Maimonides On God And Duns Scotus On Logic And Metaphysics Volume 12

Moses Maimonides and John Duns Scotus are key figures as regards the thirteenth-century philosophical tradition that developed out of the Western Christian reception of the Neo-Platonized Aristotelianism of Islamic and Jewish thinkers. Whereas the writings of Maimonides count among the received works that inaugurate and shape this span, the variety of conceptual instruments developed by Scotus arguably signal its end, preparing the way for the emergence of diverse fourteenth-century philosophical worldviews. Maimonides on God and Duns Scotus on Logic and Metaphysics explores the eponymous thinkers’ work across a variety of fields. In the domain of natural theology, Maimonides presses for creation de novo, adapting from the Islamic Kalām tradition what has come to be known as the Argument from Particularity, which deduces intelligent design when science seems, in principle, unable to account for states of affairs that conceivably needn’t obtain (to take an example from modern physics, the strength of the four fundamental forces). Part one of this volume contrasts Maimonides’s and Aquinas’s parallel treatments of this and other proof strategies still employed by contemporary philosophers. Part two, on Scotus, includes discussion of the authenticity of the logical writings attributed to him, the evolution of his thought in this field against the backdrop of various thirteenth-century developments, the types of Aristotelian universals theorized by Scotus, his semantics of theological discourse and ontology of possible entities.

This volume considers the contemporary relevance of Aquinas’ thought and what parameters should influence its reception. It discusses the reception of Aquinas on creation ex nihilo and offers guidelines for reception in the fields of metaphysics and natural theology. Chapters on physics and philosophy of mind intersect with key modern debates. Contributions interpret Aquinas’ physics in light of contemporary findings and discuss his account of human self-awareness.

This volume considers the Aristotelian virtue-ethics tradition as it develops in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Part One studies the types of virtues Aquinas believes are held by Christians in a state of grace. Aquinas’s intriguing account is apparently fraught with inconsistencies, which have split contemporary interpreters over not only how to understand Aquinas on this matter, but also as to whether it is even possible to provide a consistent interpretation of his doctrine. This book brings together scholarship that reflects the various sides of the debate. Part Two explores a Thomistic synthesis regarding Aquinas’s account of the good as telos or end that emerges in the seventeenth century, as well as what promise his virtue ethics holds today, arguing that Aquinas’ hylomorphic understanding of human beings as matter-form composites furnishes a robust moral accounting that seems unavailable to alternative, reductive materialist accounts.

One of the most debated topics in medieval philosophy was the metaphysics of identity—that is, what accounts for the distinctness (non-identity) of different individuals of the same, specific kind and the persistence (self-identity) of the same individuals over time and in different possible situations, especially with regard to individuals of our specific kind, namely, human persons. The first three papers of this volume investigate the comparative development of positions. One problem, considered by William of Auvergne and Albert the Great, deals with Aristotle’s doctrine of the active intellect and its relation to Christian philosophical conceptions of personhood. A larger set of issues on the nature and post-mortem fate of human beings is highlighted as common inquiry among Muslim philosophers and Thomas Aquinas, as well as Aquinas and the modern thinker John Locke. Finally, the last two papers offer a debate over Aquinas’s exact views regarding whether substances persist identically across metaphysical “gaps” (periods of non-existence), either by nature or divine power.

This author-meets-critics volume about Robert Pasnau’s After Certainty treats the history of epistemology, from Aristotle to the present. Pasnau presents this history as a gradual lowering of expectations regarding certain knowledge, the culmination of a sea change dating to the early-modern rejection of Aristotelian essentialism. The result, he concludes, is that contemporary epistemology is, more than any other branch of philosophy, estranged from its tradition. Pasnau’s After Certainty draws conclusions that are not just historical, but also systematic, an effort that led to a 2018 Parisian symposium to evaluate the text, collected here as a volume that stands alone as an intriguing work on the history of epistemology or together with After Certainty as an invaluable companion piece.

Mereology is the metaphysical theory of parts and wholes, including their conditions of identity and persistence through change. Hylomorphism is the metaphysical doctrine according to which all natural substances, including living organisms, consist of matter and form as their essential parts, where the substantial form of living organisms is identified as their soul. The theories date to Plato and Aristotle and figure prominently in the history of philosophy up until the seventeenth century, where their influence wanes relative to a reductive materialism that culminates with deflationary accounts of objects and persons, where mere conglomerates constitute things and we are left to account for mental phenomena in terms of the powers of physical materials. In view of such difficulties, there is a renewed interest in hylomorphism, as its forms structure matter and can account for natural kinds, with their various capacities and powers. This volume presents medieval theories of hylomorphism and mereology, articulating the conceptual framework in which they developed and with an eye on their relevance today.

Contemporary introductions to the theme of self-knowledge too often trace its emergence in the history of philosophy to thinkers such as René Descartes and David Hume. Whereas Descartes conceives of self-knowledge as intimate and first-personal, Hume contends that it is limited to our awareness of our impressions and ideas. In point of fact, self-knowledge is a perennial theme. We may, for instance, trace the lineage of Hume and Descartes on these matters to Aristotle and Plato, respectively. This volume studies philosophical treatments of self-knowledge in the Medieval Latin West. It comprises two sets of papers; the first is taken from an author-meets-critics session on Therese Scarpelli-Cory’s Aquinas on Human Self Knowledge, which advances the thesis that Aquinas’s theory of self-knowledge wherein the intellect grasps itself in its activity bridges the divide between mediated and first-personal self-knowledge. The second set of papers discuss self-knowledge in terms of self-fulfilment. Authors look to Aquinas’s account of how we can know when we have acquired the virtues necessary for human happiness, as well as the medieval traditions of mysticism and theology, which offer accounts of transformative self-knowledge, the fulfilment that this brings to our emotional and physical selves, and the authority to teach and counsel about what this awareness confers.

Since the first decade of the 14th Century, Thomas Aquinas’s disciples have struggled to explain and defend his doctrine of analogy. Analogy after Aquinas: Logical Problems, Thomistic Answers relates a history of prominent Medieval and Renaissance Thomists’ efforts to solve three distinct but interrelated problems arising from their reading both of Aquinas’s own texts on analogy, and from John Duns Scotus’s arguments against analogy and in favor of univocity in Metaphysics and Natural Theology. The first of these three problems concerns Aquinas’s at least apparently disparate statements on whether a name is said by analogy through a single concept or through diverse concepts. The second problem concerns the model of analogy suited for predicating names analogously across the categories of being or about God and creatures. Is “being” said analogously about God and creatures, or substance and accidents, on the model of how “healthy” is said of medicine and an animal, or on the model of how “principle” is said of a point and a line? The third problem comes from outside challenges to Aquinas’s thought, in particular Scotus’ claims that univocal names alone can mediate valid demonstrations, and any demonstration that failed to use its mediating terms univocally would fail by the fallacy of equivocation. Analogy after Aquinas makes a unique contribution to the study of philosophical theology in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas by showing the historical and philosophical connection between these three problems, as well as the variety of solutions proposed by leading representatives of this tradition. Thomists considered in the book include: Hervaeus Natalis (1250-1323), Thomas Sutton (1250-1315), John Capreolus (1380-1444), Dominic of Flanders (1425-1479), Paul Soncinas (d. 1494), Thomas dio vio Cajetan (1469-1534), Francis Silvestri of Ferrara (1474-1528), and Chrysostom Javelli (1470-1538).