Macarthur S Ultra

Cracking the enemy's radio code is a task so urgent and so difficult that it demands the military's best minds and most sophisticated technology. But when the coded messages are in a language as complex as Japanese, decoding problems multiply dramatically.

On May 8, 1945, Victory in Europe Day-shortened to "V.E. Day"-brought with it the demise of Nazi Germany. But for the Allies, the war was only half-won. Exhausted but exuberant American soldiers, ready to return home, were sent to join the fighting in the Pacific, which by the spring and summer of 1945 had turned into a gruelling campaign of bloody attrition against an enemy determined to fight to the last man. Germany had surrendered unconditionally. The Japanese would clearly make the conditions of victory extraordinarily high. In the United States, Americans clamored for their troops to come home and for a return to a peacetime economy. Politics intruded upon military policy while a new and untested president struggled to strategize among a military command that was often mired in rivalry. The task of defeating the Japanese seemed nearly unsurmountable, even while plans to invade the home islands were being drawn. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall warned of the toll that "the agony of enduring battle" would likely take. General Douglas MacArthur clashed with Marshall and Admiral Nimitz over the most effective way to defeat the increasingly resilient Japanese combatants. In the midst of this division, the Army began a program of partial demobilization of troops in Europe, which depleted units at a time when they most needed experienced soldiers. In this context of military emergency, the fearsome projections of the human cost of invading the Japanese homeland, and weakening social and political will, victory was salvaged by means of a horrific new weapon. As one Army staff officer admitted, "The capitulation of Hirohito saved our necks." In Implacable Foes, award-winning historians Waldo Heinrichs (a veteran of both theatres of war in World War II) and Marc Gallicchio bring to life the final year of World War Two in the Pacific right up to the dropping of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, evoking not only Japanese policies of desperate defense, but the sometimes rancorous debates on the home front. They deliver a gripping and provocative narrative that challenges the decision-making of U.S. leaders and delineates the consequences of prioritizing the European front. The result is a masterly work of military history that evaluates the nearly insurmountable trials associated with waging global war and the sacrifices necessary to succeed.

Examines the role of signals intelligence in U.S. military planning during the final stages of the war with Japan in 1945 -- particularly its contribution to planning for an Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland. It is not intended as an argument for or against the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. Addresses the question of whether & to what extent intelligence might have influenced the decision to drop the bomb, & the military calculus concerning an invasion of Japan as it influenced the bomb decision. Examines the intelligence that was available at the time & to weigh the role this intelligence played in the deliberations on an invasion.

They were the forgotten commanders of World War II. While the names of Bradley and Patton became household words for Americans, few could identify Krueger or Eichelberger. They served under General Douglas MacArthur, a military genius with an enormous ego who dominated publicity from the Southwest Pacific during the American advance from Australia, through New Guinea, to the Philippines. While people at home read about the great victories that were won by "MacArthur's navy" and "MacArthur's air force," his subordinates labored in obscurity, fearful lest attention from the press lead to their replacement. Historians too have paid little attention to the men who fought so well in the far reaches of the Pacific, and not a single biography has appeared in the decades since V-J Day. Yet General Blamey played a key role in the early battles of New Guinea. Generals Krueger and Eichelberger led American armies to major victories over the Japanese. General Kenney was one of the foremost air strategists of the war, while few airmen could match General Whitehead's tactical brilliance. Admiral Kinkaid took a crucial part in one of the greatest naval engagements in history. Admiral Barbey was an acknowledged master of amphibious warfare. We Shall Return! addresses a serious shortcoming in the literature of World War II. Revealed for the first time is the full extent of the contributions made by MacArthur's commanders to the defeat of the Japanese. As the authors of these essays so ably demonstrate, many of MacArthur's bold decisions and innovative tactics were urged upon him by his subordinates. Clearly, these men deserve more credit for his successes than they have received.

A fighter pilot who flew 75 combat missions in World War I, George C. Kenney was a charismatic leader who established himself as an innovative advocate of air power. As General MacArthur's air commander in the Southwest Pacific during World War II, Kenney played a pivotal role in the conduct of the war, but until now his performance has remained largely unexplored. Thomas Griffith offers a critical assessment of Kenney's numerous contributions to MacArthur's war efforts. He depicts Kenney as a staunch proponent of airpower's ability to shape the outcome of military engagements and a commander who shared MacArthur's strategic vision. He tells how Kenney played a key role in campaigns from New Guinea to the Philippines; adapted aircraft, pilots, doctrine, and technology to the demands of aerial warfare in the southwest Pacific; and pursued daring strategies that likely would have failed in the European theater. Kenney is shown to have been an operational and organizational innovator who was willing to scrap doctrine when the situation called for ingenuity, such as shifting to low-level attacks for more effective bombing raids. Griffith tells how Kenney established air superiority in every engagement, provided close air support for troops by bombing enemy supply lines, attacked and destroyed Japanese supply ships, and carried out rapid deployment by airlifting troops and supplies. Griffith draws on Kenney's diary and correspondence, the personal papers of other officers, and previously untapped sources to present a comprehensive portrayal of both the officer and the man. He illuminates Kenney's relationship with MacArthur, General "Hap" Arnold, and other field commanders, and closely examines factors in air warfare often neglected in other accounts, such as intelligence, training, and logistical support. MacArthur's Airman is a rich and insightful study that shows how air, ground, and marine efforts were integrated to achieve major strategic objectives. It firmly establishes the importance of MacArthur's campaign in New Guinea and reveals Kenney's instrumental role in turning the tide against the Japanese.

In 1974 Frederick W. Winterbotham's book The Ultra Secret disclosed the Allied success in breaking the German high command ciphers in World War II, and a new form of history began—the study of intelligence and its impact on military operations and international politics. This guide documents and annotates over 800 sources that have appeared in the past 20 years. It examines and evaluates primary and secondary sources dealing with the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also covers sources on the Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers. The book examines and annotates primary and secondary sources on the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also provides details on sources concerned with Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers.