Macroeconomic Policy Credibility And Politics

Uses a game theoretic approach to explore which economic policies are 'credible' and 'politically feasible', questions that had eluded traditional macroeconomic approaches.

First published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This is the first of two volumes on a theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible. Instead of looking at policy as an end product, the contributors approach policy as an ongoing process of revised goals, changes in tactics, and political pressures. They consider what kinds of incentives within different institutional settings, drive policy-making and the behaviour of policy-makers. The approach explains why certain monetary and fiscal policies are implemented, and provides insights into situations that occur repeatedly in macroeconomic policy, such as the bias toward government deficits, partisan competition and central bank independence.

The results of macroeconomic policy are often unpredictable. One of the major reasons for this is the importance of confidence and expectations in economic affairs. Confidence, Credibility and Macroeconomic Policy explores this interaction between confidence and expectations, and the credibility of the government's financial policies. The volume is divided into three parts. * An overview of the inter-relationship between fiscal policy, credibility and inflation * Empirical research on the importance of public confidence and expectations to the success of fiscal and monetary policy. * The definition and functions of consumer confidence as it is measured today. Confidence, Credibility and Macroeconomic Policy will be an invaluable guide for all those interested in macroeconomic policy.

Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker, and the role of tough policies in signalling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a policy is carried out, however, will also reflect the state of the economy. We present a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in unemployment, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. We test this implication on data for the interest rate differential between France and Germany and find support for our hypothesis.