Manstein

From the preeminent British military strategist comes this riveting biography of Manstein, Hitler's most controversial general. Among students of military history, the genius of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (1887–1973) is respected perhaps more than that of any other World War II soldier. He displayed his strategic brilliance in such campaigns as the invasion of Poland, the Blitzkrieg of France, the sieges of Sevastopol, Leningrad, and Stalingrad, and the battles of Kharkov and Kursk. Manstein also stands as one of the war's most enigmatic and controversial figures. To some, he was a leading proponent of the Nazi regime and a symbol of the moral corruption of the Wehrmacht. Yet he also disobeyed Hitler, who dismissed his leading Field Marshal over this incident, and has been suspected by some of conspiring against the Führer. Sentenced to eighteen years by a British war tribunal at Hamburg in 1949, Manstein was released in 1953 and went on to advise the West German government in founding its new army within NATO. Military historian and strategist Mungo Melvin combines his research in German military archives and battlefield records with unprecedented access to family archives to get to the truth of Manstein's life and deliver this definitive biography of the man and his career.

A selection of the Military Book Club: An “informative and objective” biography of a genius commander and a study of his loyalty to the Nazi cause (Library Journal). To many close students of World War II, Erich von Manstein is considered the greatest commander of the war, if not the entire twentieth century. He devised the plan that conquered France in 1940 and led an infantry corps in that campaign. At the head of a panzer corps, he reached the gates of Leningrad in 1941, then took command of 11th Army and conquered Sevastopol and the Crimea. After destroying another Soviet army in the north, he was given command of the ad hoc Army Group Don to retrieve the German calamity at Stalingrad, whereupon he launched a counteroffensive that, against all odds, restored the German front. Afterward, he commanded Army Group South, nearly crushing the Soviets at Kursk, and then skillfully resisted their relentless attacks as he traded territory for coherence in the East. Though an undoubtedly brilliant military leader—whose achievements, considering the forces at his disposal, rivaled of Patton, Rommel, MacArthur, and Montgomery—surprisingly little is known about Manstein himself, save for his own memoir and the accolades of his contemporaries. In this book, we finally have a full portrait of the man, including his campaigns, and an analysis of what precisely kept a genius like Manstein harnessed to such a dark cause. A great military figure, but a man who lacked a sharp political sense, Manstein was very much representative of the Germano-Prussian military caste of his time. Though Hitler was uneasy about the influence he’d gained throughout the German Army, Manstein ultimately declined to join any clandestine plots against his Führer, believing they would simply cause chaos, the one thing he abhorred. Though he constantly opposed Hitler on operational details, he considered it a point of loyalty to simply stand with the German state, in whatever form. Though not bereft of personal opinions, his primary allegiances were, first, to Deutschland and, second, to the soldiers under his command, who’d been committed against an enemy many times their strength. It is thus through Manstein that the attitudes of other high-ranking officers who fought during the Second World War, particularly on the Eastern Front, can be illuminated. This book is a “well-researched, convincingly reasoned analysis of a general widely considered one of WWII’s great commanders” (Publishers Weekly). Includes photographs.

Most military historians are in agreement that Feldmarschall Erich von Manstein was the most outstanding German high commander of the Second World War. Many view him as the foremost exponent of large-scale mobile operations in any of the Second World War armies. Surprisingly, no biography of him has yet been written. To this day, his family refuses to release the papers of his estate to the German military archives at Freiburg. Furthermore the contradictions in the personality of von Manstein make it difficult to generate a synthesis. On one side there is an extraordinary military talent, on the other many political and moral aspects. His military achievements stand in sharp contrast to his inhumane policy of occupation in Russia, his active participation in the slaughter of Jews in Southern Ukraine and the Crimea and his ambivalent attitude to the military resistance movement. These contradictions have led the author to describe Manstein as the Janushead - the term chosen for the title of the book. He has not written a traditional biography but a portrait. A complete account of all phases of Mansteins career is given in one chapter, seven more chapters deal extensively with milestones in Mansteins career: his successful plan for the battle of France which led to the defeat of the French Army in less than one month, his dereliction of duty during the battle for Stalingrad, his hubris which led to the disaster of the battle for Kursk, his refusal to take part in the military resistance movement, his compliance with the Commissar order and his involvement in the Holocaust. he author has widened the subject well beyond the personality of its central figure. It shows how the Nazi system, step by step, succeeded in perverting the centuries-old traditions of the Prussian and German officer corps.

