Loss And Redemption At St Vith

Loss and Redemption at St Vith closes a gap in the record of the Battle of the Bulge by recounting the exploits of the 7th Armored Division in a way that no other study has. Most accounts of the Battle of the Bulge give short-shrift to the interval during which the German forward progress stopped and the American counterattack began. This narrative centers on the 7th Armored Division for the entire length of the campaign, in so doing reconsidering the story of the whole battle through the lens of a single division and accounting for the reconstitution of the Division while in combat.

The U.S. 1st Infantry Division (1st ID), familiarly known as the Big Red One, adapted to dynamic battlefield conditions throughout the course of its deployment during World War II by innovating and altering behavior, including tactics, techniques, and procedures. Both the Division’s leaders and soldiers accomplished this by thinking critically about their experiences in combat and wasting little time in putting lessons learned to good use. Simply put, they learned on the job—in battle and after battle—and did so quickly. In telling the Division’s WWII story, which includes an extensive photographic essay featuring many previously unpublished images, Gregory Fontenot includes the stories of individual members of the Big Red One, from high-ranking officers to enlisted men fresh off the streets of Brooklyn, both during and after the conflict. Colonel Fontenot’s rare ability to combine expert analysis with compelling narrative history makes No Sacrifice Too Great an absorbing read for anyone interested in the military history of the United States.

Colonel Pat Proctor’s long overdue critique of the Army’s preparation and outlook in the all-volunteer era focuses on a national security issue that continues to vex in the twenty-first century: Has the Army lost its ability to win strategically by focusing on fighting conventional battles against peer enemies? Or can it adapt to deal with the greater complexity of counterinsurgent and information-age warfare? In this blunt critique of the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, Proctor contends that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Army stubbornly refused to reshape itself in response to the new strategic reality, a decision that saw it struggle through one low-intensity conflict after another—some inconclusive, some tragic—in the 1980s and 1990s, and leaving it largely unprepared when it found itself engaged—seemingly forever—in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first book-length study to connect the failures of these wars to America’s disastrous performance in the war on terror, Proctor’s work serves as an attempt to convince Army leaders to avoid repeating the same mistakes.

When one thinks of influential World War II military figures, five-star generals such as Dwight D. Eisenhower and Omar Bradley instantly come to mind. As important as these central figures were to the Second World War, the conflict produced equally effective lower-profile leaders whose influence had an undeniable impact. Among these leaders are William Simpson, commander of the US Ninth Army, and James Moore, his chief of staff. Working in tandem, the pair helmed a unit that gained recognition as "uncommonly normal," an affectionate designation driven by their steadfast professionalism in all endeavors. It was their unobtrusive leadership style that relegated these career military men to the footnotes of military history. Commanding Professionalism: Simpson, Moore, and the Ninth US Army corrects this historical oversight by examining the achievements of these overlooked heroes. Focusing on Simpson and Moore's careers from 1940 through the end of World War II, author William Stuart Nance recounts the pair's working relationship. Together, they successfully maneuvered through the squabbling of the American and British forces and developed an army admired for its consistency of conduct and military prowess, capable of resisting the complex external and political machinations of the time. Simpson and Moore's unflinching devotion to the greater good and their steady handle on the dynamics of command/staff relationships proved essential to the war effort and its ultimate success. Their example, Nance argues, remains aspirational and worthy of emulation in the military command structure of today.

George S. Patton Jr. lived an exciting life in war and peace, but he is best remembered for his World War II battlefield exploits. Patton’s War: An American General’s Combat Leadership: November 1942–July 1944, the first of three volumes, follows the general from the beaches of Morocco to the fields of France, right before the birth of Third Army on the continent. In highly engaging fashion, Kevin Hymel uncovers new facts and challenges long-held beliefs about the mercurial Patton, not only examining his relationships with his superiors and fellow generals and colonels, but also with the soldiers of all ranks whom he led. Using new sources unavailable to previous historians and through extensive research of soldiers’ memoirs and interviews, Hymel adds a new dimension to the telling of Patton’s WWII story.

General George S. Patton Jr. is one of the most successful yet misunderstood figures in American military history. Despite the many books and articles written about him, none considers in depth how his love of history shaped the course of his life. In this thematic biography, Furman Daniel traces Patton’s obsession with history and argues that it informed and contributed to many of his successes, both on and off the battlefield. Patton deliberately cultivated the image of himself as a warrior from ages past; the more interesting truth is that he was an exceptionally dedicated student of history. He was a hard worker and voracious reader who gave a great deal of thought to how military history might inform his endeavors. Most scholars have overlooked this element of Patton’s character, which Daniel argues is essential to understanding the man’s genius.

This fast-paced and compelling read closes a significant gap in the historiography of the late Cold War U.S. Army and is crucial for understanding the current situation in the Middle East. From the author's introduction: “My purpose is a narrative history of the 1st Infantry Division from 1970 through the Operation Desert Storm celebration held 4th of July 1991. This story is an account of the revolutionary changes in the late Cold War. The Army that overran Saddam Hussein’s Legions in four days was the product of important changes stimulated both by social changes and institutional reform. The 1st Infantry Division reflected benefits of those changes, despite its low priority for troops and material. The Division was not an elite formation, but rather excelled in the context of the Army as an institution.” This book begins with a preface by Gordon R. Sullivan, General, USA, Retired. In twelve chapters, author Gregory Fontenot explains the history of the 1st infantry Division from 1970 to 1991. In doing so, his fast-paced narrative includes elements to expand the knowledge of non-military readers. These elements include a glossary, a key to abbreviations, maps, nearly two dozen photographs, and thorough bibliography. The First infantry Division and the U.S. Army Transformed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm is published with support from the First Division Museum at Cantigny.

A gripping and authoritative revisionist account of the German Winter Campaign of 1941–1942 Germany’s winter campaign of 1941–1942 is commonly seen as its first defeat. In Retreat from Moscow, a bold, gripping account of one of the seminal moments of World War II, David Stahel argues that instead it was its first strategic success in the East. The Soviet counteroffensive was in fact a Pyrrhic victory. Despite being pushed back from Moscow, the Wehrmacht lost far fewer men, frustrated its enemy’s strategy, and emerged in the spring unbroken and poised to recapture the initiative. Hitler’s strategic plan called for holding important Russian industrial cities, and the German army succeeded. The Soviets as of January 1942 aimed for nothing less than the destruction of Army Group Center, yet not a single German unit was ever destroyed. Lacking the professionalism, training, and experience of the Wehrmacht, the Red Army’s offensive attempting to break German lines in countless head-on assaults led to far more tactical defeats than victories. Using accounts from journals, memoirs, and wartime correspondence, Stahel takes us directly into the Wolf’s Lair to reveal a German command at war with itself as generals on the ground fought to maintain order and save their troops in the face of Hitler’s capricious, increasingly irrational directives. Excerpts from soldiers’ diaries and letters home paint a rich portrait of life and death on the front, where the men of the Ostheer battled frostbite nearly as deadly as Soviet artillery. With this latest installment of his pathbreaking series on the Eastern Front, David Stahel completes a military history of the highest order.