Logics Of Hierarchy

Political science has had trouble generating models that unify the study of the formation and consolidation of various types of states and empires. The business-administration literature, however, has long experience in observing organizations. According to a dominant model in this field, business firms generally take one of two forms: unitary (U) or multidivisional (M). The U-form organizes its various elements along the lines of administrative functions, whereas the M-form governs its periphery according to geography and territory. In Logics of Hierarchy, Alexander Cooley applies this model to political hierarchies across different cultures, geographical settings, and historical eras to explain a variety of seemingly disparate processes: state formation, imperial governance, and territorial occupation. Cooley illustrates the power of this formal distinction with detailed accounts of the experiences of Central Asian republics in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, and compares them to developments in the former Yugoslavia, the governance of modern European empires, Korea during and after Japanese occupation, and the recent U.S. occupation of Iraq. In applying this model, Logics of Hierarchy reveals the varying organizational ability of powerful states to promote institutional transformation in their political peripheries and the consequences of these formations in determining pathways of postimperial extrication and state-building. Its focus on the common organizational problems of hierarchical polities challenges much of the received wisdom about imperialism and postimperialism.

The theory set out in this book results from the meeting of descriptive set theory and recursion theory.

A new approach to the study of social structure, drawing on recent developments in the physical, biological and cognitive sciences.

Giving on occasions a talk on the subject of this book, one of the queries raised was, 'surely, what you mean are flat hierarchies'. This, I think, gives an indication of how difficult it can be to conceive of organizations which do not have a hierarchical structure. A rather similar response was obtained when, in the 1950's, an account was given to a manager of the British Coal Board of an autonomous composite team of more than 40 miners, who had taken over complete responsibility for a three-shift cycle, and divided the income obtained among themselves. His comment was that this could not possibly work. The new mode of work organization which had been evolved by the miners in several pits in the Durham coal fields was, at the time, well ahead of the prevailing concepts and philosophy of both management and the Trade Union. It did not help matters very much that the detailed accounts were presented in an academic and scientific form (Trist et aI. , 1963; Herbst, 1962). I think that we felt that all the backing of systematic research and data analysis would be needed to present the case for modes of organization, which deviated from conventional practice. However, something was learned from this experience. When at the beginning of the 1960's the Norwegian Work Democratization Project was started, a number of demonstration sites were set up which people could look at, and which could function as centers for diffusion.

The English School of International Relations has traditionally maintained that international society cannot accommodate hierarchical relationships between states. This book employs a unique theoretical and conceptual approach challenging this view and arguing that hierarchies are formed on Western states' need to manage globalised risks.

The discipline of public administration draws predominantly from political and organizational theory, but also from other social and behavioral sciences, philosophy, and even theology. This diversity results in conflicting prescriptions for the "proper" administrative role. So, how are those new to public administration to know which ideas are "legitimate"? Rather than accepting conventional arguments for administrative legitimacy through delegated constitutional authority or expertise, Logics of Legitimacy: Three Traditions of Public Administration Praxis does not assume that any one approach to professionalism is accepted by all scholars, practitioners, citizens, or elected representatives. Instead, it offers a framework for public administration theory and practice that fully includes the citizen as a political actor alongside elected representatives and administrators. This framework: Considers both direct and representative forms of democracy Examines concepts from both political and organizational theory, addressing many of the key questions in public administration Examines past and present approaches to administration Presents a conceptual lens for understanding public administration theory and explaining different administrative roles and practices The framework for public administration theory and practice is presented in three traditions of main prescriptions for practice: Constitutional (the bureaucrat), Discretionary (the entrepreneur), and Collaborative (the steward). This book is appropriate for use in graduate-level courses that explore the philosophical, historical, and intellectual foundations of public administration. Upon qualified course adoption, instructors will gain access to a course outline and corresponding lecture slides.

Hierarchical relationships—rules that structure both international and domestic politics—are pervasive. Yet we know little about how these relationships are constructed, maintained, and dismantled. This book fills this lacuna through a two-pronged research approach: first, it discusses how great power negotiations over international political settlements both respond to domestic politics within weak states and structure the specific forms that hierarchy takes. Second, it deduces three sets of hypotheses about hierarchy maintenance, construction, and collapse during the post-war era. By offering a coherent theoretical model of hierarchical politics within weaker states, the author is able to answer a number of important questions, including: Why does the United States often ally with autocratic states even though its most enduring relationships are with democracies? Why do autocratic hierarchical relationships require interstate coercion? Why do some hierarchies end violently and others peacefully? Why does hierarchical competition sometimes lead to interstate conflict and sometimes to civil conflict?