imminence of potential misuse. The findings from this assessment are applied to analyze and evaluate the threat posed by the intentional misuse of genome editing technologies to develop biological weapons. Furthermore, the book discusses the implications of misuse for different applications of genome editing, such as making existing pathogens more dangerous, modifying the human microbiome, weaponizing gene drives, engineering super soldiers, and augmenting the general population to confer economic advantages. Technologies that enable genome editing with programmable nucleases—including CRISPR, TALEN, and ZFN—allow for the precise genetic modification of organisms and cultured cells. While these technologies are used for a variety of beneficial applications, intelligence and defense experts have raised concerns that genome editing technologies, especially CRISPR, could be misused to develop new and improved biological weapons. Furthermore, experts worry that the number and type of actors who could potentially misuse genome editing is dramatically increasing given the democratization of biology, which is allowing biology to become more accessible to everyone including nonexperts. The book provides a comprehensive assessment of how feasible it is for users with different levels of knowledge and skill to acquire and then to apply the technologies to develop a biological weapon. It also provides an assessment of governability and a tailored set of recommendations that address security concerns. These recommendations are sensitive to the cost-benefit trade-off of regulating genome editing technologies. The book targets researchers as well as intelligence analysts, defense and security personnel, and policymakers.