Covers a pivotal but largely neglected period on the Eastern Front Focuses on German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, one of the best commanders of World War II After the Soviets trapped German forces in Stalingrad, the Germans regrouped under Erich von Manstein, who orchestrated a dramatic reversal of fortune during the winter of 1942-43, enabling Germany to continue fighting for two more years.

Erich von Manstein was one of the most successful German commanders of World War II. His military mind proved outstanding in many a conflict but perhaps his greatest triumph was his ingenious operational plan that led to the rapid defeat of France in May 1940. Manstein also showed great skill under adversity by commanding a furious rebuff to the Soviet armies in 1943, whilst Germany were retreating. However, his skill could not reverse Germany's declining fortunes and Manstein's frequent disagreement's with Hitler over military strategy led to his dismissal. Robert Forczyk tells the story of one of Germany's most valuable military talents, from his early years to his post- war conviction and his later career.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze selected campaigns/operations of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein in order to draw lessons from those campaigns as they relate to command, control, communications (C3) and logistics — subjects of immediate and relevant interest to those who take up the profession of arms. But all too often, histories of battles, campaigns and entire conflicts neglect the treatment of these areas. And when these factors are dealt with, the treatment they receive is likely to be rather shallow, lacking the depth necessary for the student to analyze these factors/functions as they related to overall success or failure. This analysis will be conducted of specific, delineated functions as they relate to C3, but owing to the far reaching scope of logistics, this paper will be limited to treating a few critical aspects of logistics as they impacted on the campaigns of Manstein and the German Army. The second chapter will introduce Manstein to the reader and highlight his accomplishments. Chapter III will deal with C3 functions as they related, supported or were used by Manstein, and the fourth chapter will deal with key logistics issues as they influenced/impacted the campaigns of Manstein. The final chapter will present some conclusions and broad lessons derived from the German experience in general.

This study is a historical analysis of the campaign waged by Field Marshal von Manstein on the Russian southern front during the winter 1942-43. The study begins just after the 6th Army’s encirclement in Stalingrad and describes the four principal phases of Manstein’s campaign: the attempted relief of the 6th Army; the protection of Army Group A as it disengaged from the Caucasus; the prevention of Manstein’s lines of communications from being cut; and the counterblow to regain the initiative. The lessons learned from the campaign provide a perspective of battle at the operational level of war. The factors leading to Manstein’s success are discussed and include: superior generalship at the operational level; superior tactical maturity of the Germans; and German tactical and operational agility. The study describes the transition from the operational defensive to the operational offensive and how a defender can have the initiative. Manstein’s use of depth is explained. The concepts of center of gravity and operational art as they pertain to this campaign are also described. The study concludes with the implications of the lessons learned for a NATO-Soviet conflict in a central European scenario. The study points out that Manstein demonstrated that victory is possible even when forced to react to the enemy’s plan. The ability of NATO to replicate, today, the agility of Manstein’s forces and the synchronization achieved by his commanders is questioned. The implications of NATO’s lack of operational depth, in contrast to Manstein, are described. The impact of changes in force design since World War II are also explained.

In the 1990s the United States Armed Forces will be asked by its leaders to do more with less. This represents a significant turn from the policies of the last decade. During World War Two the German Army operated effectively under similar policy constraints. There are many lessons in strategic planning that can be learned from Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s operations during the Winter of 1942-43. He was able to grasp tremendous opportunity amid extreme strategic danger. He decisively changed the strategic situation on the Eastern Front over a four month period. This thesis addresses the following questions. What factors enabled him to operate so effectively? What hindered him? What decisions did he make, when and why? How might leaders today make similar decisions under similar circumstances and be as successful? The answers to these questions will be of great value to the United States Armed Forces as they restructure themselves for the 1990s.